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CONTENTS. PAGE.

I.—Reason and Religion : H. D. Bhattacharyya 1
II.—Kumarila's Conception of Soul : Janakivallabh Samkhyatirtha, M. A. 30
III—The Rational basis of Advaitism : T. R. V. Murti M. A. Vedanta Sastri. 57

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THE
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Reason and Religion.*

H. D. BHATTACHARYYA

Dacca University.

Religious literature has always been faced with the task of pleasing two masters, namely, devout minds and speculative thinkers. The first class is prone to mysticism and disbelieves in the possibility of understanding man's relation to the supersensible in the same way as his relations to the finite facts and events of the empirical world. Devotion uses modes of expression which baffle the comprehension of ordinary thought. The heart speaks a language which the head struggles in vain to understand. Devotion speaks with conviction and holds on to certainties. It derives its forceful appeal from the immediacy of its vision and it has a daring that can come only from unassailable firmness of belief. The prophet, the seer and the mystic are arrogant and dictatorial in their utterances as befit men to whom the sublimest truths of existence have been revealed. There is fire in their speech and eloquence in their tongue and they expect the world to hear and to obey. Have they not known "the mighty Person of sunlike lustre beyond darkness—the Person by knowing whom one passes over death"? Therefore, their "verses go forth like suns upon their course and all the sons of the immortal listen—even those who ascended to heavenly stations" (Śvetāśvatara Upan., ii.5). Vested interests have trembled in awe and authority has nodded uneasily its crowned head at their fierce onslaughts. Social abuses and sanctimonious practices have alike been blown away by the fury of their jeremiads. The world has very often failed to fathom the etiology of their strength, but it has seldom escaped the impact of their violence. They have challenged creeds and customs and produced divine credentials for their conduct. In the same proportion as they have been submissive to divine will and passive to divine inspiration they have been aggressive in their social attitude and peremptory in their commands to the world at large.

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*Presidential Address to the Philosophy of Religion Section, Fifth Indian Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1929.

Being rooted in an initial certainty, devotion knows no wavering. The storms and tribulations of the world do not give faith any shaking: they are welcomed as divine tests. Joys and sorrows are equally the gifts of God and lead to the same conclusion, namely, that God is present in both. They are not used as premises to establish contradictory conclusions about the nature and existence of God; they are regarded as conclusions following from the inscrutable ways of Providence in the world. The primary certainty of immediate knowledge is not affected by apparent contradictions in experience: faith is strong enough to overcome doubt and incredulity. What is unclear is shoved on to the side of human knowledge: how can the weak human intellect dare to understand the intricate ways of God? Man's reason is not the measure of divine operation, and the mysterious ways of Providence totally ignore and baffle human calculations. Prophecies and prodigies, miracles and mysteries, have always been a stumbling block to the learned. What frail vessels has God chosen all through history to make His will known among mankind and how often has the world learnt its wisdom from babes and sucklings! Is not abject submission to the will of such a God justified of His children? Should they not humbly admit that the spirit of God bloweth where it listeth and that it is not for them to question or to murmur?

But how many are so emotionally related to the world that they would stem the rising tide of reason that chafes and frets to be told that transcendental wisdom and empirical knowledge are separated by the whole diameter of being and that it is futile to attempt a reconciliation? To those rationally inclined, an acquiescence in such a position is indistinguishable from intellectual indolence, if not dishonesty, and an abjuration of the right to think coherently on all matters. Does man live in two such radically distinct realms that the laws governing them are absolutely incommensurable? How can man ever transcend his proper nature and, in the absence of all earthly analogy, have unquestioning faith in the unseen? He can much sooner outstrip his own shadow than leave all ordinary logic behind. Not by transcending, much less by contradicting, reason is man able to fix his relation to the supersensible. Such a step is no wiser than the resolve of a navigator to cross the vasty deep without the help of any chart or compass. The one sure mooring of life is reason: to drift away from it is to expose oneself to the vagaries of sudden squalls and the mercies of heaving seas. How often has charlatanism passed for revelation and the world duped by the impetuosities of false prophets! What misunderstanding, what difference, what dissension and suffering have been caused in the name of religion! By shutting reason out of religion, or at least by curtailing its function and scope, men have deliberately refused to come to terms and made themselves the veritable mouthpiece, not of eternal truths, but of passing fancies, transient passions and chance desires. What wearisome formalities and lifeless creeds have the religions of mankind sheltered behind the entrenchment of revelation! Like noxious weeds thriving in a well fenced enclosure, these unmeaning and soulless fancies have been withdrawn from the struggles of existence and managed to survive unchanged through the centuries like some primeval fauna. What a curious museum of ancient beliefs, crude superstitions, popular cults and mystic faiths every religion is! How strenuously have all faiths resisted the intrusion of critical reason and scientific knowledge! It reminds one of the close and dingy sanctuaries of some Hindu temples where modern scientific inventions are not wanted to dispel the gloom and oppressive heat. If one were inclined to study the relics of ancient thought and conduct, one cannot turn to a more fruitful source than institutional religions. Here the advancing tide of rationalism has been bidden to halt or else to be harnessed in the interest of faith. Where pontifical authority is still a potent force, whether that authority is wielded by a supreme vicar or a host of lesser potentates, a periodical encyclical may prohibit the tampering of revelation by reason and condemn the faithful to a lifelong antediluvianism in culture.

Reason refuses to speak the langnage of such devotion in two cardinal matters. It refuses to acknowledge the infallibility of any revelational utterance or to admit that it is an unalterable verity. It prefers to treat each institutional religion as an essentially human document, sharing in the imperfections of the age, taking on the colouring of environmental traditions and vitiated by the personal idiosyncrasies of the promulgator. To it each scripture is an historic document, having a preponderating validity in its own time and place but destined in course of time to be outworn in some respects and in the long run to be superseded by another more adequate to the needs of a future time. In its eyes, religion represents the culmination of personal culture. It cannot, therefore, remain unaffected by the new experiences which the rolling time brings inevitably in its train in almost every field of knowledge. It takes cognizance of the latest marvels of science and the newest spiritual values revealed to thought. Rational religion has its face, and not its back, turned towards the future; and while it may be prepared to admit the formal validity of institutional faiths and to conserve elements thereof that are of abiding worth, it refuses to assent to their material validity for all times. Incidentally, therefore, it has to uphold a theory of divine relation to man and the world more in consonance with the advancing culture of the human race, and this constitutes a fundamental point of difference from the devotional attitude.

Devotion is prone to mysticism and has a tendency to ignore variety and change. Personal communion with God need not necessarily take other human beings into consideration, as again and again in history has it thrived equally well on religious selfishness. Nor need it examine critically the working of Providence in Nature: as Hegel pointed out, by a simple admission that all is God it may dismiss all further consideration of divine operation and quietly proceed with the act of personal identification with or immersion in, the Infinite. This is the danger of devotionalism: to it the hum and bustle of existence does not essentially matter. Detachment and dispassion are writ large on its face, and an exclusive pre-occupation with the self has a tendency to engender anti-socialism and indifferentism, which are both fatal to social service and diffusion of spiritual culture.

That it has not invariably done so is due to the fact that men are not always or essentially logical in their conduct.

Even the sceptic has his lapses and the devotional man his concessions to the obstinacy of objective facts. Faith that can thrive without any scripture and creed that rears itself on a particular revelation both find themselves forced to recognise the presence of reason in man, and when they do not make a legitimate use of that faculty they make an improper use of it by pressing it into service of illogical faith and outworn creed. It is the tragedy of all faiths that in spite of themselves they become infected with scepticism and doubt in course of time. What expedients do they not adopt to keep up a show of constancy! Refusal to think, allegorising, interpretation, confession of inability to think transcendentally have all been tried to keep faith unassailed. And yet the still small voice, that speaks with an authority higher than that of any outside power and of conscious rationalisation, dins into the ear the uncomfortable truth that, in spite of these aide and precautions, faith is dissolving slowly and the moving world is calling for fresher understanding and broader sympathy. The heroic consistency of shutting oneself in a cave, cloister or cell, or of immuring oneself for life, or of retiring into the forest to meet God in the solitude of one's heart, though once largely practised, is now a discarded method of finding God — a God into whose world no one can enter without social co-operation nor live a day without social sympathy. The impact of cultures, again, has rendered spiritual isolation in any civilised society a marvel and an impossibility, and when the press and the platform are busy disseminating the latest scientific discoveries and the results of critical studies of scriptures, and education is largely in profane hands, it is difficult for a well read man to escape contamination by free thinkers in spite of all priestly injunctions and ecclesiastical precautions. Hence, from age to age the warfare of faith and reason is re-enacted in all civilised countries when a considerable mass of new experience accumulates and waits for synthesis with old beliefs; and this is bound to recur from the necessity of the case as faith cannot be entirely rationalised and reason cannot be effectively silenced.

Reason tries, first of all, to establish that the enigmatical wisdom of mysticism may be due to laziness or inability to think strenuously. God has ever been the refuge not only of those who want to abjure the world but also of those who refuse to think. To drop plump into the abyss of the Infinite by binding the hands and feet of the thought that differentiates, – whether that condition is achieved by mystic vision or narcotic draught or cataleptic fit or even sexual orgy, – to feel one's being dissolve back into the Infinite, where the torments, responsibilities and contradictions of life do not reach, is an exhilarating experience to many natures, and scriptures are not wanting that extol the earthly analogues of such condition, e. g. falling asleep, as beatitude in disguise. For a similar reason austerities that emaciate the body and cloud the brain have never lacked ardent advocates in any age. This pantheistic absorption this mystic calm, has ever been the anathema of reason; for while it professes to annul the separation between God and man, it takes no account of the objective world or of the process by which, over against the sole reality of the Infinite, an illusory plurality, destined in the long run to be re-absorbed, ever came to be posited. Reason is equally interested in both procession and absorption, and refuses to admit that by simply branding plurality and change as illusory they can be either effectively got rid of or adequately explained. It stakes it all on the reality of the many and, when ethically imbued, insists on man's fulfilling his social obligations and otherwise bearing the cross of finitude. It sees an equal danger in the merely intellectualistic attitude which thinks that the function of religion is fulfilled by somehow understanding the world-process without finding at the same time an adequate basis for the sense of obligation to further the scientific, aesthetic, moral and spiritual interests of life. It thus fights against mysticism on the one hand and cold intellectualism on the other.

A difficult task that reason imposes on itself is to make divine relation to the world intelligible to ordinary minds. There is an obvious danger in this precedure – a danger so ably pointed out by Hegel in his denunciation of the function of Understanding in religion. That danger is that we may be tempted to ignore the truth that all mysticism embodies, namely, that there is an element of mystery or incomprehensibility in the relation of the finite and the Infinite and that you cannot treat God as you treat your neighbour or delve fully into the workings of His will and intelligence, howsoever anthropomorphic your view might be. Mysticism overstated the inscrutability of God when it signified its knowledge of Him by an attitude of silence or else by a juxtaposition of contradictory attributes. But reason stands equally baffled, unless it denies the existence of God altogether, when it tries to understand the nature and function of a God who is as much responsible for creating the good, the beautiful and the rational as for permitting the bad, the ugly and the absurd. No wonder that those to whom the infallibility of reason is a cardinal creed have preferred to declare themselves as agnostics—whether religiously so or atheistically !

In fact, the attempt to understand the working of Providence may have a number of alternative results. We may, first of also, think that the Infinite works in pretty much the same way as the finite does ; possesses almost the same qualities as the latter, though on a grander scale ; reciprocates human feelings ; and is in all ways a being with whom it is possible to deal confidently by means of thought, emotion and conduct. The attitude of the positive religions (especially in their primitive interpretations) mostly coincides with this position. Through anger and love, mercy and pity, justice and benevolence, power and foresight, God is ruling His creation. You can please Him by worship and prayer, and displease Him by iniquity and insubordination. He makes His will known through natural phenomena and human conscience, through miracles and prophetic revelation. You can even form a tentative picture of the way in which He created the world and how He would deal with it in case the iniquity of the world invites its own doom. You can picture the pleasures He has reserved for the faithful in Heaven (and of the Heaven itself you can give topographical details) and the punishments He metes out to the recalcitrant in Hell. In short, there is very little of Him that the human mind is unable to picture or conceive even though He is infinite, eternal and absolute. The position of simple faith is not much different from this type of rational attitude which is dominated not by abstract thinking but by pictorial imagination. The logical outcome of such a position is anthropomorphism, if not idolatry, as can be easily seen by a reference to early Jewish thought and to Hinduism through the ages. Speculative theology has been obliged to treat much of popular religion as merely symbolic—a parable, as it were, meant for the easy understanding of popular minds, and has time and again sounded its note of warning against all empiric modes of thinking in relation to the Deity and a too literal interpretation of scriptural descriptions. The tendency to lapse into the popular mode of thinking is so strong that even pure monotheistic faiths have been faced with the danger of idolatry in some form or other at all times and, but for prophetic and puritanic denunciations, would have been swamped by the latter as the easiest method of conceiving the Deity.

A rational justification for the popular procedure has been found in the argument that if God is to be understood and described at all, He must be invested with the highest attributes revealed to human experience, even though the lower forms of existence equally owe their origin to Him. Whether due to a constitutional bias or to right reasoning, man is incapable of thinking any qualities which are superior to his own spiritual attributes; and so he ascribes to God attributes which are the same as, or similar to, his own highest qualities Thus, a God who is constructed in the image of man but who is freed from the spatial, temporal, dynamic and spiritual limitations of humanity has the highest appeal to our minds and commands the greatest reverence. We confide in Him our hopes and aspirations, we fear His wrath and anticipate His justice, we pray for His mercy and appreciate His grace, we turn to Him for succour on earth and salvation in Heaven, we adore His greatness and marvel at His wisdom, we offer Him our grateful thanks and obediently carry out His orders, we worship Him for His goodness and love Him for His benignity. It is indeed true that our social, political and personal needs of the moment very often decide what particular attribute of God should have the greatest appeal to our mind. Think, for instance, of the successive stages through which the Lord of Hosts, of whose powerful help against the Egyptians, the Canaanites and the Assyrians the early Jews were so much in need, was transformed into the Father in Heaven whom Jesus preached; or of the mighty deities whose aid the Vedic seers invoked, into the familiar friend of the cowherds in the cult of Krishna. We always want to be on good terms with God, and unless we bring Him, nearer to us in quality, space and relationship—"domesticate" Him, to use the expressive word of L. P. Jacks,—the feeling of constraint and of fear born of remoteness and strangeness is bound to persist. We, therefore, palliate the deity not only by offerings and prayers but also by ignoring the terrible side of His nature (which we generally reserve for frightening our enemies). Was not Rudra the terrible dubbed Siva the benignant in later Indian speculations ! We throw ourselves into the position of a son or a servant, to which the only logical Divine reaction is love or compassion. The God we worship is not the God as He is in Himself but the God as we wish Him to be—a God whose psychology does not differ materially from our own. Thus, in times of war we go to the length of foolishly invoking His intercession as if prayer could alter the course of His inexorable justice between the belligerents, even if, to use Russell's picturesque expression, "envy, cruelty and hate sprawl at large with the blessing of nearly the whole bench of Bishops".

But this logic of simple faith, to which we lapse so frequently in speech and writing, is bound to be assailed as a crude method of theological speculation and fraught with all the dangers against which iconoclasts of every age have been obliged to fight. To humanise God (and it should be remembered that according to some religions some gods were originally men) may please our fancy and feed our vanity, and we may feel very much at home when the Being with whom we have got to deal is so much like ourselves in attributes and sentiments. But does critical reason pronounce so unambiguous a verdict as simple faith demands ? Popular reason never gets away from wishes and feelings : much of popular religion is mere "wish-illusion", to use Freud's word. A rigorous application of logical reason may easily land us in antinomies and leave us in perplexities. Who can be sure that facts of experience lend themselves only to a teleological explanation and do not admit of any mechanical interpretation ? So far as the past history of the world is concerned, does it matter very much, as James asked, whether an intelligent God or an insentient matter created it? Is it not rather in the interest of a conservation of values (and religion has been defined by Hoffding as a belief in the conservation of values), which we have created or intend creating, that we postulate the existence of an intelligent creator and an ethical Providence? Does the history of the world or the evolution of conscience unerringly prove the existence of a moral God? And not only teleological and moral arguments: even about ontological argument from the universal existence of the idea of God, did not Sir John Lubbock and Robert Flint differ as to the fact itself?

The classical proofs for the existence of God have been tested more than once and declared wanting in some respect or other by critical reason—they either lead nowhere or give such ambiguous verdict about the nature of the First Principle that on it no positive religion can be based. From Fichte in his first period to General Smuts is a far cry and yet both failed to draw a theistic conclusion about divinity—the utmost that they could do is to infer the existence of a moral order or a holistic impersonal activity as the world-ground. Once you ignore the susceptibilities of the human heart and the crude imagination of an unenlightened age you invite vacillation in your religious belief. Two contradictory conclusions have been drawn from the inability of reason to comprehend the nature of God. On the one hand, there are those who believe that reason was fashioned to deal with the finite and not to scale the heights of infinity,—that in view of the radical opposition between the finite and the infinite it is only by a kind of unreason that we can ever hope to escape the limitations of our own faculties. The baffled human reason, unable to declare roundly that what it does not comprehend does not exist, admits with humility that religious truths are supra-rational (or even contra-rational) and that the proper faculty for apprehending such verities is faith. True, faith has not been understood in the same sense by different writers, and starting with postulation in the face of manifest absurdity we may end with reasonable probability, a little short of absolute demonstration. Does our personal experience vouchsafe the certainty of God ? Or is God merely a legitimate assumption to round off the scheme of things ? Or is He an object to which we are to cling in spite of all irrationality ? Thus, one possible result of applying reason to religion is that religion is an extra-rational (whether super-rational or contra-rational) faith. With Kant we may dethrone reason in order to make room for faith ; or with St. Augustine we may start with belief in order that our unbelief may be helped by Divine grace and we may attain knowledge to the extent it is possible for mortals to attain.

But may we not take just the reverse view and conclude that the failure of reason comes not from impotence but from the fact that nothing exists to be religiously known, neither by reason nor even by faith ? Hegel had said that religion was a passing phase in the evolution of human reason, destined ultimately to be superseded by philosophy. He had indeed pleaded for a theistic philosophy all the same ; but what guarantee is there that reason will invariably lead us to uphold a spiritualistic monistic view of the world ? May not the universe be thoroughly pluralistic ? May there not be a Prince of Darkness contending against the Light on High ? May there not even be a recalcitrant matter that refuses to submit entirely to the will of God ? May it not even be that the ultimate principle of being is unknown and unknowable and that it is to an unknown God that we shall have to raise our altar ? What even prevents us finally from speculating with the nihilistic Vedic seer, whom the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad tries to refute, whether it is out of non-being or out of being that creation began ? It does not help matter very much by referring to the earnestness with which people uphold religious belief; for, as Russell points out, "the passion is the measure of the holder's lack of rational conviction". How rare in a critical age is the depth of religious conviction! What contrast with the past does modern Christianity and Islam present about their belief in the ultimate fate of the unbelievers!

Shall we then adopt the Platonic device and invent a myth when dialectics fail? Failing to establish the rationality of faith, shall we assume that even if religion has no objective validity, it has a personal and a social value and as such must be retained? Shall we appeal to the primal instinct of fear and invent a heaven and a hell to which the omniscient God consigns the virtuous and the vicious respectively? Was traditional religion an attempt to mitigate the terror inspired by destructive natural forces, as Russell says, or was it invented to stabilise society on the basis of law and order? Is God then a mere postulate posited in the interest of social solidarity and safety? Shall we, with James, make a distinction between the metaphysical and the moral attributes of God and stigmatise the former as "an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind" because they have no practical bearing upon our life, and retain the latter as "they positively determine fear and hope and expectation and are foundations for the saintly life"?

While it is permissible to speculate that religion in some form or other fulfils an instinctual need which no other type of experience can adequately satisfy (and that is why it has survived in the struggle for existence), it is difficult to defend the position that religion was launched into being by the conscious deliberations of interested religious, social or political leaders who made a common cause against the ignorant mass and exploited their weakness for personal benefit. As an acute Indian philosopher pertinently remarks, why should the promulgators themselves go through all the austerities and inconveniences which every religion involves if they knew that it was a trick to deceive the innocent? Did they mean by their own observances to complete the deception, or are they themselves the dupes of their own imposition? Again, when the psychological and sociological origin of religion will be known, will it cease to have the compelling obedience that it now commands as from one whose religion, to quote the words of James, "has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit"? That is, does the knowledge of origin affect the value of faith and does religion continue to possess that emotional value as complexes do, even when it has been found out that it was a social device to keep the crooked straight? If it does not, then it ceases to be even "a morality tinged with emotion", with which Matthew Arnold identified it. If any emotional reaction to an object is to be looked upon as religion, then why not accept Seeley's adoration of Nature as equally religious—a sentiment that had its predecessor in Kant's famous eloquence over the starry heavens above? That would at least be disinterested faith.

The difficulty, however, is that even if religion be "what the individual does with his solitariness", as Whitehead describes it, its social significance is so great that an admiration of Nature is a very uncertain foundation to build upon. Nature may indeed evoke the logical and aesthetic sentiments but it leaves the moral side of existence severely alone; and that is why Kant had to add an admiration for the moral nature to the adoration of physical nature to complete the emotional attitude of man towards the world of matter and spirit. The other danger is that it is as unreasonable to grow ecstatic over the beauties and grandeur of nature as over the religious bond of social fellowship, and we may proceed to analyse them as coldly as we did the religion of human origin and find in them nothing but peculiar concatenations of brute forces, of no intrinsic value at all but only of such with which our emotional temperament invests them. Does not a lover see a Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt? Nature is a very uncertain foundation to build a religion upon and eminent thinkers have drawn contradictory conclusions from her beauty so far as the religious aspect is concerned. Here, for instance, is a passage from Prof. J. A. Thomson: "There are three voices of Nature. She joins hands with us and says *Struggle*, *Endeavour*. She comes close to us, we hear her heart beating; she says *Wonder*, *Enjoy*, *Revere*. She whispers secrets to us, we cannot always catch her words; she says *Search*, *Enquire*," And here is Santayana's reply: "If by calling nature God or the work of God, or the language in which God speaks to us, nothing is meant except that nature is wonderful, unfathomed, alive, the source of our being, the sanction of morality, and the dispenser of happiness and misery, there can be no objection to such alternative terms in the mouth of poets; but I think a philosopher should avoid the ambiguities which a too poetical tone often comports. The word nature is poetical enough". Nature may make a self-transcending reference to God; Nature herself may usurp the function of divinity; or Nature may dethrone God and herself be reduced to a concourse of physical units without mind. without purpose. The onslaught of scientists on religion from the evolutionary point of view is too recent to need any repetition here. It is only within the last few years that serious attempts to rehabilitate the Deity from that side are being made and loopholes found in the evolution theory.

But even here critical reason has been unable to come to a definite decision. Do science and religion stand on the same level, each supplementing the work of the other ? Or, is religion inclusive of science which it transcends at the same time ? If, as Spencer says, "it is impossible that there should be two orders of truth in absolute and everlasting opposition", are they to be reconciled in the highly abstract conception of the Unknowable and shall that be "our highest wisdom and our highest duty" ? Or, shall we admit with Thomson that science and religion are not antithetic but complementary ? Or, shall we take sides with the emergent evolutionists like Lloyd Morgan and say, "Spiritual values stand at a higher emergent level than economic, moral, aesthetic or intellectual values, though one or all may be also "possessed by mind" concurrently with spiritual value" and that "spiritual value is supervenient on them, but it does not supersede them in any strictly antagonistic sense" ? In this opinion very strong support is forthcoming from Munsterberg, according to whom "the special values, as for instance science or art or law or industry or love, may enter into conflict with each other, but religion cannot be in disagreement with any one of them on principle, as religion's fundamental task is to unite the valuations by reference to a beyond".

But while patient workers are toiling in faith and reconstructing the once mighty fabric of religion with such elements as scepticism and science have been unable to destroy, fresh attacks are being made every day to scatter the garnered materials to the winds. Freethinking is popularising the doctrine that religion is an atavistic reversion to a primitive attitude towards the forces of nature, justifiable in a primitive condition of society but unworthy of cultured minds. We are all familiar with Comte's three stages of cultural development—how the theological, the metaphysical and the positivistic phases succeed one another in regular succession in all climes. Religion is in modern times a vestigial element of the human mind, of no significance to man's present mental make-up. In a religious attitude we simply regress to the childhood of the human race when the forces of nature were personified and the helplessness of man before these forces made supplication to the powers behind them an almost indispensable necessity of thought and action. But with the rise of industrialism and gradual mastery over the forces of nature we are learning to be self-confident, to stand on our own legs and to dispense with the necessity of God. Science has banished miracles and we are gradually encroaching upon the domain of omniscience. With the growth of human knowledge and human power the necessity of religion is gradually passing away. It is a childhood superstition which we are learning to outgrow.

Nay, we may go further and assert that religion is nothing but "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity". The primal father, against whom men normally develop the Oedipus complex, has been the prototype of God and men, "knowing that they had brutally set aside the father, determined, in the reaction to their outrage, to respect his will in future". That is why he is endowed with human qualities and called our Father in heaven. Just as most of the childhood neuroses, especially obsessional neuroses, pass away spontaneously as one grows up, so also "the abandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth". The human intellect is indeed weak in comparison with human instincts which supply the primary basis of religion, but the soft voice of intellect does not rest until it has gained a hearing. "The primacy of the intellect certainly lies in the far, far, but still probably not infinite, distance." Not even the purified religious ideas can escape this fate, so long as they still try to preserve anything of the consolation of religion. So says Freud. And now hear Bertrand Russell : "Religion, since it has its source in terror, has dignified certain kinds of fear, and made people think them not disgraceful. In this it has done mankind a great disservice : all fear is bad, and ought to be overcome, not by fairy tales but by courage and rational reflection. Even if the open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional humanising myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigour, and the great spaces have a splendour of their own". And compare these views with that of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller : "It (religion) is always heavily infected with "half-belief", and hypocrisy and ritualism and other forms of insincerity, and corrupted by priest-craft. Its social importance is indisputable ; but its rationality can always be called in question. The relations with mysticism which it cultivates would alone suffice to ensure its condemnation by the rationalist, and the infusion of an obvious element of irrationality into every religion is, perhaps, too plain to require elaborate proving".

The logical, if not the chronological, climax of this attitude towards religion is reached in Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra* where, in the transvaluation of all values, morality and religion undergo radical transformation. In the very Prologue we have the significant utterance of Zarathustra that *God is dead*, and in many later chapters the refrain occurs : "Who is more godless than I, that I may enjoy his teaching ?" What, then, are the gods of religion ? They are poet-symbolisations, poet-sophistications—gaudy puppets set on clouds. What proofs are there that God exists ? Here is the dialogue of two old, sorrowful, arid night-watchmen :

> "For a father he careth not sufficiently for his children :
> human fathers do this better !"
> "He is too old ! He now careth no more for his children".
> "*Hath* he then children ? No-one can prove it unless he

himself prove it. I have long wished that he would for once prove it thoroughly".

"Prove ? As if *he* had ever proved anything ! Proving is difficult to him ; he layeth great stress on one's believing him".

"Ay ! Ay ! Belief saveth him ; belief in him. That is the way with old people !"

In the place of religion Nietzsche teaches the cult of the Superman who is above the ordinary codes of morality and whose sole aim is to be the master of the earth. These supermen form the new nobility which is the adversary of all populace and potentate rule : "That is just divinity, that there are Gods but no God !" "Once did people say God, when they looked out upon distant seas ; now, however, have I taught you to say, Superman. God is a conjecture : but I do not wish your conjecturing to reach beyond your creating will. Could you *create* a God ?—Then, I pray you, be silent about all Gods. But ye could well create the Superman... God is a conjecture : but I should like your conjecturing restricted to the conceivable. Could ye conceive a God ? But let that mean Will to Truth unto you, that everything be transformed into the humanly conceivable, the humanly visible, the humanly sensible".

We need not refer in detail to the development of British thought from Hamilton to Herbert Spencer, where agnosticism was based on a similar line of argument regarding the limitations of human knowledge. It is true that Spencer had still hoped that in the recognition of the Unknowable science and religion would be reconciled ; but subsequent speculation refused to share his hope. Nor need we refer to the irreligion of those who discard all spiritual values as restraints upon their unbridled licence. For, though there is in such cases a personal reason for discarding religion, that reason is not rational. There is no doubt that much

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of materialism and atheism is due to the temperamental make-up of the thinkers concerned. But even leaving them aside, the history of religion shows a triadic rhythm of devotion, hypocrisy, and doubt which causes so much anxiety in spiritual minds. It is necessary, therefore, to ask what element in religion runs this peculiar risk and whether it is possible to justify the religious attitude in the face of scientific advancement on the one hand and philosophical speculation on the other. It is these two rational methods that have caused the biggest gashes in the side of faith, and religion must come to some sort of terms with both, if that is possible, or agree to differ at all times, if agreement cannot be achieved without sacrificing principles. Fortunately the times are opportune for a rapprochement after the internecine triangular fight of the centuries.

If one turns to contemporary thought in science, philosophy and religion, one finds three noticeable peculiarities, namely, that scientists are getting accustomed to abstractions, that philosophers are becoming intuitive and that religion is becoming less wedded to dogmas and more prone to mysticism. All these tendencies augur well for a reconciliation of the claims of the three disciplines. The objection of science against religion is that the latter deals with supersensibles and not with realities that are empirically verifiable. But recent developments of science have been so much towards conceptual entities that the old charge against religion is losing much of its ancient force. With Dalton's inert atoms moving according to Newton's picturable law of gravitation it was possible to hold an empirical view of existence and to deny all reality to supersensibles. But think of the transformation that the elements have undergone in recent years. The atoms are now only averages of their isotopes in weight, they are interlocked systems of

पुस्तकालय
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electrons held together by a positive nucleus round which they revolve with a velocity which can be expressed only mathematically, and their radiations take place as formulated in the Quantum theory. No wonder that Poincaré should draw attention to the hypothetical character of scientific constructions and Vaihinger should call them scientific fictions! The old world-picture where atoms pulled and pushed one another like rugby players in a scrummage is now thoroughly outworn, and Newton's easily comprehensible law has given place to the Einsteinian hypothesis of relativity where even ether is not a necessity.

Add to this the fact that whereas in former times scientists took pride in triumphantly declaring like Laplace that they had no need of God in their world-system, the most remarkable fact in modern times is the growing number of scientists that are taking interest in the religious aspect of scientific discoveries. The biologists, the physicists and the mathematicians are now all contributing to the stock of religious literature, and within the last twenty-five years a number of them have delivered the Gifford Lectures. It would be uncharitable to hold that their profession of religion is a reaction against an unconscious atheism or that they wish to appear decent in a society which is gradually becoming more religious and that they have no longer the courage of their conviction like Huxley and Haeckel.

The philosophers are also becoming more prone towards immediacy in knowledge. They are seeing the limitations of the old method of knowing God indirectly by means of certain so-called proofs. So long as the philosophical world stuck to the old definition of man as a rational animal, laying all the emphasis upon the differentia and none on the other aspects of his nature, it was inevitable that it should refuse to acknowledge that there could be any extra-rational mode of knowing. From that opinion the philosophic world is gradually liberating itself. We need not refer to Bergson and Croce in whose systems Intuition plays such a large part (for there it is not primarily a religious faculty) nor even to the "feeling" of Bradley and the "appreciation" of Royce in relation to the Absolute. But something akin to Intuition is to be found, for instance, even in Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. Religion, according to the former, is faith, not in the conservation of values but in deity – that ultra-human perfection which emerges in Space-time and completes the evolution of reality in God. "God is apprehended cognitively through the religious emotion by the assurance we call religious faith". According to the latter, God is to be known by acknowledgment and natural piety. Here again are two impressive quotations from L. P. Jacks: "I will venture to suggest to anyone who is perplexed by doubts about the reality of God, not to trust the fortunes of his faith too unreservedly to the field of mere argumentation". "All religious testimony, so as I can interpret its meaning, converges towards a single point, namely this. There is that in the world, call it what you will, which responds to the confidence of those who trust it, declaring itself to them as a fellow worker in the pursuit of the Eternal Values, meeting their loyalty to it with reciprocal loyalty to them and coming in at critical moments when the need of its sympathy is greatest; the conclusion being, that wherever there is a soul in darkness, obstruction or misery, there also is a Power which can help, deliver, illuminate and gladden that soul". And if a professional theologian is suspect, here is the view of Munsterberg whom nobody would accuse of a theological bias: "In science and art, in love and peace, in industry and state, in morality and law, in religion and philosophy: mankind is to unfold in freedom what is intended as necessary goal of its own will.

...But this eternal unity of outer world and fellow-world and inner world in the whole richness of their connections and unities and realizations would never have been possible if they were not all flowing from the same eternal absolute deed of the over-self. That this over-self is real, and that its will really and unchangeably binds our world of values, and that our loyal life is therefore endlessly valuable, no knowledge can teach us. No knowledge could be sufficient. This certainty is founded on the rock of conviction, and on oonviction, thereforc, is based every value of truth, of unity, of realization, of completion". Dr. Rashdall says, "Faith is, or rather includes, a particular kind or stage of knowledge, and is not a totally different and even opposite state of mind". Enough has been said to show that philosophers are no longer so opposed to immediate knowledge in relation to the Ultimate Principle as they once were. Sir Henry Jones goes so far as to assert: "Philosophy, when most true and positive, is the process by which reason substantiates the main hypothesis of religion and furnishes a rational basis for man's infinite claims, making him no doubt a pilgrim on a road that leads to a very far city. But the way is, at every step, a way of life",

And what about the religious men? The unreasonable sensitiveness about the creeds which made the church-going populace look with eyes of suspicion upon every scientist and philosopher is happily passing away. The creeds should be to cultured minds not ready-made truths but starting points of enquiry, as Sir Henry Jones well says. In former times religion was synonymous with institutional religion. Men could be religious only in one way, namely, by subscribing to a positive faith, mostly the faith of their fore-fathers. And they were not only wedded to a revelation that took place in the past to persons other than themselves but very often to persons who were so little scientifically equipped that they made bad blunders about natural phenomena, which they might have left severely alone when talking about their own spiritual experiences. Naturally, if in order to be religious a man was to be condemned to crude scientific theories at the same time, he would rather be sceptical than disbelieve in accurate science. The Book of Genesis has created more unbelievers than the rest of the Bible, and Aristotle and the Post-Kantians lost more authority by their crude scientific speculations than by their philosophical doctrines. The theologians have now come to see that it does not pay to defend every doctrine to be found in the scripture in the face of the discoveries made by science and comparative religion. They are now rightly laying exclusive emphasis upon the spiritual values discovered by the founder of the faith and lending their moderate support to such essential dogmas as can provide the basis for a religious brotherhood. The effect has been that the moral and the spiritual elements in religion are getting larger recognition and it is being freely admitted that the spiritual revelation may come to any one fitted to receive it. The very large increase of mystical religious literature and a wider interest shown in all forms of mysticism in the East and the West in recent years are welcome signs that religion is returning to a personal standpoint from the communal and that it would be possible to compare notes about the deepest visions of men, widely separated in culture, without rousing religious animosities and fanatical orthodoxy, A genuine desire to pool together the religious resources of the world, to interchange thoughts in periodical meetings and to disseminate the truth of spiritual values without reference to creeds and communities is the happy augury of the times. If an agreement can be reached on the main issue, namely, what spiritual religion must be, then much of insane jealousy among the creeds would be over. Let us close our discourse with a reference to that aspect.

If the war of creeds is to be over and future conflict with science and philosophy is to be narrowed down, if not altogether avoided, religion must insist on three irreducible qualities for itself, namely, that it is an *immediate* experience, that it is a *unique* experience, and that it is a *comprehensive* experience. Regarding immediacy, every religion must be a personal possession and not a mere acceptance of a revelation on faith. Every person, whatever be his creed, must feel that *he* is religious and not that he *belongs to* a religion. It does not debar him from taking the help of spiritual leaders, nay even of inanimate things as Jacob Boehme did; but the acceptance must go beyond a mere blind obedience to the commands of the prophet or the religious leader and must culminate in a personal appropriation of the spiritual illumination. The Church that one should attend is not merely the visible Church, where very often bodily presence sums up the process of spiritual participation, but also the invisible Church where the Holy Communion is performed in spirit and in truth. In immediate religion communal considerations have place only in so far as they make for spiritual advancement and hold society together in common fellowship in spiritual bonds. Anything that has a tendency to lower the spiritual standard is to be assailed wherever found. A religious man is not the enemy of faiths but of faithlessness; so toleration and sympathy come easy to him wherever godliness is to be found.

Spiritual religion is a unique experience. It cannot be reduced to any other type of experience. Even when the components of religious faith are laid bare, they do not explain religion entirely. There is in all religion an unanalysable sense of valuation which may be called the sense of the holy, of which a prominent part is contributed by what Otto calls the 'numinous' state of mind. "This mental state is perectly *su igeneris* and irreducible to any other; and, therefore, like every absolutely primary nd elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined". Like samādhi in the Yoga system it can be only evoked or awakened in the mind but not taught; you can point the way, but you cannot induce the feeling by instruction. Religion is realisation and not mere understanding. There are no doubt the ideas of unity, beauty, morality and spirituality involved, as also feelings like fear, dependence, sublimity, awe, mystery. But the feeling of the holy or sacred is not a mere juxtaposition of these concepts and feelings—there is a creative synthesis in religion, a blending of elements, as in the honey collected by the bee, which defies complete analysis. The rational and the non rational elements are absolutely fused together and produce a unique attitude of mind. At times the rational element becomes aggressive and the non-rational element recedes to the background; but this is never exterminated and like free floating affects in neurosis, attaches itself to some object or other. It is strange that people wish to get rid of religious feeling but not of love or friendship, as if sentiment is rational in human relation but not in relation to the super-sensible. Sympathy, which gives such insight into other minds, is not a rational mode of perception why, then, of all non-rational modes of knowing, should religion alone be specially objected to? By simply analysing religion you may indeed point to the many elements that go to make it up, but you can no more make a religion out of them than you can reconstruct a living body with dissected tissues. You can analyse perception into many sensory elements and yet perception is a single act. Objecting to religious knowledge because it is not like the ordinary mode of knowing is like objecting to the knowing capacity of the ear because it does not give vision. They respond to entirely different aspects of existence. We may now briefly refer to that in our closing paragraph.

Religious experience is a comprehensive experience. It is the reaction of the whole personality upon the total universe. It is not exclusive of any other type of experience, for a religious significance can be read into any and every experience of the human mind. Into our scientific pursuits and our social dealings, into our appreciation of the beauties of nature and the loftiness of human conduct, we may import a religious attitude which does not contradict or annul the specific character of the original experience but suffuses it with a divine glow. Just as although the botanist is not interested in the velvet sheen of the pansy and the zoologist ignores the gorgeous finery of the plumage in a bird of paradise the poet may yet grow rapturous over both, so also when pursuing our scientific and social pursuits we may neglect the halo that a religious experience is always able to throw over them ; but that does not justify us in saying that the religious way of looking at the world of matter and spirit is not permissible. The little flower in the crannied wall may reveal the existence of God and the love for one's dear ones may open up the fountain of spiritual solidarity with the world. It is this world that then becomes transmuted into a footstool of the deity and the ordinary avocations of life are ennobled by a sense of divine presence. No one is then solitary in the world—not even in the midst of the intensest sorrow, for an invisible presence is laying the soothing hand on the troubled soul. No one is powerless then, for the power that makes for perfection and righteousness is invisibly operating all around to supplement human endeavour. Every fibre of our being then vibrates in unison with the invisible melody of truth, beauty and goodness, and we are lifted up above our limitations and feel the kinship of entire creation. True, this feeling does not give us a finished theory of existence, but it glves us enough conviction to place our feet firmly on the road of life and to take the next step without faltering. Creeds have their day and pass away with the advance of culture, but religion rises perpetually anew phoenix-like out of its own ashes. Trace religion to the sexual instinct, if you like ; but do not forget that there is all the difference between brute sexuality and sublimated passion—between the crude chemical that kills and the refined chemical that saves. The composition does not wholly explain the character : do not coal and diamond possess the same constituents and yet what vast the difference in value between them ! Even on pragmatic grounds is it not far better to hold, seeing that we cannot do away with the uniqueness of spiritual experience, that religion comes not from the baser depths of our being but from above ? Let us, therefore, echo the thoughts contained in this profound utterance of Emerson :

"When I watch that flowing river, which, out of regions I see not, pours for a season its streams into me,—I see that I am a pensioner,—not a cause, but a surprised spectator of this etherial water; that I desire and look up, and put myself in the attitude of reception, but from some alien energy the visions come.

The Supreme Critic on all the errors of the past and the present, and the only prophet of that which must be, is that great nature in which we rest, as the earth lies in the soft arms of the atmosphere ; that Unity, that Over-Soul, within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other ; that common heart, of which all sincere conversation is the worship, to which all right action is submission ; that overpowering reality which confutes our tricks and talents, and constrains every one to pass for what he is, and to speak from his character and not from his tongue; and which evermore tends and aims to pass into our thought and hand, and become wisdom, and virtue, and power, and beauty".

Kumarila's Conception of Soul.

JANAKIVALLABH SĀMKHYATIRTHA, M. A.

In the Mīmānsā literature the room alloted to philosophical speculation is too narrow to contain all sorts of Philosophical discourses on the subject. [1]The main purpose of this literature is to expound theories for the justification of the practice of the Vedic rites, in the proper order, suggested by the Kalpa Sutras. Still, the literature does not consist of these theories alone but it also makes reference to the ultimate principles of the world. Without any motive one cannot perform any action. The bliss of Heaven attracts men to actions. Again, without any enjoyer this bliss is meaningless. Hence, Mīmānsā literature will also take into consideration the nature of the enjoyer.[2] Again, it is only through the revealed literature that people are able to know that such and such actions lead to such and such results. And, hence, it is the duty of this literature to support the validity of knowledge derived through the revealed literature. And, hence, it will also discuss all valid sources of knowledge in general and on the revealed literature in particular. In as much as the Vedas constitute the body of the revealed truth, the expounders of the Mīmānsā literature will devise all the schemes to establish the superiority of the Vedic literature and to attach unquestionable sanctity to it. In this connection, it will also discuss the Philosophy of

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(1) Athātodhamajijñāsā,

(2) Sāstradīpika pages 478-793 Slokavārtika, Atmavāda ; verses 3-6.

Grammar and the meaning of words together with the nature of sounds, the basis of the rational interpretation of a sentence etc. Again, the doctrine of the sound, the enjoyment of the indestructible bliss in the highest Heaven, the independent existence of the external world etc. reveal the realistic character of the system of Mîmānsā. The doctrine of soul has secured a prominent place in it. I choose this particular topic to dwell upon, pointing out clearly Kumārila's originality and his indebtedness to other systems irrespective of their peculiar religious views. In spite of Kumārila's being out and out orthodox in his Philosophical disposition, he could not avoid the influence of the atmosphere in which he was born. At that time the Idealistic doctrine of the Buddhists was on the wane and Jain Philosophy was gaining popularity among the free thinkers. In that age of criticism and heterodoxy mere utterances of the Vedas were not sufficient to conquer the mind of the people at large. Hence, Kumārila, though he based his views on the Vedas, could not yet go against the spirit of the age and tried to construct his Philosophy as critically as the age demanded. Kumārila, in spite of his vehement opposition to the heretical schools had a true insight into their merits, and picked up important doctrines from the different systems and strung them together by his synthetic genius. Kumārila's Philosophy conquered the mind of the heterodox and the orthodox sections by his refutation of the current theistic conception and his deep veneration for the revealed literature, respectively. Above all, in the doctrine of soul he gave free scope to his synthetic mind and combined the ubiquity and indestructiblity of the soul of the Brahmanical literature with the changing character of cognition etc. of the heretical school. His soul is not an abstract universal of the Vedantic type, the true character of which the searchlight of empirical knowledge fails to reveal. Such a doctrine which crushes vanity and pride cannot be received with open arms by the average people on whom spiritualistic pluralism has firm hold. Again, of this soul, cognition, feeling, will etc. are not accidental qualities which are produced through the instrumentality of the internal sense organ (Manas) and in connection with it. Somehow, by virtue of the relation of inherence cognition, feeling etc. can not constitute the essential character of this substance as supposed by the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika systems. Such a substance is in no way better than the unconscious matter with which nobody will be willing to identify the conscious principle. Again, the soul of the Sāmkhya system possessing mere transcendental character cannot enjoy and do anything. Only through transcendental illusion in the shape of reflection are plesaure and pain attributed to it. Such a conception of soul contradicts the popular view of the soul. If a doctrine of soul can bring about harmony between the popular and the philosophic view on the subject it is sure to win the minds of the philosopher and the man in the street, alike. The flux of mental phenomena bewilders an ordinary man and cannot serve the purpose of a soul. The doctrine of void creates awe in the heart of people where it fails to gain a footing. Now, the followers of Jaina Philosophy, though not less philosophical in their exposition, could not yet set aside the commonsense view. But their only mistake lies in the fact that their soul like any elastic material object is subject to expansion and contraction though declared to be eternal and indestructible. This view may bring full satisfaction to the rustic mind which conceives the soul to be cc-extensive with the body but seems contradictory to a critical thinker.

In Kumārila' system, though cognition, feeling etc. are essential attributes of the substance termed as soul, yet the substantive aspect of soul which connects and unites these phenomena of cognition etc. remains unchanged.[3] The soul is the concrete whole which is neither a mere abstract unity nor a manifold of discrete and disconnected psychoses. The view that cognition etc. represent one aspect of soul is foreign to the philosophy of the orthodox school and has been borrowed from the system of Jains by Kumārila. The genesis of the doctrine of the transitory character of cognition etc. may be traced to the Buddhist doctrine of the fleeting character of sensation, feeling etc. though Kumārila has made some further improvement on the latter. Again, the infiuence of Jaina Philosophy on Kumārila has compelled him to go against even the orthodox school of thought. In the opinion of the Sānkhyas, the soul is consciousness, that is, consciousness constitutes the substance and not an aspect of soul. But Jains as well as Kumārila hold the doctrine that consciousness cannot be equated with the soul but is one of its aspects and that the soul is the unexhausted source of consciousness.[4] Again, Kumārila has parted from the Naiyāyikas by holding that consciousness always characterises the individual soul. Jains hold that the stream of consciousness flows on uninturrupted in the bed of the substratum (soul). Kumārila, at first, establishes the thesis that individual souls are eternal.[5] He raises possible objections against his thesis and refutes them. The soul is both doer and enjoyer.[6] In most cases our soul fails to recognise that its present experience of pleasure or pain is due to good or bad actions of its past life. If this be the case, what is the harm in admitting that one may enjoy the fruits of actions not done by him since in both cases the causal

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(3) Bhāttacintāmani page 54, S. D. page 473, S. V. Ātmavāda verse 73.

(4) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 73.

(5) S. V. Ātmavāda, Verse 7,

(6) S. D. page 468.

connection between the action and the results remains unknown.[7] Again, if one cannot understand that he is suffering because of his past vicious deeds, he will never think of being virtuous.[8] If this theory of eternality of soul be not in any way helpful to us who will shape his life in the light of this doctrine ?—It is an idle doctrine, having no practical unity of its own. The sufferer or the enjoyer may think that his pain or pleasure is an event of chance, pure and simple, since he is not aware of any causal relation subsisting between his previous actions good or bad, and present pleasure or pain. Since this theory of eternality has no merit of its own, it is not wise to repudiate the theory of non-eternality of soul which gets support for the popular mind unbiased by any doctrine of Philosophy.[9]

Kumārila's answer to this objection is that the remembrance of one's past deeds is not, in any way, concerned with the production of the result by these actions. The Vedas directly teach that from performance of such and such sacrifices such and such bliss will accrue to the agent in the next life. But in the life to come, we have no knowledge of our past life and actions which will bring about fruits. Again, through perception or memory we cannot know that the past actions and future enjoyments are causally connected but through other valid sources of knowledge we can rightly determine the relation existing between them. Again, we prepare soft bed so that our sleep may be sound but while we actually enjoy sound sleep, we do not become conscious of the fact that this sleep is due to the soft bed.[10] Therefore, the objection does not affect the theory of eternality of soul.

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(7) S,.V. Ātmavāda, Verse 8.
(8) S. V. Ātmavāda Verse 10.
(9) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 12 ;
(10) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 18.

Again, the character of being a doer and enjoyer is not compatible with its character of being eternal.[11] Enjoyment means certain modifications of the substance, called soul. Temporal association with pleasure and pain is the enjoyment of soul. Neither pleasure nor pain can occupy a permanent seat in soul and hence, they are sure to cause changes in their abode. The doctrine of change and eternality of an object cannot go together, One should accept one to the exclusion of the other. But Kumārila, to be consistent, cannot reject any one of the two alternatives. Hence Kumārila boldly meets the objection and holds that a substance may undergo changes without any prejudice to its character of being eternal.[12] The surface of the sea is never smooth and yet this constant modification of the surface does not affect the parmanent character of the sea below. If change of an aspect would bring about the destruction of the substance, the soul, identified with some particular aspect of it, would be destroyed with the cessation of that aspect, i. e, if a person identifies himself with a particular pain, with the extirpation of that pain, the soul will also be annihilated and no soul will survive to enjoy pleasure that closely follows the pain. These aspects do not constitute the substantive part of soul and therefore any loss of an aspect does not necessitate the destruction of the substance "soul".

Another objection is that the all-pervading soul cannot be a doer, since, without movement no action can be done and movement is only possible in limited things.[13] The very idea of movement is bound up with the idea of filling up some unoccupied space. An omnipresent substance cannot move an inch. Therefore, the soul can

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(11) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 20.

(12) S. V. „ verse 21.

(13) Nyāyaratnākara page 693.

never be a doer. In the system of the Jains there is no such difficulty, since the soul has got a limited extension and moves with or without body. Kumārila's conception of soul is more philosophical. He faces the above difficulty and urges that movement is not a necessary condition of an action. Any and every action should not be translated into terms of movement. Again, every doer of an action is not necessarily a mover, since, in some cases, a person helping the real performer of an action by his advice, etc. becomes doer. In the case of going, movement actually belongs to the body but the self is said to be a goer.[14] Kings, in many cases, become doers though they actually do no action and get their works performed by their servants by their mere presence.[15] Similarly, a commander makes his regiment move without moving in the least.[16] So, our soul becomes agent of actions through the instrumentality of the body. Our soul guides our non-intelligent body by the aid of intelligence and becomes performer of actions. Therefore, soul may be truly a doer though it is omnipresent The soul is ever embodied except in the state of salvation. The actions of this life can not go unrewarded or unpunished. If they do not bear any fruit in this life, they will surely do so in the future life which is brought about by them. This present life has also been enforced on us by the meritless actions of the previous birth. Unless and until the soul realises the highest end, its severance from a body is absurd. Again, the world has no beginning. The cycle of mundane existence is revolving on for ever and knows no break. Hence, every individual soul has been constantly associated with one body or another from eternity and has never been in want of an

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(14) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 81.
(15) „ „ „ 86.
(1C) S. D. Page 502.

instrument in the shape of a body to serve some purpose of its own. Hence, the individual soul has always been a doer.

The individual soul is also permanent since, if it be destructible, the doer will not invariably be an enjoyer. In that case he who has sown seeds is not sure to reap the harvest and another person who has not sown seeds may reap the harvest. Again, we cannot exlplain the surprising visits of pleasure and pain arising from the workings of blind chance. If we do not admit the permanence of our soul our life becomes a series of events where there is no reign of the law of causation and which draws inspiration from the dictates of capricious chance, the queen of chaos. Such a life is worse than misery itself. If our soul be not permanent, death by commiting suicide will be the only means of repose since one cannot place any confidence in his own actions which may or may not be conducive to any good or bad consequence. If our soul be denied permanence, ethical and philosophical life would be embraced by the lunatic and these speculations would be reduced to fanciful stories of the fairy lands.

In the topic on soul Kumārila has referred only to ubiquity of soul and has not put forward any argument to justify his assertion. Kumārila was so much influenced by the orthodox systems of thought that he was even unable to examine this characteristic of soul and dogmatically assumed it. The doctrine of spiritual atoms, I think, is the logical development of the Jaina doctrine of soul. This theory of soul that finite beings are spiritual atoms and infinite in number has been propagated by the Vaisnava Philosophers. In Kumārilas, writings we find no reference to this theory of soul. If one is to accept premanence of soul, he has no other alternative than to acquiesce in the attribute of omnipresence of soul.

Kumārila believed in plurality of individual souls. He did not put forward any reason in support of his view. From Kumārila's words we can not be sure whether phenomenal or noumenal souls are many. His followers have followed the foot-steps of pluralistic philosophers like Sankhyas and Naiyayikas. If we be satisfied with the views of the interpreters of Kumārila, individual souls in Kumārila's opinion are, in reality, many.[17] Tradition, also, lends support to the view of the interpreters. Predecessors of Kumārila are also not explicit in this matter. Pūrva-Mīmānsā and Uttara-Mīmānsā form one complete system, the doctnine of soul in the first part cannot contradict that in the other part. The Sankarite interpretation of the Brahma-Sutras cannot be maintained to be the only possible interpretation of the Brahma-Sutras. Savara Swamin has indubitably declared that he has based his doctrine of soul on the texts of the Upaniṣads, that is, his doctrine of soul is not different from that of the Brahma-Sutras. Now, let us see whether the Brahma Sutras shed any light on this particular topic. It is very difficult to discern with true conviction what the view of the Brahma-Sutras is. The Upaniṣadic passages also contradict one another. Some passages clearly hold the doctrine of the unity of soul. But several other passages have distinctly declared that individual souls are infinite in number. Again, we do not find an answer to the question whether infinite souls are metaphysical realities or mere appearances. Different interpreters have arrived at either of the two conclusions by their peculiar preference of one set of texts to the other. We cannot reconcile these two views opposed to each other with respectful attitude of the same order towards two contradictory sets of texts. Now, if we are to solve this problem, we are bound to be guided by our own power of

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(17) S. D. page 495.

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reasoning, since authoritative texts and recorded experiences give no material help (in this mater.) Kumārila has cleverly managed the situation by committing himself to neither of these views definitely. This policy of ending a problem does not become a philosopher. But this policy has a peculiar advantage of being, interpreted in two ways i. e. from the standpoint of idealism and from that of realism. Idealists will depict the atomism of Kumārila with new colour and realist will foist the doctrine of plurality of souls on Kumārila. In any case Kumārila's position is safe. Kumārila has drawn distinction between one's own self and the self of another.

An unbiased reader of Kumārila's system will interpret Kumārila as an exponent of realism. Hence, from the standpoint of such an interpreter, Kumārila holds the doctrine that individual souls are really many. Again, Kumārila's souls are doers and enjoyers. If souls are merely appearances, we cannot account for the difference of real experience in different individuals. These experiences constitute the individual soul and individual souls are in reality different from one another. I think, Kumārila's previous statements are clear enough to throw light on this topic.

Kumārila establishes the existence of Apūrva or the residence of an action. If any action has to produce any result, it is only possible through Apūrva, since, an action perishes as soon as it is performed. A non-existent thing connot lead to something positive.[18] The destruction of anything cannot be causally connected with any positive entity. If an action fails to bring about any consequence, the whole list of the Vedic actions fails to the ground, since, they, are not ends-in-themselves but means to some higher ends. If the performance of a Vedic action does not satisfy the performer

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(18) Mimānsā paribhaṣā page 3.

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with the endowment of the promised reward in the present or future life, who will be a fool to listen to the dictates of the Vedas and act in accordance with them. Hence, actions cannot die out without leaving some traces on the soul of the performer, since, soul alone survives the body and the sense-organs of a person.[19] If these traces of an action be located in the sense-organs of a person, they will also be destroyed with the decay of the latter and the very assumption of Apūrva will be frustrated. Therefore, these residues of an action must have permanent seat in the soul and bear fruit in due time.

Apūrva is not an attruibte of soul in which it does not inhere. It is different from Adṛṣṭa of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, Adṛṣṭa is an attribute produced by the performance of religious deeds etc., whereas Apūrva is a kind of force. Adṛṣṭa inheres in soul but Apūrva is connected with soul by some external relation. Adṛṣṭa cannot do anything without being excited by the will of the Lord but Apūrva discharges the function of both the will of the Lord and Adṛṣṭa. It requires no external excitation and is sufficent to produce its result in due time. This Apūrva is also the cosmic principle. Apūrvas of individual souls play the part of an efficient cause in the construction of this universe. Again, these Apūrvas cannot act themselves without resting on some substance, since what is not a substance cannot effectuate anything without being located. These Apūrvas raise individual souls to the exalted position of the creator of the world.[20]

Now, in the system of Kumārila, there is no God personal or impersonal. Kumārila has criticised all the theistic doctrines which prevailed in his time. Individuals through

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(19) S. V. Ātmavāda, Verse 7,

(20) S. V. Samvandhākṣepaparihāra.

Apūrvas discharge the function of God of the later Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika system and the Pātanjala system. In Kumārila's system God is not a member of the soul class but each individual is God. He also has refuted the doctrine of monotheism. If God be alone real, it is not possible for us to explain the production of the world. He must have materials to act on and other conditions in the shape of instruments which are necessary for the production of an effect. Therefore, we see that in Kumārila's system any question regarding the relation of God to the individuals does not arise at all. If individuals be equated with God, they are all equal in their substantive character but are all different in their phenomenal nature.[21]

Let us, now, consider the relation of the individual soul to the world. The world derives its matter from the atoms which exist eternally and are independent of mind. Therefore mind does not supply the world with matter i, e, soul is not the material cause of the world but the world receives its form by the action of the individual being. The soul shapes and fashions the formless atoms into this universe displaying plan, order and marks of intelligence. It is impossible for the individuals of the systems of Gautama and Kaṇāda to guide the invisible principle so that the atoms may be joined together into this correlated and systematic world since they are unconscious during the state of dissolution. An unconscious principle should find in some intelligent being its guide. God alone is intelligent in that dismal condition of disorder. Therefore, He is a necessary factor in the affair of creation from the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. But in the individual soul of Kumārila consciousness always inheres.[22] Individual souls

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(21) S. V. Sūnyavāda 285.

(22) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 26.

being the cause and substrate of consciousness, it exists in them always, either actually or potentially, since, every effect is connate with its cause individual soul, being constantly possessed of intelligence, is able to control the invisible principle and the unconscious atoms. The atoms. the ultimate realities of this world are co-eternal with individual souls. These atoms are infinitely small and these souls are infinitely large. These atoms constitute the objects of enjoyment of the individual souls. The atoms are moved whereas the souls are movers. These atoms are never objects of knowledge of the individual beings but the compounds made up by them are the objects of knowledge of those beings who are subjects. The subjects constitute the inner world but the atoms construct the outer world. The constructor of the world is each individual who can experience his own world only. But this outer world is the common object of all individuals.

Is there any soul apart from our body ? Or, does our body serve the purpose of our soul ? In our ordinary life, we take our body to be the most useful thing. We spend much of our time and intelligence in the service of our body. The consideration of our body cannot be neglected, since, it is the object of our profound love. Philosophers agree in holding that our soul is denoted by the word "I".[23] But what is really denoted by the term "I"? Is it body or soul ? When we say that I am fat or thin, fair or ugly, I certainly use the term "I" to indicate my body. When I say that this is my body, I do not express any relation subsisting between the body and the soul. But, we simply create here a distinction just as we do by saying that this is the body of that doll. The doll is identical with its body but the imagining mind of the perceiver has created some difference

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(23) S, V. Ātmavāda, verse 126.

of the doll from its body. Such an imagined difference is. in reality, nothing but a mistake. So the statement that it is my body cannot truly declare any actual difference between the thing expressed by the word "I" and the body on its new merit. But we have proved that our soul is intelligent. Let us see whether our body is conscious or not. What are the constituents of our body? Five elements are the components of this body. None of them is intelligent and therefore the compound of these elements cannot also be intelligent, since, the effect cannot be different from the cause as regards the essential nature. Hence, body cannot be a conscious thing.[24] Therefore there must be something else which will be the substrate of our thinking, feeling and willing. I say that I am a knower. Therefore, the thing which is denoted by the term "I" is not my body but my soul, the intelligent principle.[25] My assertions that I am fat or thin referring to my body are mistaken. Again, a body remains always the same. A dead body is as much a body as a living body is. A dead body is undoubtedly unconscious. Hence, in the living body consciousness cannot inhere. Again, a dead body being an aggregate of its limbs cannot be eternal. If it be destructible, our experience becomes a matter of chance since our body suddenly appears without any rhyme or reason and passes away abruptly without enjoying the fruits of its actions. The sudden entrance in and exit from the world-stage cannot be tolerated. Such an explanation of the world and individual life owes its origin to ignorance. One cannot find satisfaction in the explanation of this sort which practically explains nothing and ascribes everything to the miraculous power of chance. What is this chance? Does it admit of any ex-

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(24) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 111.

(25) S. V. „ verse 132.

planation ? Or is it assumed simply to fill up the gaps of a system ? Philosophers cannot explain chance and determine its exact nature. It remains always a mystery. Philosophy is not a science of magic and has no business with such a principle. Still, the body is most intimately related to our soul. Our soul can think, feel and will when it is embodied. A disembodied soul is nothing but unaffected ether containing seeds of consciousness. It has no mission of life and no purpose to realise but exists like a windowless room without receiving any influence from outside and imparting anything from within. Though this body may be looked upon as a very useful and unavoidable companion from the standpoint of the worldly-minded people like ourselves, yet it is a fetter to us whose highest goal is absolute freedom. It is the body which causes the soul to suffer endless troubles. Again, it is the body alone through which our soul enjoys. The body is the seat of sense-organs which without being located in some body can not operate. Is this preceptible body the only body ? Or is there any other subtle body encased in this gross body ? Kumārila accepts the doctrine of Vindhyavāsin and holds that there is no other body except this visible body of our soul.[26] If there be any thing like a subtle body it would be preceived since every body is an admixture of five elements and cannot be subtle. But no such subtle body is perceived. And therefore, it is idle to admit the existence of such a body. Each body is acquired by the actions of an individual soul and hence with that particular body that individual is so intimately connected. The body is the servant and the soul is the master. It understands the very inner heart of its master and carries out every order of its master like an obedient and faithful servant. Again, when the body is ill, the master

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(26) S. V. Ātmavāda Verse 62.

is affected by its illnness and feels pain. There is mutual communication between the body and the soul. But an individual soul can directly act upon its own body but not on the body of others, Again, the body of one also cannot directly affect the soul of another. Now, a question arises why souls are not affected by the influence of all bodies and why a body does not obey the dictates of all souls, since, all souls being omnipresent dwell within every body. The question of this sort is easily solved, since a particular individual soul has some specific relation with a particular body and not with other members of the body-class. That specific relation subsists between that particular soul and that body only because that body has been acquired by the action of that particular individual. The soul has temporal connection with a particular body because a body cannot last long and hence is subject to laws of destruction: The new connection with a new body which is an organic whole of its parts, is the birth of a soul and the separation from the body is the death of the soul. But in reality there is no beginning and no end of an individual soul which transcends time and space. It is through the medium of this body that our soul acts on the external world and is reacted upon by the external world.

The sense-organs are not our soul which unites and systematises our sensations. If they were conscious, they would be their own masters and would fight with one another.[27] In that case, the order, harmony and peace of our life would be distorted, and the very existence of life would be threatened. Again, that he who perceives, remembers.[28] is the general rule accepted by all. If the sense-organs were our souls, the

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(27) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 13 ; see also Bhāmati 1st sutra Bhāṣya.

(28) S. V. Ātmavāda Verse 116.

remembrance of an object perceived by a lost sense organ would, become impossible.[29] But it is a fact that a blind person remembers the rays of the sun and coloured objects. Therefore, sense-organs are not the soul. The sense organs are implements of knowledge of our souls. The soul is the real cogniser, As the soul is indestructible there is no difficulty in accounting for our remembrance of objects perceived by the lost sense organ. The external sense-organs are intimately connected with the body which is their support. The external sense-organs are also made of the elements; practially, they are nothing but limbs of our body. The internal sense-organ is materially different from the body. It plays the most important part in the manifestation of consciousness which exists latently in an individual soul. This internal sense-organ has also close connection with an individual soul which it serves from eternity. Even when the self reveals itself to itself, this internal sense-organ alone becomes the instrument of that knowledge.[30] Even in the state of salvation when an individual soul is without body, sense-organ and everything else, it cannot dissociate itself from this organ.

When an individual soul realises its highest end, the mental world created by it becomes reabsorbed in that individual being out of which it evolved. The individual soul, then, becomes blind to the light of world. But the cessation of the psychical states does not mean the absolute destruction of one's soul. The change of the aspect does not mean the destruction of the substrate of that aspect. Green mangoes become yellow. This change of colour does not cause the destruction of the coloured object. Bliss also constitute the phenomenal world and hence, it must obey

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(29) S. D. page 486.

(30) Do.

the law of change. Therefore, we cannot think of permanent bliss as characterising soul in its realised condition. Again, without enjoyment bliss is meaningless and without a body enjoyment is absurd. But in the realised state association with a body is contradiction in terms. We are eager for salvation because we are troubled with the sufferings of life. The source of this stream of pain is the association of our soul with some body. Therefore our first attempt at realisation will be to find out the cause of this association and the means of disentangling our soul from the body. The path of proper action leads us to our desirable goal. Actions from egoistic motives enforce on us embodied existence. If we check such actions and perform only those actions, the non-performance of which brings about suffering and the performance of which does not add to the stock of our virtue, the actions which are stored up will be exhausted by fruition and no new life will ensue. Only thus will our soul be in its natural condition. In that state of soul there are no pain and pleasure. Then soul is not conscious of itself. Then it exists as an abstract reality, having no desire and want. This salvation is the absolute annihilation of all sufferings. This salvation is negative in its character.[31] Here, Kumārila has been influenced to a great extent by the doctrine of Goutama. But Kumārila's soul in that state is different from that of Goutama and Kaṇāda. In their view, salvation means absolute destructionof consciousness and the soul becomes identical with Space and Time without any reference to the past history of one's life. But Kumārila's soul is the permanent seat of consciousness. In that state, consciousness rests on soul potentially. To possess consciousness is not the same thing as being conscious of itself. The liberated souls of the Sānkhya school are

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(31) S. D. Page 508

consciousness. In the systems of the Sāmkhyas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas there is no duality as regards the nature of the soul. But in the system of Kumārila the seed of consciousness is inseparably bound up with the liberated soul stripped of the phenomenal aspects. But to an unreflecting mind the liberated souls of the different systems lack in distinction since none of them are conscious of themselves and consciousness out of relation to an object is inadmissible. Empty consciousness has imaginary existence and cannot have any real existence. But a critical thinker knows well the distinction between consciousness as a substance, consciousness as an attribute and consciousness as an accident. A critical thinker is not also taken aback by the surprising attack that consciousness cannot exist without any reference to some object. But a casual thinker fails to show that consciousness is produced and not modified by the objects. The main assumption of the first type of thinkers is that a cause produces an effect which was non-existent before its production. They do not convince us of the doctrine of new beginning. They simply assume it and base their view on it. But if consciousness were an accident and not an attribute of soul, the distinction bettween matter and spirit would be an idle talk and it would be better to accept the doctrine of materialism. It is consciousness which constitutes the soul of spiritual principle. If consciousness be allowed to part with our soul in any condition it is sure that the latter will renounce its spiritual character and be identical with dead matter. An effect to be effect must inhere in the cause in some from. Consciousness cannot constitute the substantive part of our soul, since, it is not unity i.e. it is not the connecting link but it is connected. Again, consciousness admits of variation and therefore cannot be a metaphysical entity maintaining identity in the midst of change. Therefore, consciousness is an effect.

The cause of this effect is soul which also supports it. This consciousness does not always manifest itself. Because this appearance in the actual from requires the operation of certain other conditions. These conditions are not eternal and hence consciousness in the actual form cannot be ever present. But its transition from the kinetic state to the potential state does not imply its reduction to void but it exists in the cause in the subtle form, for, destruction is nothing but the merging of the effect in the cause. Therefore, absolute destruction of a thing has no significance apart from its subtle existence in the cause. Therefore, our soul is always marked by consciousness. In the liberated state, the conditions of manifestation of consciousness being absent, consciousness of soul does not develop into self-consciousness and object-consciousness. But consciousness without any content may be empty and non-differenced; still it is never non-existent since the content of consciousness does not constitute the essential nature of consciousness. But, in ordinary life, we are always conscious either of ourselves or of ourselves and objects and hence, we think that consciousness in any form is invariably connected with some content. But we know nothing of consciousness in the potential form; because our actual consciousness is invariably connected with some content, we cannot infer that contentless consciousness is an impossibility. The law of causation which is more fundamental than the psychic law contradicts such a view. The law of causation implies the existence of an effect in the cause in the state of latency, The effect in this latent state cannot be differentiated from the cause. But if it had a content, it would reveal the nature of that content, since, every consciousness having any content whatever illumines that content. An object, if it is presented to consciousness cannot remain unknown. Therefore, consciousness in the liberated state is contentless; still, it is existent. Kumārila has mainly refuted the doctrine of soul of the Buddhist System. In the system of the Buddhists soul is nothing but the pure ideas. There is no permanent soul in their system. The idea of permanence is due to the fact that these ideas are very similar and one cannot detect this similarity and mistakes similarity of ideas for personal identity. Transitoriness constitutes the essence of all things. Ideas cannot be considered to be exceptional in this matter. Ideas as facts are like all other things of this world. We shall now critically examine this view. Ideas are momentary by their very nature. Hence this doctrine contradicts the well-established doctrine that the doer is the enjoyer.[32] The doer only lasts for a moment and during the short period it is not possible for it to do an action and enjoy the fruit of that action. In some cases, it is not also possible for an individual idea to complete even an action since, that action may extend over a long period of time.[33] In such a case a large number of ideas becomes the agent of that action. But the question is. "Who will be the enjoyer ?" If the fruit of an action done by one accrues to another, what is the necessity of doing actions at all ?

We may enjoy at the cost of the trouble and anxiety of others. The series cannot be held to be the real doer and enjoyer of action since a series has no real existence of its own. It is fictitious if it be different from the fleeting ideas. If the series be identical with the ideas, the difficulty is not solved.[34] Again, the series cannot be held to be partially different and partially identical with the momentary ideas, since, this series actually becomes identical with soul and

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(32) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 34.

(33) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 36.

(34) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 37.

the real contest is the contest of name.[35] One idea causes another idea and that in its turn produces another and so on. By virtue of the causal relation a non-doer may be an enjoyer as the son inherits the property of his father who has acquired the property. As a father does something for the good of his son so the cause-idea does an action for the enjoyment of the effect-idea. A cause cannot transmit its acquired character to the effect. The cause of inheritance has nothing in common with the causal transmission of character. Again, none in the world does something for the sake of another. The father maintains his son from the egoistic motive of deriving help in old age.[36] Again, if ideas be so, there is no possibility of rebirth. Ideas are immaterial and hence they cannot migrate from this body to another.[37] The Buddhists, to mend this defect, have had recourse to the assumption of a subtle body which appears after the death of a body and disappears at the time of rebirth.[38] Such a body may have mythological significance but has got no philosophical justification. The ideas are motionless and hence they cannot have any entrance to that subtle body. Again, this subtle body being the product of five elements cannot be mysterious in nature like an imaginary body of a visiting spirit and if it did exist, it would be perceived by us. Now, let us see what kind of ideas exists in the foetal body. Are these ideas actual or potential? If these ideas partake of the nature of the ideas of our later state, these ideas must be ideas of some objects. But the body in the embryonic stage is devoid of sense-organs and hence, the ideas are vague and cannot be coloured in the

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(35) S, V. Ātmavāda, verse 42.
(36) S. V. Ātmavāda, verse 84,
(37) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 61.
(38) „ „ verse 62.

light of the specific character of an object.[39] Again, impressions from within cannot supply the ideas with the forms since impressions are impossible without any relation of the ideas to the objects. Therefore, that these ideas are in potential condition must be admitted. But, in the potential condition, they must exist in some substrate.[40] The foetal body cannot serve the purpose of being the support since the ideas will vanish for ever with the destruction of the foetal body, the support of them. The theory of rebirth of the Buddhist system, in that case, should be abandoned. Therefore, we must accept some parmanent support of these potential ideas. This parmanent support is, in reality, the soul of the orthodox system by whatever different name it may be designated in the Buddhist system. Therefore, we see that the Buddhists to be consistent must accept a permanent principle which will support and connect these transient ideas. Again if the momentary ideas be our soul, it is not posssble for them to recognise past experience.[41] That I knew it and I know it at present is the form of recognition. In recognition of this form the identity of the cogniser is unavoidable. If the cogniser of the past fact be identical with the cogniser of the present fact, the cogniser cannot be momentary. Impressions cannot explain this fact of recognition.[42] Similarity cannot be equated with identity. Two ideas are not similar though they possess the common character of being the cogniser. (Again, recognition does not only take place when two experiences are similar but it also takes place when they are not alike.) The participation of ideas in a common character does not bring about the solution of the problem, since,

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(39) S. V. Ātmavāda, verse 65.

(40) S. V. Ātmavāda Verse 69.

(41) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 115.

(42) S. V. „ verse 103.

any and every idea is cognised but is not recognised and hence this fact of recognition remains unsolved. Hence, we must admit the existence of a permanent soul which underlies these two experiences and interprets them.

Is Kumārila's soul perceptible? Soul reveals itself to itself since it is self-luminous. But one's soul is not perceived by others because of its unique character of being self-luminous.[43] The existence of soul of another person is known through inference.[44] As the voluntary actions of myself are possible because in my body dwells the soul so the voluntary actions of others will also point to the existence of soul in their body. Kumārila like the Naiyāyikas hold that the individual soul is sometimes the object of cognition. Soul, characterised by cognition, becomes the subject and the substantive portion becomes the object. The substantive portion of soul is not illuminating and is unconscious as the objects are. This substantive portion of soul becomes the object of cognition. This view has been illucidated and criticised by Jayanta in his Nayamanjari.[45]

Kumārila, lastly, has held that this doctrine of soul is in perfect harmony with that of the Upaniṣads. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the wife of Yājañavalkya being confused by the conflicting views on this particular topic asks her husband about the true conclusion of the sages and particularly that of her husband on this subtle subject. The Upaniṣadic passages, in some places, clearly declare that the world has come out of void and in other places some other passages put forward the view that the world has evolved out of some existent principle. In some places, the soul has been equated with the body, the sense-organs, internal sense-organ etc. but, in other places, it has been described as eternal, bliss, exist-

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(43) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 142.

(44) S. V. Ātmavāda verse 145.

(45) Nyāyamanjari page 430.

ence, consciousness, free from all stain, hunger, thirst etc.These passages are sure to confound a reader, Yājñavalkya removes all doubts of his wife and teaches that soul is a separate substance and that it is imperishable. Kumārila's theory in these two respects is not in conflict with the doctrine of the Upaniṣads. But are these two aspects most fundamental? Kumārila has failed to establish the true relation subsisting between the doctrine of soul of the Upaniṣads and that of his system. Is soul of the Upaniṣads constituted by existence, bliss and consciousness? Or, is it the abode of consciousness etc.? What is the character of this bliss? Is it empirical pleasure? Or, is it transcendental in character? Or is its bliss constituted by the negation of pain? Is it one? Or is it many? Is it omnipresent? Or, is it a spiritual atom? In salvation does the individual soul merge into the Absolute? Or, does the individual soul acquire the auspicious and exalted attributes of the Supreme being? Kumārila has not solved all these problems of Upaniṣads in consonance with his position. But he has held that his doctrine of soul is based on the texts of the Upaniṣads. In Kumārila's opinion atheism does not consist in the repudiation of the Supreme being, but it consists in the non-acceptance of soul as a separate and real entity which is indestructible.

(1) A close exanination of Kumārila's doctrine reveals that Kumārila's merit consists in synthesis and that he has got no originality of views. Kumārila has applied the theory of causation of the Sāmkhya school to the soul of the Nyāya school. Kumārila does not believe in the doctrine ef new beginning. Consciouness is inseparably connected with its substrate. But the substrate is different from consciousness. This substrate of Kumārila is in no way different from the substrate of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The cognition, feeling etc. are mere accidents in view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school because

this school thinks that cognition etc. are non-existent before their coming into being. Therefore, the difference in the theory of causation is responsible for the difference in the nature of soul of the two schools. The followers of Kapila have restricted the law of causation to the sphere of unconscious matter. But Kumārila has extended the application of the law of causation to this spiritual sphere. In taking this bold step Kumārila has followed the foot-steps of the Jains. The soul of the Jains is changing in its character. Kumārila's soul also closely resembles that of the Jain school in the formal aspects. Therefore, we see that Kumārila has only exercised his genius in the matter of choice.

(2) Kumārila's soul is nothing but the combination of the intellect and the soul of the Sankhya school. Souls and the intellect of the Sankhya school are pure forms and the matter of empirical consciousness, respectively. In the Sankhya school the form and matter of consciousness are heterogeneous with each other. Kumārila has been able to construct a bridge over this gulf. Kumārila's soul is the harmonious whole consisting of the substrate and the stream of consciousness. Kumārila's genius lies in bringing about this harmony. But it is difficult to prove that this harmony is possible, since, the relation of the changing consciousness to the unchanging unconscious substrate is inconceivable.

(3) The substantive portion of soul is different from consciousness though it stands in permanent relation to the seed of consciousness since relation presupposes the existence of at least two terms entering into relation and the mutual distinction of the two terms. One cannot be related to itself. One of the two terms is consciousness and the other should be unconscious since there is no necessity of assuming two principles of consciousness. Again, if it be so, these two principles will be identical. Therefore, the substrate of the seed of consciousness is unconscious. If this be the case, we

fail to discern any relation existing between consciousness and its so called substrate since the unconscious principle can never be the support of consciousness. If we are willing to accept such a view, we should also be prepared to show our respects towards materialism. Therefore, Kumārila's soul is the material principle dressed in the attire of spirituality.

(4) Kumarila has not solved the following problems: How do individuals produce the object of common enjoyment? Why does the individual guide the invisible principle when it brings about some unpleasant consequence? How can a disembodied soul guide an invisible principle? What constitutes the difference in the nature of the liberated soul? Is salvation attainable during one's lifetime? How can the path of activity alone lead us to salvation, since, without true knowledge of soul one is sure to do such actions as stand in the way of attaining salvation?

The Rational basis of Advaitism.

T.R V. Murti M.A. Vedanta Śastri.

The purpose and scope of this paper is to inquire how far the main contentions of the Vedānta can be established without appealing to Scripture-texts or even to mystic intuition. The paper must be regarded as an attempt to arrange the arguments of the chief Vedāntic authors rather than an original construction of Advaitism. No statement or argument will be introduced which does not either refer to some arguments or words actually used by acknowledged Vedāntic writers or unmistakably imply them. As a preliminary measure the main contentions are here sought to be deduced from a few premises, which would be adequate to cover the entire field of Vedānta—its Ontology, Epistemology and Ethics. I shall then enquire—and this is the main purpose of this paper—how many of these propositions can be established by Reason alone and that too in what manner. The procedure is more or less similar to what Mr. Russell has done in regard to the system of Leibnitz in his book "The Philosopohy of Leibnitz".

I

The whole system of Vedānta can be deduced from these three premises which are given almost in the words Saṁkara. (1). "The differentiated view—'I am different from that and that from me" —pertains to the realm of Ignorance—to unreality. (यस्तु भेददृष्टि विषयः अहमन्योऽसावन्य इति न स वेदेत्यविद्याविषयः बृ. उ. II i. 1.)

This proposition with its implications as will be shown presently sums up what the Vedānta has to say about the number and nature of Being, how it is arrived at and the criterion of Truth—the Ontology and Epistemology of the Vedānta.

(2). The second is, in continuation with the first, that this false view (Ignorance) is the root of imperfection (pain, evil etc.) (अविद्यातद्विषयश्च ह्यनर्थं हेतुः Br. Sutr. Bhāsya. I. i. 1.).

(3.) Freedom from that is the moral ideal—the Absolute And the Absolute is the Self. "तत्प्रहाणं मोक्षः, मोक्षश्च ब्रह्मभावः (Br. Sutra I. i. 4 आत्मा च ब्रह्म). The last two comprise the Ethical contentions of the Vedānta.

A few obvious conclusions can be drawn from these premises and then we shall be in a position to envisage the nature and scope of the problems. From the first, it very naturally follows that a Relational view of things gives only **Appearance**, not reality, as it is obvious that difference is the basis of all Relations. Space, Time, Cause and Effect, Substance etc. are categories of Relation. Take away the element of difference between the Relata, e. g. between cause and effect, or substance and attribute and straight away they will collapse into an identity and the category in question would have vanished too. Saṁkara's favourite and oft-recurring expressions to characterise phenomena are exactly those that define all Relations (e.g. क्रियाकारक फलात्मक, साध्यसाधनभूत, प्रतिनियत देशकालभेद etc.). The most fundamental and far-reaching Subject-object Relation (प्रमातृप्रमाण प्रमेय व्यवहार) is therefore consistently declared false.

(ii) Secondly it follows that there can be no external Reality or as Saṁkara puts it, nothing external to be known.[1] For, conceive an external reality in whatever fashion we like, as matter, god or as a colony of monads we shall still be violating the proposition, which has been allowed for the time being. The reason is that then we shall have to relate that external reality to the consciousness which takes cognizance of such a reality. And this requires difference which is not compatible with our first premise.

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[1] "Br. up. Bhāṣya II i 20. P. 288. Anandaśrama Edn.

(iii) Therefore the Vedāntic Absolute (ब्रह्मन्) cannot comprehend more than the self. In this the Advaitic Absolute is entirely different from the Hegelian absolute in which the self is merely a moment, a part in the whole. Brahman is not a system, not a coherent whole of parts.[2]

(iv) It will also be easily conceded that such an Absolute must be self-established, i.e. it cannot be arrived at by a process of inference, for in that case the premise or premises which engender the conclusion shall have to be granted a status. But this will violate our proposition (1). The Vedāntic reality cannot be stated as an inference ; nor can it be even a judgment. If the predicate states more than the subject, it palpably introduces difference ; if it does not, the question is verbal. It is here suggested that the Hegelian conception of the Absolute Idea as a logical process undergoing a logical evolution cannot square with that of the Vedānta. To conceive it as a temporal process overflowing and fulfilling itself at each stage is out of question. This is to say that Truth and Reality must be coincident. There is actually no inferential process in arriving at Truth ; nor is the latter to be applied elsewhere—to Reality.

(v) The criterion of Truth applicable to the Vedāntic Ultimate can neither be correspondence nor coherence. Correspondence is a relation holding between two entities—in this case between the ideal content and the object such that, there is a one-one relation between the terms comprising the one and the other. Commonsense conception of truth as put forth by the Nyāya system (तत्त्वानुभूतिः or तद्वति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा) is a good example. A general criticism of this conception is here out of place but it is enough to show that Vedānta cannot accept this criterion, for the correspondence notion of Truth really starts with the unquestioned existence of some external reality to which the ideal content must approximate and bear a one-one relation. Nor can the Vedānta well countenance coherence which though hostile to external independent realities, is yet a notion applicable only to a system, to a rich content. But Brahman is a rigorous unity. So the criterion of Truth that is accepted by Vedāntic writers is Non contradiction ("अबाधितानधिगतासंदिग्धत्वम्").[3] As the criterion is purely negative, as it says what the reality is not rather than what it is, it is compatible with the initial proposition and its implications.

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[2] Brahman is Niravayava and Nirvikara etc.

Can the Vedāntic reality be adequately conceived as a substance—as conceived, e. g. by Spinoza ? The substance-hypothesis serves two useful purposes ; one in conceiving together two or more attributes which do not interpenetrate and sometimes even positvely exclude each other. Spinoza's 'substance' with the two mutually excluding attributes thought and extension is a case in point ; here the substance is more extensive than the attributes singly taken and there is a real difference between the two, substance and attributes. The second useful purpose is to give permanency to the substance even while the attributes are impermament, e.g. the Ātman of the Naiyāyikas. Here too the difference is real, else with the impermanence of the one the other cannot escape a similar fate. Apart from the criticism that this conception of substance is untenable, as the attributes so adventitiously brought together are independent substances themselves, it is enough for my purpose to point out that the Vedāntic Reality cannot be conceived as a substance as this necessarily implies a real difference.

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[3] Bhāmti. P. 108 (Nirnáya Sagara Edn.)

Brahman, therefore, cannot be a substance nor a system; it is not arrived through a process, being a self-established rigorous unity.

The second Premise बद् represents the transition from ontlogy to the metaphysics of morals and implies two things. First, it affirms the existence of imperfection, of evil and hence the necessity for Right conduct. Secondly it identifies the problem of conduct with that of knowledge by equating Ignorance with imperfection much as Spinoza does in conceiving Human bondage as due to the strength of the Passions, which are in turn nothing but "Confused ideas". There is nothing very startling in this standpoint for all the Indian systems do the same thing. Vedānta only carries this more fully and unflinchingly.

The third and last premise makes three or four assertions. The first is the possibility of the removal of moral imperfection whose presence the previous proposition took cognisance of. Secondly the moral ideal—the Ethical Absolute (मोक्ष) is identical with the ontological Absolute (ब्रह्म). And as a matter of fact this has to follow from two considerations, first from the identification of the Problem of conduct with that of knowledge and secondly from there being no scope for two ultimates in the Vedāntic scheme. The last assertion of the third premise is that the moral sanction or Authority is self-evident ; that it is not imposed upon us *ab extra*. The question "why is it incumbent upon us to realise the moral ideal" is answered by pointing out that the Absolute (moral ideal) is the self. (आत्मा च ब्रह्म, तत्वमसि etc.). It is thus evident that the two last propositions adequately formulate the chief Ethical issues.

II.

From Saṁkara's introduction to the Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya we may perhaps be led to think that Adhyāsa is the real starting point of his system and that he arrived at it not by any reasoning but through the Śruti texts (नेह नानास्ति किंचनः, यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति etc.). And that like Spinoza who started with *ex cathedra* definitions of Substance, modes, Attribute etc and spun a fairly complicated system, Saṁkara too, it may be held, took the Sruti texts and deduced some obvious consequences therefrom. But one who pronounces anything as Appearance (Adhyāsa) must have alighted upon Reality ; in any case that person uses a criterion of truth.

It cannot be said that Vedānta starts from a mere logical ideal of truth as Abādhyatva and then a reality is found answering to it. This will be to reverse the situation ; it was the reality which supplied the criterion and this is applied elsewhere only to pronounce other things as unreal, lacking reality. The reality in question is the Svayamprakāśa Ātman variously called as Saṁvit, Sākṣi caitanya, Kūtastha etc. Vedāntic writers themselves when they want to be convincing begin with an analysis of the self.[4] It was seen in considering the implications of the first proposition, that the Vedāntic Reality must needs be a self-established homogeneous unity, not a substance nor even a system and that in its content it cannot comprehend more than the self. It is to be shown that these contentions can be validated by anylysis of experience.

All presentations, experience in general, involve a transcendental factor—conscious awareness by which they are known as such. By a transcendental factor I mean in

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[4] Citsukhī, Pancadasī and Khaṇḍana ; Opening Chapters.

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the Kantian sense, that which makes experience possible though not presented as a content itself. A distinction is here sought to be made between the content, the manifold of sensations etc—and the awareness to which they are presented as such. It seems fairly obvious that what is known is different from the act of knowing. If this position be not acceptable one may adopt either of the following alternatives. One may, as Russell[5] has done after criticising the analyses of Brentano and Meinong, deny "the hypothetical act of awareness"—"the time-honoured Psyche" and say that there is nothing but 'content' or in Russell's own words 'events.' The difference between a Physical and the so-called conscious event lies, according to Russell, in the latter's occurring in a region combining, the correlation of various sensitivities and the law of "Conditioned reflex" to a remarkable degree—that is, in a region called the living brain. A slightly different position was held by some Buddhists whe endowed mental events with conscious awareness of themselves—both as the content and the act at once. (एकत्र कर्म्मकर्तृभावः).

The second alternative is to conceive the act of awareness as a sort of reflexive stroke. First, there is the presentation, the idea in the Lockean sense and then by reflexion, by a distinct and separate act, the first is made the content of another and so on. This is practically the standpoint of all English Empiricists ; the best Indian representative is the Naiyāyika with his Anuvyavasāya.

These two alternatives are untenable ; the first because it seeks to account for the difference between a physical and a mental event not in terms of experience, knowledge, but in terms of physiology, by saying that it is entirely due to the place of occurrence (brain). And

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[5] Analysis of Mind ; Chap. I.

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as this place of occurrence does not enter consciously even as a content into the mental event the epistemological status of the two (mental and physical event) is the same i. e. nil. I am equally unaware of them both.

The second alternative[6] too is untenable, not only because it leads to a regress but because there is no experiential basis for this hypothetical backstroke. It is not that an appreciable time—say even a moment elapses between the presentation and my awareness of it. The first emergence of a presentation carries with it an awareness of it. This it to say that the factor of awareness is present from the outset. If so, it is clear then that such a factor cannot be a product—an outcome of experience. Let us suppose the opposite view—that it is a product of experience – to be true. This means that the factor of consciousness came late on the scene (आगन्तुक). There was a time when experience could do without this and there is no reason why it should not do without this altogether. What is more, the burden of explaining or explaining away the precise function of consciousness in the economy of things will have to be shouldered by one who would seek to conceive consciousness as a product (as an epiphenomenon).

Hitherto, it was shown that the act of awareness must be different from the content and that it is not a product of experience because what is a requisite condition of all experience cannot itself be conditioned by it. But here we fall into a dilemma.[7] If the act of awareness be known then straight away it becomes a content and then a good deal more of it must be known than its

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6. Cf Citsukhī P. 16. where Anuvyavasaya is criticised.

7. Cf Citsukhī (P. 8).

mere form. At least it will prove that there is no hard and fast distinction between the apprehending consciousness and the thing apprehended as they can change places. If unknown, it is better in the interest of truth, that we cease talking glibly about it; it is only a fiction. Neither of these alternatives is acceptable. Unknown it cannot be for in that case even when we have expereince we may either doubt the knowing or even hold that we do not know[8]. But this is directly contradicted by our expereince. Any genuine doubt or denial pertains only to the centent side and is never about awareness. The other alternative is equally incompatible. If it is known as a content it will cease to be a transcendental factor; the consequence will be that we shall have to bring in another consciousenss to apprehend the first and so on. This means that even the first experience is not established; we are drawing a conclusion which goes against its own premise.[9]

We are therefore led to conclude that (1) the act of awareness is and can never be presented as a content —it is the eternal subject (2) and yet it is to be known and this is possible only when it is considered self-conscious—directly and immediately known[10]. It is self-established. The Kantian doctrine of the Transcendental unity of Apperception or self consciousness involves this conception.

This factor of self-consciousness is not a mere logical form, like the rule of cause and effect, the law of identity etc. which guide us in drawing conclusions. A logical form never actually enters as a factor in experience for one can say that a logical dictum is always before the mind but not in it. But here the presence or absence of the factor of self-consciousness makes all the world of difference. Kant himself was very serious in his belief that he was giving another discipline, a Transcendental Logic closely parallel to the traditional one. His successors Fichte and Hegel saw the true metaphysical significance of his critique and were not slow to profit by it.

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[8]. Cf Khandana. (P. 89, Benares, Choukhamba Edn.)

[9]. Citsukhī P. 16.

[10]. Cf Citsukhī's Definition of Svayamprakāsa and also Saṁkṣepa Śārīraka, I. 331.

Further, this conception of self-consciousness involves that it should be one, unitary and invariable, otherwise the same inpasse. Suppose the transcendental factors which condition our knowledge were many, they must then severally operate and make their presence felt as it is idle to maintain a mere possibility of their existence. Then they are known as many and the consciousness by which they are known as many must be different from them. And secondly, what is known as a content is not and cannot serve as a transcendental factor. This means that these many factors are not real and if they are there, the consciousness which knows them as many must really be one. Many consciousnesses appear to be contradictory; therefore it must needs be a unity.

The question of its being invariable (continuous) is allied to the question of its being a unity ; the one refers to numerical oneness and the other to temporal oneness. The continuity of consciousness, like its unity can be proved only negatively by showing that the hypothesis of a break in consciousness is untenable. The undemonstrablity of any positive ground for continuity, far from constituting a defect in the argument, rises from the very nature of the case. For we have already seen that it cannot be known as a presentation ; but a positive demonstration implies its being presented.

Let us suppose then that there is a break in consciousness; then it is either known or unknown. If it is known, then far from proving discontinuity it reiterates the continuity of consciousness. The consciousness of breaks has overlapped and healed the break. Take the other alternative that it is not a conscious break but a break all the same. We may at once dispose of it by questioning the evidence for such breaks and then the second alternative will really be reduced to the first. But let us grant it merely to appreciate the consequences. By a break in consciousness we must understand that sometimes consciousness exists, at other times not. Just as sometimes we perceive things about us due to the presence or absence either of our attention or the things. The consequences of such a position would be that sometimes we would be having perceptions without our being aware of them. Some presentation will knock at the door and yet there will not be any Sākṣi-caitanya to cognize it. But this is not warranted by our experience. A presentation is known as such when it receives admittance. All cases of subconscious or unconscious ideas are really consciously perceived at the time of their occurrence, the difference being that they are not fully co-ordinated with the stream of waking ideas. This is evident from the fact that when they are unearthed and brought to light by removing the 'censorship', they are not disowned. The psychological status of the conscious and the so called unconscions and sub-conscious ideas may be different but not their epistemological one. They are known as presented from the very outset. We are not justified then in asserting a break in consciousness. We can say of consciousness that its light is never put out.[11] It is Abādhita and this cannot be said of any other.

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[11] Cf. Samkara's Bhāṣya on the Br̥. up. Text. नहि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपविद्यते and also Page. 162. Anandashrama Edn.

If there is neither break nor end to consciousness, there is also no doubt in respect to its existence. Saṁkara disposes of the doubt concerning the ātman in two ways. Firstly, there is no genuine doubt, as none actually doubts it. An analysis of doubt will show us that it pertains only to that which is presented as 'this' or 'that' इदन्तया प्रतिपन्न or, as the Naiyāyikas have it, to the content of knowledge expressed by the predicate (प्रकारांशे संशयः). As consciousness—the eternal subject cannot be presented as an object, it cannot be doubted. Secondly even if it is doubted the very doubt proves its existence (य एव निराकर्त्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात्).

From the non-presentability of the Ātman (consciousness) some considerations follow; one that the Ātman is attributeless (निर्धर्मक) for we cannot give it any content, any predicate, and hence no difference or limitation can be assigned to it as difference must be based upon special features—attributes. And these are absent in consciousness.

But the greatest difficulty still remains. It may be that consciousness is different from the content or the object, that it is not a product of experience but a prerequisite condition of its possibility and that it is not presented as content but directly and immediately known. But this is all in vain if it is proved that consciousness cannot be divorced from content, that the subject is indissolubly connected with the object so that if the one is not, the other also is not. The assertion of the Vedānta that there is no external reality and that the Absolute cannot be said to contain more than the Self, must fall to the ground. It is therefore to be shown that the self can exist without the object and its nature is in no way impaired. At least an unmistaken possibility must be pointed out. It may be objected that this problem is identical with what was essayed to be proved at the beginning that the act of awareness is different from the content as it is can apriori condition of all experience. But really the issue here is different. There we were interested in showing that experience is not possible without the apriori factor which has at the same time to be different from the content. Now we are interested in asking whether the apriori factor can be without the content and still be unimpaired (in Vedāntic language the Muktasvabhāvatā of the Ātman).

The realation between the two, consciousness and content, seems to be indissoluble. Idealism in the West can be said to rely entirely on the strength of Relations. Berkeley was successful in proving that 'ideas' cannot exist without the mind, without a relating consciousness. But the argument really cuts both ways. The relating consciousness also cannot exist without the object to be related, as relation is internal i.e. bites into and grips the relata. No one has felt the implications of this position more strongly than Hegel. His whole dialectic rests upon the untenability of having the one without the other—the inherent contradiction of abstraction. So the Hegelian Absolute must needs contain all denomintions, all the rich variety. It is to be a concrete universal. The Vedāntic Absolute is quite the opposite ; it repels all content, all richness. Both the systems assert vehemently that there is nothing beyond the Absolute. Hegel's argument is that, whatever cannot be abstracted away, must in reality be there already. The Vedāntic argument is that, whatever can be absent or abstracted away without impairing the nature of anything really does not belong to it, must be thought of as an excrescence. (अविद्या परिकल्पित) The crucial test between the two views is the showing of the possibility or otherwise of any expereince in which the object is unmistakably absent.

The position of Kant is rather curious. We have followed him till now in bringing out the implications of experience, in recognizing the apriori factor, the transcendental synthetic unity of Apperception. He begins to falter in assigning a status to that factor. He considers the self-conscious unity as an empty form—I am I—when regarded apart from all the manifold which it apperceives. But still his instincts were right; he refused to confront the self eternally with the manifold. As he thought he could not prove the freedom of the self by pure reason, he fell back upon practical reason after having taken extraordinary precautions to silence understanding if it transcended its spheres. The Transcendental Dialectic serves this purpose of disarming understanding so that he may have a free hand with regard to his cherished doctrines, Freewill, Immortality and God. But Vedānta does not have recourse to Practical reason to safeguard the freedom of the self. It relies upon more natural and common experience; it explores the implications of the various phases of experience—waking, dreaming, sleeping etc. Kant missed this chiefly because it is not the vogue in the west to explain these phases of life. If there can be a metaphysic of the waking experience, there is no *prima facie* reason why it should be denied to the equally common and univrsal experience of sleep. If there cannot be, at least the impossibility is to be shown. We have a real problem to be dealt with.

Sleep presents us three problems. Is there any consciousness at all there? This is tantamount to asking whether the self exists in sleep. There were not wanting persons even in the upaniṣadic times, who denied the self in sleep. Indra says to Prjāpati that in sleep the self does not know its very existence, it comes to nought.

Secondly, what can be its nature if some entity is accepted in sleep and thirdly is it strictly continuous with the preceding and posterior consciousness?

The importance of of *Suṣupti* to the system has been very well recognized by the Vedāntic authors. The Maṇḍūkya upaniṣad and the kārikās represent a brilliant attempt to reach Reality through an analysis of these states, which are there described as the *Pādas* and *Mātrās* of the *Praṇava.* In the Bri. Up. there are two places where Śaṁkara undertakes a very elaborate and suggestive discussion of the issues. The one is in connection with Ajātaśatru's questions (addressed to Bālāki after forcibly waking up a sleeping person)—"where was he," "whence has he come". (क्वैष तदा भूत्, कुत एतदगात्). The other is the persistent questioning of Yājnavalkya by Janaka, "By what light does the Puruṣa work and move about when all the empirical paraphernelia is taken away. (अस्तमित आदित्ये......किं ज्योतिरयं पुरुष :)

This is a common experience of all of us that "I slept well", "I was not knowing others not even myself". This has to be explained. It is possible to consider this either as a true experience, (experience actually undergone) or as illusory, meaning thereby that the content of one experience is falsely referred to another. A pre-sleep or a post-sleep experience of the absence of any concrete objects then, is falsely transcribed and attributed to the time of gap—a difference merely in the dating of the perception of emptiness (अभाव) But this attempt at explaining away is futile,[12] for the two states must be known—the pre or post-sleep state on the one hand and the gap state on the other, so that the content of either of the former can be falsely transferred to the latter (gap state), just as both shell and silver must be known to a certain extent if the one is to be mistaken for the other. But here *ex hypothesi*

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12. Cf The arguments of Citsukhi pp. 55 ft.

there is no knowledge of the gap at any time and hence it cannot enter as a term in illusion.

Let us take the other alternative that this experience is true, as really experienced. The simplest hypothesis is to admit the existence of consciousness, that it was conscious of its having had nothing to cognize, of its being a spectator[13] of an empty theatre otherwise usually crowded. Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya has very admirably shown to us in his lectures on the "Dissociation of the Subject"—that an adumbration of complete dissociation is given us in such psychical experience as the conscious non-perception of objects (अनुपलब्धि), trying to think, trying to imagine an ostensibly impossible thing as the square-circle etc. The self subject, is as it were in a knowing attitude but there is not anything to be known—through no fault of it.

What other alternative can be adopted if we do not want to accept consciousness in sleep with its invariable implications—its being self-consciousness, independent of objects and continuous and yet not going to the extent of treating the experience as illusory. There is the handy conception of the self as a substance, consciousness or thought appearing at intervals—the self remaining a permanent identical entity, because it is a substance. The knotty problems of personality, memory and moral agency seem very admirably explained by the conception of substance. The example that will readily suggest itself is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the Ātman as a substance with about 9 special attributes no two of them existing simultaneously. The sleeping state does not present a problem at all to such a philosophy.

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[13] Cf Sidhantaśarsaṁgrah. P 184, (Benares Ed.)

But this hypothesis does not really explain anything. If a thing has any property either it has it always or it has that not altogether.[14] "Sometimes having the propety in question" means that one substance (X) had the property A_1 at one time and a numerically different substance (Y) has the property A_2 at this time. The numerical identity of the two substances (X & Y) cannot be proved, for, this can be done only through the numerical identity of the attributes; but for one who says that the attribute is sometimes present and sometimes not this is denied. If the attribute is present always and equally so throughout the substance, no useful purpose is served by the substance-hypothesis.

We have to conclude that consciousness is continuous in sleep; that it is self-conscious or else the very purpose of admitting a consciousness is defeated, and that no useful distinction can be made between consciousness and the self for the very same reason. The nature of the self must be such that it persists even when severely alone and we cannot assert any thing else of it than self-conscious awareness (स्वयं ज्योतिः स्वभाव). Naturally it follows that what can be absent without impairing the nature of an entity must be considered super-added to it, an appearance of it. The absence of the object does not impair consciousness hence the object is an appearance. The relation between consciouness and content is one-sided; though the latter cannot exist and be known without the former, the reverse is not true.

To sum up, the self is the only thing to which the criterion of Reality is applicable as it is continuous and invariable. It is self-established and self-conscious. We have also seen that it can neither be a system nor a substance. These are precisely the implications of the 1st premise.

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[14] Br. up. Bhāṣya, P. 289.

II.

If Vedānta declares that the self is the only Reality we may not agree but we cannot begin by asking it to recognize the reality of the world as well, on whatever grounds we might have come to persuade ourselves of its reality. The opponent may adopt some such procedure as this to urge his contention. If it is proved that consciousness is a condition of experience, the content is also an equally important factor. Surely, it is not a product of consciousness, for, then the whole distinction between the two will have vanished. So it is to be considered as being contributed by the independent reality—the world of objects.

But this is cogent if there were no other means of something appearing as content in knowledge. In all cases of illusion what is not really in being comes to find its way in knowledge and this constitutes its falsity. Provided Vedānta makes this explanation plausible, there should be no insurmountable epistemological difficulty. The Vedāntic acceptation of a Vyāvahārika world does not mean a duplication of realities. The Vyāvahārika and the *Pāramārthika* are not to be conceived as existing side by side or that the former exists at one time and the latter at another when the Vyāvahārika is sublated. It is meant to convey that the Vyāvahārika in its nature and duration is coincident with false knowledge. For a false knowledge these three things are requisite.

(i) First, a privation of knowledge of the true state of things. This is indispensable, for a knowledge of the true state would not only put an end to the illusion any time but would make it impossible from the very outset. This is the very basis (*Adhiṣthana*) on which the illusion stands.

(ii) An adequate idea of the thing mistaken for is also necessary as it determines the *content* of the illusory knowledge, gives it a character (as the illusory perception of a snake, of a piece of silver etc). The idea may be either the impression of a thing actually experienced or simply something communicated to us by others or even imagined by us at any other previous time. The idea must be adequate too in the sense that there cannot be more in the content of an illusion than what can legitimately be explained as due to our previous knowledge.

(iii) Thirdly, a relating consciousness must also be granted. For, we cannot conceive of any falsity in being, when things are severely alone by themselves. "Things appear what they are not really" means that they are wrongly brought together and this is the work of consciousness.

These three conditions being enough to explain any illusory perception to which the content in presentations has been reduced by Vedānta, it can be legitimately asked to establish these only. Enough has been said to establish the third condition—consciousness. The first two —the non-emergence of the real thing in consciousness and an adequate idea of the thing mistaken for, are conveniently brought by Vedānta under the conception of Avidyā [15] as at once an *Avaraṇa* (that which covers the true nature of reality) and Vikṣepa (the cropping up of the new factor in illusion).

This new factor Difference is quite adequate to explain the manifold content of the world of Relations. Space, Time, Causality, Substance and other categories are Relational and so given relations we must be able to deduce them. Relation is based upon difference. The categories

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15. Saṁkṣepa Śāriraka. I. 20.

through which the world appears to us are nothing but the different froms of this one factor.

This being the requirement and conception of Avidyā, it is to be established that Avidyā of this precise nature exists. And this is sought here to be proved by a critique of moral consciousness. The steps in the procedure are (i) that moral consciousness as a fact of experience cannot be doubted and hence whatever is implied by that will have to be granted (ii) An analysis of any moral endeavour will show the existence of a present imperfection which is sought to be remedied by an endeavour directed towards the ideal. (iii) Thirdly this imperfection cannot be conceived except as ignorance; on no other supposition can it be consciously removed by the endeavour of a moral agent. And this can only be an ignorance of the good, the moral ideal. (iv) Fourthly the moral ideal can have no binding upon us if it is conceived as any other thing except the self. In any other case there will be no moral endeavour. So moral imperfection means igrorance of the moral ideal—the self and this is precisely the Avidyā of the Vedāntins. If the following arguments are not considered for the actual existence of anything, they are to be treated as postulates necessary to safeguard our moral nature.

(i) By moral consciousness, I mean any conscious practical endeavour directed towards a desired end. (इष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहाररूप). All our activities are of this sort. Man cannot consider himself a part of nature; he is willing and resolving always.

Now someone chooses to deny the existence of moral consciousness; he can do so only by denying the essential conditions. They are two; one is a present state of dissatisfaction with the existing condition of things, an imperfection, and second, an ideal conceived as possible of achievement by volition. One can deny imperfection by saying that nothing is amiss, everything is as it should be and hence no call for any remedy. Imperfection is therefore merely imagined illusory requiring therefore no measures.

But this conception directly plays into the hands of the Vedāntin, for it reduces imperfection to illusion. The moral endeavour will now be directed not to remove imperfection (as it does not exist) but the illusion of an imperfection. And this is possible only by proving that in reality every one is perfect—precisely the Vedāntic standpoint.

Secondly one may deny the possiblity of achieving the moral ideal adducing some such arguments as that from the very nature of the case the ideal is a stone-wall which cannot be climbed over. Or that it is an eternal strife, an endless energising and in this consists the essence of moral life. But this cannot prevent moral endeavour but only its being fruitful. And fruitfulness or otherwise can be ascertained only by trying. Where one fails another may succeed; much also depends upon the nature of the moral ideal. If really the moral ideal is impossible of achievemnet even then the illusion about its possibility demand activity to be removed. Let us consent to call this activity to remove the illusion about the possibility of achieving the moral ideal, a moral endeavour, for it is no little gain to know our limitations. In any case the presence of an imperfection and the endeavour to attain the moral end cannot be denied.

Now in what way can we conceive the nature of moral imperfection? Religious nature would regard it as sin, swerving from the straight narrow path, sometimes going to the extent of calling it an original sin. Others regard it as evil tendencies, passions or as the identification of oneself with a lower universal. In this set of conceptions man is treated as a conscious spiritual principle as a moral agent at whose door responsibility is laid. Man being a conscious principle, the only imperfection suitable in the case is that which makes him less so, less conscious of his own nature i. e. that it can be only Ignorance.

Take the Spinozistic conception of imperfection (Human bondage as he calls it) as due to passions. The essence of passions consists in their being misdirected. The difference between love and hate cannot be measured in terms of volition for that is present in both the cases equally. The differentia is that one is misdirected, the other is not; in the one case something is mistaken for the good but in the other it is not so. In the Hegelian view of imperfection as indentification with a lower universal, the moral agent mistakes the lower for a Higher one which would adequately realise his interests.

By another consideration too we have to identify imperfection with ignorance. If it were anything but that, it cannot be consciously removed by our will. No amount of willing can reduce, much less remove imperfection if it were a real entity.[16] Then there is no objective in making the realisation of the moral ideal imperative, in yoking us to an admittedly impossible task. Nothing but ignorance can be consciously removed and if moral endeavour is to be safeguarded, imperfection is not only to be granted but must be identified with ignorance of the good—the moral ideal.

But there is another set of conceptions about moral imperfection (if it be so called) which will not lend itself so easily to its being identified with ignorance.

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16. Cf. Saṁkara's criticism of Prapañca pravilaya Vāda. Br. Sūtras III ii 22.

Want of proper adjustment with the envorinment, says the Evolutionist, is imperfection, as in a perfect state the two would be propely attuned ; or it is also conceived as want of adjustment between the pleasure-giving and vital processes. The utilitarian view of imperfection is that of a state in which the greatest pleasure of the greatest number is not secured. These systems of Ethics really treat man as a product of nature ignoring his spiritual nature. The acceptance of these will upset most of the conclusions reached in the previous part of this paper and there is no strong apriori reason why they should be accepted. Moreover the moral ideal in these cases has no binding as will be shown presently.

It was shown before that moral imperfection really means ignorance of the moral ideal—the supreme good. The problem of conduct is persent with us because something not really the good is paid homage. 'What is the good' is now the question. Whatever may be ultimately arrived at as to the nature of the good, this dictum can be laid down that it should be such that would not make moral endeavour impossible.

We can atonce proceed to the root of the matter by stating that if the moral ideal be conceived in any other way except as self-realisation or better still as the self, there is no categorical imperative, no binding why we should realise the ideal. The standard—greatest pleasure of the greatest number—is binding upon me only if I accept that the greatest pleasure is my aim ; but I may refuse to accept this hypothesis and yet be none the worse for it. Even when individual pleasure is put forth by Hedonism as the moral ideal, I can refuse to take steps to realise it unless it is proved that I shall be worse without it, i. e. will be injuring myself. All conceptions of the moral ideal as something external to the self as "dnty for its own sake," 'virtue,' "the good of society" etc. have only a hypothetical binding.

Saṁkara in his criticism of the Karma Kāṇḍa— injunctions (स्वर्गकामोयजेतen) says that they are binding upon one who accepts that svarga etc. as his ideal but none whatsoever upon one who sets no great store by them. Hedonism derives its plausibility because it is uncritically held that through pleasure the self is realised. But this ought not to be taken for granted. Ethics cannot avoid a critique into the nature of the self to ascertain what sort of moral ideal can be suitable to the self. This has been well-recognised by the Hegelians especially by Green. Hypothetical morality may serve a very useful purpose in our practical life and is good as far as it goes but it has absolutely no metaphysical justification to be considered as the good unconditionally. If self-realisation is the moral ideal, it is binding upon us as we cannot deny ourselves. Vedānta sums up its supreme teaching in the fromula which expresses the complete identity of the moral ideal with the self तत्वमसि. The enquiry now turns upon the character of the self that cannot be denied. What is truly the self? The first part of this paper was undertaken to determine the essential nature of the self. There we came to the conclusion that it is a self-conscious unity whose nature is not impaired when severely alone.

It may be objected of this self being the moral ideal that there is really no use for moral endeavour, no willing of anything, for, one can neither leave nor acquire the self as it is actually there. This is true when the self is actually alone, in its own nature. To the extent it is not realised as such there is the moral endeavour. Volition—the will—has for its objective the removal of imperfection, the ignorance which infects it. The essence of willing consists in merely holding steadfast to one idea to the exclusion of others, which seek to displace it. And this sort of willing is possible even when there is nothing really to be achieved externally. In this sense of excluding the not-self (Avidyā) alone is self-realisation meant in the Vedānta.

So it comes to this that if there is a moral consciousness there is imperfection, which is nothing but ignorance of the good. This in turn cannot be anything but the self; hence it is really an ignorance of the self—the Absolute. Ignorance is not only a mere privation of a knowledge of the Alsolute but also the very opposite of it, for imperfection is an existing entity. If the self is a self-conscious unity, Avidyā is the principle of inertness जड़ and difference etc—the stuff of which the world is made.

The second part of our enquiry has tried to validate the Ethical doctrines of the Vedānta viz. the existence of the moral problem, its identity with that of knowledge and the nature of the moral ideal and authority summed up in the formula—the self is the Absolute (आत्मा च ब्रह्म).

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CONTENTS

PAGE.

I.—The Subject and the Object (Contd): G. R. Malkani. . . . 149
II—The Nature of Empirical Self : R. Das 162
III.—The Voluntaristic Conception of the World : H. D. Bhattacharyya 174
IV.—A Neglected School of Vedanta : Umesh Chandra Bhattacharyya 191
V.—Reviews.

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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

The subject and the object (Continued.)

By G. R. Malkani.

IV.

The next question that confronts us is the relation of the subject and the object in experience. Now whenever we think of relation, we necessarily think of two or more terms between which the relation is supposed to subsist. A single term by itself cannot be thought of as related [1]. Secondly, we also think of the terms as, in a certain sense, independent of the relation and of each other. To speak of them as constituted by the relation is to say what is meaningless ; for in that case the relation will have to be conceived as logically prior to the terms *between which* it is supposed to be a relation. On the other hand, if we regard the terms as somehow independent of the relation in which they afterwards enter, we create other difficulties. The relation becomes a sort of an external tie, not only indifferent to the being of the terms related, but requiring some other relation whereby it may be related to the terms in question. This new relation will in turn require to be related and so on *ad*

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(1) Some writers think that a thing can be related to itself. This we think is impossible.

infinitum. We shall never be able, in this way, to complete the necessary links to get a relation.

It appears to us that we cannot give any satisfactory analysis of what we call a relation, if we regard a relation as a constituent of the world of objects, existing apart from the relating consciousness. A relation must not be *there* simply ; a relation must relate ; and relating is an activity that can only be exercised by what is itself unrelated and what constitutes the essential unity of the relation, namely mind or consciousness. A relation is therefore the subjective determination of one object by another object, and does not exist *between* the terms related but in the mind that relates them. The question whether relata are first or relation is first, is quite meaningless ; for neither can exist apart from the other ; they are two aspects distinguished with one and the same piece of knowledge. What is first, if we may say so, is the unrelated ground of relations.

But is not the subject itself in some way related to its objects ? Evidently, it is the supposition that there is a relation here which makes Mr. Bradley regard consciousness as a paradox, and to advance the theory that it is a superinduction upon what is according to him a more harmonious and consistent whole, namely experience or feeling. He says in one place "Is the subject given ? No, for, if so, it would itself be an object. we seem, then, to have one term and a relation without a second term. But can there be a relation with one term ? No, this appears to be self-contradictory, and, if we assert it we must justify and defend our paradox." [2] But is there any relation here at all ? We think that Mr. Bradley has not faced this issue, and that therefore his attack upon consciousness is misdirected.

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(2) Ibid, P. 211.

A relation is only possible between objects; for objects alone can be said to be mutually determined. The subject, *ex hypothesi*, is not an object, and can never be. How can it then be related? It is true that we distinguish it from objects. But as soon as we have so distinguished it, it has ceased to be the true subject; it has become an object. The true subject can never be distinguished, and can never be related. Further, no relation is possible that is not grounded in what is unrelated. This unrelated ground, we have seen, can be no other than the subject of knowledge. The subject then, taken as subject and not as object, cannot be related. There would be no kind of a paradox if we so took it. The paradox arises because we are inclined to treat the subject both as subject and as object at the same time.

Let us however suppose that the subject is related. The subject then becomes an object and we require another subject to know it. That in turn will require another subject; and so on *ad infinitum*, with the result that the subject will not be known at all.

It might perhaps be argued that this difficulty is not a serious one; for after all the subject *is distinct* from the object. Professor Ward for example says in the article to which we have already referred. "If, however, on the other hand, we regard the subject knowing as distinct from the object known; then, in order that this knowing subject may be an object known, we require a second subject or at least a higher grade of consciousness. We seem committed not only to consciousness of consciousness but to consciousness of consciousness of consciousness. and so on indefinitely. This has been regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum* from Aristotle onwards, and has led psychologists generally, either to shirk the whole question or to incline to the alternative of absolute identity. But whatever may be our speculative preference for an absolute limit as against an indefinite regress, there is surely great force in Kant's doctrine that it is the business of science to abide by the latter. After all perhaps the regress will not be found to go very far."[3] The hope here expressed will never be realized; for a question which is appropriate to start with will never become inappropriate by any number of mere repetitions of it. Besides, the issue as presented by Professor Ward does not appear to us to be a correct one. For, if we cannot regard the subject as an object known, it does not follow that the subject must therefore be identical whith the object. Such identity is incompatible with any form of knowledge, and nobody has seriously argued it. We cannot even regard it as a limiting case. Professor Ward says, "A knowledge in which subject and object are one is at best but a limiting case towards which we might perhaps conceive ourselves approximating in self-consciousness and even continue to approximate indefinitely."[4] But do we approximate to this identity in self-consciousness? Then we rely more upon the form of this expression than we do upon the fact itself. Self-consciousness is not in principle different from objective consciousness; and the duality of subject and object does not become less evident because the object is one of reflexion and not one of direct sensible apprehension.

The mistake lies in raising at all the question, how the subject may be known or how it is related to its objects. If it could be known, it would no longer be subject; and if it were related to its objects, it would, by this very relation, become its own object. The subject is subject, because it is unrelated; any attempt to conceive it in any relation will end by making of it a subject no longer.

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(3) PP. 64-65.
(4) P. 64.

It is perhaps natural for us to think (and this is because we think by making distinctions), that as an object has relations to other objects, so one of its many relations is its relations to the subject. But a little reflexion would show us that while all those relations of an object to other objects are relations between what is quite distinct one from another, neither the object nor those relations are distinct from the subject, and that this relation therefore cannot be one of the object's many relations. *It is a relation, if relation we can call it, in which the terms supposed to be related cannot be held apart even ideally without destroying the relation.* It is not a relation in any sense of the term that we know of.

We may put the same matter in a slightly different way. The object has many relations which are known. But its relation to the subject cannot be one of these relations; for, if we knew the relation of the object to the subject, the knowing relation itself would cease. There would then be no one to know and no relation. The complete knowledge of the object thus does not require the knowledge of its relation to the subject as a costituent.

This so-called relation cannot supply us with *any* information about the object just as other relations of the object do. Shall we say, it is redundant? But how can it be redundant, when the object itself and all its relations are known only in this relation? The truth is that since the object and all its relations are only known in their "non-distinction from the subject", they have no reality apart from it. It is in this sense that we can maintain the identity of the subject and the object; and this identity is an actual fact and not a limiting case. It is based upon the recognition that the object and all its relations cannot be disengaged from the relation of knowing which they are assumed to have to the subject.

V

It has been suggested that the subject and the object are neither one, nor separate and distinct. The subject and the object are *correlative* ; and the fact of this correlation is the ultimate fact which any analysis of experience can possibly reveal to us. The attempt to find contradiction here will in fact defeat itself ; for if there were any contradiction, there would be no possibility of that very experience upon which the attempt itself is ultimately based.

Now two terms are said to be correlative when they are constituted the terms they are not by anything that they are "in themselves," but by their relation each to the other. But how can such terms be known ? If A has a necessary reference to B, and B, in its turn a necessary reference to A, neither A nor B can be known. The fact that they are known can only be accounted for on the hypothesis that they are also known apart from the relation which constitutes their mutual bond. Can we say that the subject and the object can be known otherwise than in their mutual relation ? If not, how are they known at all ? But if they *are* known otherwise, their correlatedness cannot be the ultimate word about them.

We may also note that terms that are correlated can only be known as such by that which does not itself form a term of the correlation. This means that only objects can be correlated. The subject that knows can never be known to be correlative to anything. When therefore we assert that the subject and the object are correlative, who can possibly know the fact ? The truth is that although the subject may know itself to be correlated (for all knowledge is by distinctions), still, in thus knowing itself, it is in its essential nature unrelated and the very ground of the known correlation. What it apprehends as correlated to the objects is we might say, not *itself*, but the objective "me,"—a very different entity.

Terms which are correlative are also, in a sense mutually exclusive. Now it is evident that a term which is exclusive of another term cannot itself be the ground of any relation to that term. The ground evidently must be inclusive of the terms related by it: and while it cannot be merely identical with either of the terms, it cannot also be a third term. A third term would not relate, for it would itself require to be related. Mr. Bradley evidently commits this error when he treats the true subject as though it fell outside the correlation, as a possible *third* term in addition to the terms correlated by it. He says in the article to which we have already alluded, "The correlated terms are for a subject which itself is not given. The correlation falls in the experience of this new subject, which itself remains outside that object. And of the relation to this new subject the old puzzles are true. This relation must have two terms, terms more than their relation; and the "more" again must be experienced, or else be nothing. Any attempt to pass from within the experienced to that which in itself is not experienced, seems quite suicidal. The distinction between the experienced and experience seems in the end totally inadmissible. And the infinite regress is but an actually unremoved contradiction. It is itself an absolute irrational limit."(5) There is no case for an absolute irrational limit of this sort. The subject is nothing if it remains outside the correlation apprehended by it, a new term requiring in its turn to be correlated It is subject just because it does not occupy a ground in respect of the terms correlated by it, which these occupy in respect of each other. The subject is really not *a term* at all; it is rather the *ground* of any terms that are given; and a ground is nothing if it does not constitute a unity of the terms grounded in it.

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(5) P. 212.

The real meaning then of the correlation of the subject and the object is quite different from that which appears to be conveyed by it. It is that the given correlation itself would not be possible if the subject did not form the unrelated ground of it.

So far we have considered the correlation of the subject and the object in a general way. We shall now proceed to examine the relation of these two terms in actual experience. It must however be noted at the very outset that we could not do this unless experience were first analysed into its constituent terms. At the level of mere experience as such there are no distinctions, and no problems can be raised. *All problems are problems of reflexion.* But while it is necessary that we should have made some distinctions before we can raise a problem we are not to suppose that those distinctions are for us ultimate facts to which all our conclusions must conform. They are only our starting point. They have no doubt a sort of necessity for thought; for thought is formal. But experience is not formal; it is the true whole in which thought itself with its distinctions is a mere element. All problems are problems of thought; but they are relevant to experience only so far as the conclusions conform to experience as a whole.

It is a common-place to assert that the object implies the subject. But in what sense does it imply it? Does it imply it as something distinct from it? We take an instance. I am aware of a rose. Now it is evident that in being aware of the rose, I am not aware of two things, the rose *and* myself. The fact itself, which I afterwards break up into these two elements, is an absolutely simple fact; and although I call it "awareness of rose," it is not *composed* of an object rose *and* awareness. If it were thus composed, awareness would be only another object co-ordinate with the object rose, and there would be no awareness. The object then does not imply the subject as a *second* term to which it stands in some sort of a relation. If it did, the original fact of experience would go to pieces, and with it the very distinction of the subject and the object. The truth is that in actual experience the subject can never stand aloof or be given as distinct from the object, and when we say that the object implies the subject, we do not mean that it implies it as something distinct from it and related to it, but as its essential being.

Again it is said that the subject implies the object. Now it is true that when we think about ourselves, we distinguish ourselves from objects. But then we only know ourselves as we *appear* to ourselves by this distinction. An object is indeed known by its appearance. But the subject differs from the object just in this most essential respect; there is no appearance which I can truly call *myself*. No doubt we have to think in order to know that we are; but even in such thinking, the reality of the subject is presupposed, and this subject is never made our object at all. When thought tries to scrutinize it, it is simply trying to know it as it is not, or as it is foreign no itself. The subject therefore implies nothing apart from itself. It may be said to be known before anything that has implications itself may be known; for it is not known at all in the sense in which all objects of thought are known.

We might also note here that we cannot distinguish the *being* of the subject from the *knowledge* of it, as we are accustomed to distinguish the being of the object from its knowledge. The object is something that appears to us; it is formal and limited, and necessitates a movement of thought which seeks to go beyond the so-called given content. Our knowledge is thus said to be ideal in character as against the being of the thing which is real. But the subject does not appear. It has no formal content. It is not given. Thought can work no distinctions in it, and without the distinctions of thought we cannot oppose the self-knowledge of the subject to its being. In short the unity of being and knowledge is completely realised in the subject.

VI

It will perhaps be said that whatever reflective difficulties we might make as to the subject implying objects, it is nevertheless true that the subject is "subject" only so far as it knows what is objective to it, and is conscious and alive. If it does not know, or falls into a stupor, it is as little of a subject as stones and trees are subjects.

It is evident now that if the subject ceased to be subject at any time, the fact of its thus ceasing to be could not be known by it. How then do I know that it was *I* who slept or fell into stupor? Evidently I do not know this on the evidence of somebody else. Such evidence is by the very natnre of the case impossible. Whatever another's experience may be, it can only be evidence to *me* so far as it describes *my* experience. This experience then is the sole basis of my asserting that I ceased to be subject. And yet if the assertion is true, it could not be made; for a subject which ceases to be subject cannot *know* the fact of its ceasing to be.

One thing however is at once clear. I know myself to be the same person who was awake before sleep and who fell into it afterwards. If, in fact, I were not aware of a past continuous with the span of conscious life in which I find myself placed at present, I could not be aware of any interval during which I had ceased to be. It is this continuity of myself then which makes it possible for me to know the interruption of myself in sleep and such other states. But if I am really interrupted, I could not at the same time be continuous with myself. The conclusion is that my continuity with myself is not the continuity of conscious life; that I know to be broken. My continuity lies deeper than that, and the evidence of it consists in my being able to know the interruptions of conscious life at all.

This is further borne out by the fact that the conscious ego is objective to me. I am aware of it as that which comes and which goes. It is true that I do not know this as the ego itself knows something. When the ego ceases to be "ego", there is no other entity which we can lay hold of, and which may be supposed to be watching its going or coming to itself again. We lose consciousness without knowing that we have lost it; and we regain consciousness without knowing that we are regaining it. The subject that may be said to continue to function in sleep can never be shown to be distinct from the ego, watching its appearance and disappearance. And yet it cannot *be* the ego; for the ego cannot know its own absence and its own inception. The true subject is subject in a more fundamental sense than the ego. What is correlative to objects is the ego, and not that which the ego itself presupposes as its own ground.

It might be said that we are here confounding actual sound sleep from our knowledge of the same. When we know sleep, we are already wide awake and therefore subjects in the ordinary sense. But this is quite different from saying that we were subjects when we knew nothing at all. (1) Now it is true that if by "subject" is meant conscious and waking ego, we could not be subjects when the ego is laid to rest; if we were subjects in that sense, we could not be said to have been sleeping. (2) Accordingly also, our present apprehension that the ego did not function in sleep cannot be *a fact of ordinary memory*. We have memory of that which we have observed as conscious subjects. But where no conscious subject exists, and no impressions are received we cannot be said to know anything in the ordinary sense of the term, or to have a memory of it afterwards. The apprehension of the absence of the ego in sleep etc. is a fact of a different order altogether, and can only be made intelligible by a higher conception of our subjecthood than is warranted by the conscious and waking life. (3) It is sometimes said that the subject in sleep can know without rendering its knowledge in terms of objectivity. It knows the absence of the ego or the absence of all knowledge of object in some such way, and at the sametime in a non-negative fashion (for all mere negative knowledge involves the knowledge of objects) and that it is this knowledge, which, on waking up, and by means of memory, is rendered objective and thereby cognisable by the ego. This explanation is necessitated, and becomes unavoidable, if we suppose that the sleep as actually slept and the sleep as known by us on waking up are distinct, and that the distinction is ultimately true. But it may well be questioned whether we can intelligently speak about any sleep that is different from the sleep that is known by us on waking up and that is nothing if not *objective* to the knower, and whether we can appeal to any genuine experience of this so-called non-objective sleep that is supposed to have been known when we were actually in sleep. (4) Our view is that the actual sleep is not something different in nature from the sleep as later known by us, and that the appearance that they are distinct and that the one precedes the other in our knowledge is just due to a misapprehension to be corrected by discriminative thought.

It might be supposed that the whole problem is unreal, and that the ordinary subject never falls into a state of complete unconsciousness. This however would be opposed to the commonsense view that wakefulness and sleep, consciousness and unconsciousness, alternate with each other. We might admit that in the deepest sleep or state of unconsciousness, there might be a certain of amount of conscious activity which we fail to attend to and therefore fail to remember on waking up. But such activity would fall outside the *history* of the individual who supposes himself to have been in sleep, and who must be sure of being an individual with an unbroken history before he can know the fact of his having slept. So far as *his* experience is concerned (and all changes of state are significant only in that experience), anything that appears to him as a state of complete unconsciousness of himself, must be taken as true, as far as it goes.

The subject then which never ceases to be subject is not the conscious and waking ego. It is that which reveals the ego itself as ego. It is the subject which never goes to sleep and does not wake up, for sleep and wakefulness themselves are known by it. It is beyond all states, and yet it is not like a watching ego; a watching ego would be objective to it. That then is the true subject, and it cannot be correlative to the objects of our conscious life.

The Nature of the Empirical Self.

BY R. DAS.

Things are always found in relation with one another. An unrelated thing is an unreal abstraction. What is true of other substances in this respect is true also of the spiritual substance, the self. The self is never found in utter isolation from the rest of the world. All the contents of its thoughts and feelings have come from the world ; and without such contents the self would be reduced to a principle of bare identity, which again is an empty abstraction. The body and the mind of the self have been built up by the co-operation of different factors of the world. We may even say that the very substance of its being has been the product of the action and reaction among various forces, both physical and spiritual, operative in the world. It preserves its being by carrying on a cmmerce between itself and the world around it. If a person refuses to breathe in or breathe out for fear of having any thing to do with the outside world, he will within a short time be reduced to a mere lump of flesh and will no longer be called a self. If he does not learn anything from the world nor make any contribution to anybody's knowledge, his mental life will soon wither away. Our being, both physical and mental, is most intimately entwined with the being of the rest of the world ; and if we were to be cut adrift from the world, it would result in our death. It is impossible that we should cease to be a member of the world without at the same time ceasing to remain what we are. Every man is found in some particular situation and his character cannot be truly understood if we view him apart from his situation. He is always a member of a group or a whole which shapes his character and which is in its turn influenced by him. Every man is a member of a family; he is in certain relations to the other members of the family. He is what his family has made him, although, according to his capacity, he too contributes something to the total character of the family. He is a father or a son or something else. And the total character of his manhood, of his life and thought, would not be understood if his fatherhood or sonship were not taken into consideration. When a man is a father, he stands in a particular relation to some other member or members of his family and fulfils certain characteristic functions. This relation and these functions colour the whole being of the man. He would be a fiction and not the man he is, if he were conceived apart from his relation and functions. He belongs also to larger social and political groups, and very often to some religious community as well. His membership of these groups does not leave his being altogether unaffected. He has inherited a civilisation which has an individuality of its own. He is the product of an historical movement at a particular stage of its evolution. If the concrete reality of a man is to be understood, if, that is, we are to know him as he really is, we have to view him in these and many other aspects. The life of a man is always displayed in a definite historical and geographical setting; and when abstracted from such a setting, his character would at best be an enigma or a mystery. In fact it would be a fiction which can never be found in reality.

We see therefore that like a thing-in-itself, a man in himself is never to be found. Even those who drift away from their social and political moorings and take to the life of a hermit, are found to follow certain traditions and conduct themselves in a particular way in their relations with the common run of men. Even when man cuts himself off from all relations with human beings, and lives in a jungle on roots and fruits, he does not live entirely in himself. He may not depend for the sustenance of his physical life on the complex organisation of the economic world , but he has at least to establish and maintain some suitable relation with the organic world. If he has any mental life, it is the life that has been fed by the contribution of his fellow men. But such a man probably has no explicit moral consciousness and does not live the life of a moral man. We generally live in society and are members of various social groups. It is only in relation with other human beings that our moral consciousness makes itself most explicitly felt. The being of a moral man is found bound up with his relations with his fellowmen. We find as a matter of fact that every man is bound by a network of relations with other human beings. The currents of his life and thought run into those of his fellow men's. A man is not a windowless monad imprisoned within the four walls of his private being. He lives and grows not only in intercourse and communion with his fellow men, but literally *in* them as well. It may sound strange, but nevertheless it appears to be a fact. Not only did the Father live in the Son, we ordinary mortals too seem to live in one another. Take the instance of a father in a family where the relation among the members is particularly close. If his thoughts and feelings are any part of himself, he cannot be said to live entirely within his narrow self confined in his physical organism. His thoughts and feelings are never centred exclusively round his narrow self. They embrace his relations and children in such a way that he cannot be separated from the well-being of his children. Any harm done to them is more really his than any injury to his physical person. These are plain facts of everyday experience, and they unmistakably suggest that there is an actual intermingling of personalities in all our social life. We do not mean to uphold of course that the father lives merely in his children, so that when they disappear he should disappear also. His life and being may and do extend beyond those of his children , but his children form part of himself and when some of them meet their death before him, we should say, he suffers to that extent a serious loss in being. Let us try to elucidate our position a little further.

We hold that the mental life of a man cannot be separated from his self. His thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears, ideas and ideals are part and parcel of his being. It is these which determine the concrete individuality of each man. Merely as knowing subjects, no two men ever betray any difference between themselves. As such they have no individuality. It is the contents of their mind which definitely mark out the distinctions of their personality. There is no man who does not live in his thoughts and feelings, ideas and interests. A person in his concrete reality will not be there if he is isolated from these contents ofs his mind. So we conclude that the thoughts and feelings of a man are part of his own self. Now, these are never exclusively centred within the person himself, but they go out to various objects and include them in their being. Just as it is an abstraction to think of the self apart from its thoughts and feelings, so will these thoughts and feelings be mere abstractions if they are viewed apart from their objects. We never entertain mere thoughts and mere feelings ; but we always have thoughts about something and feelings for someone or another. These objects are essential to our thoughts and feelings. If the objects are included in our thoughts and feelings, and if our thoughts and feelings are within the self, the objects must also be included in the self. When we think of someone and feel for him, our being goes out in our thoughts and feelings and embraces their object. This is not a matter of mere thoery. The things in which we are greatly interested are taken for all practical purposes as part of our very self. Our friends and relatives, houses and lands, clothes and furniture are part of our self in a very practical sense. We live and move in and about them, and if an attempt is made to efface the mark of our selfhood from them, we resist it with all the strength of our being. We call them 'mine'; and 'mine' has no intelligible meaning unless it is interpreted as part of nyself!

Some objections will very readily suggest themselves against this view. I shall try to put these objections as strongly as I can, so that if I can successfully rebut these objections, I shall consider my position as fairly established.

1. In the first place it may be said that thoughts and feelings exist entirely in the mind; they cannot literally be said to include in themselves the objects to which they only refer. My thought about a chair if not lying somewhere in or about the chair; it is entirely in my mind which thinks; whereas the chair exists outside the mind. However dearly I may love my friend, my friend is never an actual constituent of my feeling of love which is mental, while the existence of my friend is not affected by the existence or non-existence of my mental state.

2. We can think of the past and also of the future. Our memories refer to the past and our hopes and fears mostly refer to the future. If our being were to go literally to things to which our thoughts and feelings refer, we should have our being extended to the past and to the future. But it is a clear verdict of our experience that we live and are in the present. To say that

my being is extended to the past or to the future is to say that I am in the past or in the future. This seems absurd.

3. The things which we see and think about appear to be very distinct from ourselves. They are our objects, and the distinction between subject and object seems to be quite absolute. When we hate our enemies we are most clearly conscious of a serious opposition between ourselves and our enemies. If by cherishing any feeling about anything, we could make the thing part of ourselves, the enemies whom we heartily hate should nevertheless be part of our being. And we should not then experience any opposition and distinction between ourselves and our enemies. This however never appears to be the case.

4, In whatever sense our friends and our relatives as well as our properties may be ours, they are not in any sense *we*. From the fact that we call them ours, we can see that we make a distinction between them and ourselves. However intimately I may love my friend, he can never be identified with my being. If he were swallowed up in my being, the very feeling of love between myself and him would be impossible.

5. This is evident from the fact even when a man loses his friends and relatives, his properties and all, he feels no change in his selfhood. He is always himself. His own being is not jeopardised by the loss of his properties. He is still there even though he has lost everything he used to call his. His being as such has not suffered any shrinkage in any dimension nor has it undergone any qualitative change.

Let us take these arguments one by one. 1. It is said that thoughts and feelings are in the mind. True, but where is the mind? One hypothesis will be that the mind is somewhere within the body or at best one with the nervous system. But if it is simply the nervous system or the brain, many serious difficulties will arise. If the mind is understood as strictly identical with the nervous system, the thoughts and feelings which are supposed to to be in the mind, must be found somewhere in the nervous system itself. But these are never discovered in any part of the body or of the nervous system. So if thoughts and feelings are to be the contents of the mind, the mind cannot simply be identified with a physiological mechanism. If we think that the mind is somehow within the body, we can never understand how the knowledge of any object outside the body can be possible. It is supposed that physical objects even from a distance, send forth currents of physical energy, which through appropriate organs reach the nervous system and so the knowledge of the objects takes place. But if the mind is entirely within the body, it can but be conscious of the last wave of the current which has reached it. The wave itself cannot inform the mind that it has come from a distant object; because the wave is not supposed to be an intelligent principle and it cannot itself declare that it represents some other entity. Even if it tells that it comes from a distant outside object, the mind will not understand it, because the mind has no acquaintance with such an object. Nor is it possible for the mind to infer the object; for inference presupposes direct knowledge, and this being lacking in the present case, the inference too is not possible. So if the hypothesis we are considering were correct, instead of seeing a tree at a distance, we should merely feel a tickling sensation either in the brain or in the eye.

These difficulties compel us to suppose that the mind is not entirely confined within the organism, although it need not be denied that a physical organism is always associated with a mind. If the mind is not confined to the body alone, there should be no difficulty in supposing that it goes out to the object. The mind has always some content or other, and although the contents themselves do not constitute the mind, they do for a time form part of the mind. They cannot be in the mind and form no part of it. These contents again connot be separated from the objects. To separate the objects from the contents is to say that the object can never be known. When we say we know some object, we mean that the object itself is the content. But although we say that the objects form part of the mind when they are known, we do not mean that their being is affected by our knowing. They are in the mind only for a time that is, when they are known, and they fall out of it when they are not known or are fogotten, without losing anything of their reality. In conceiving this relation of objects to the mind, we are helped by the theory of immanence and independence advocated by Neo-Realists. So although our friends and relations may enjoy their own independence, they are not incapable on that account of being embraced by our thoughts and feelings.

It has been said that our thoughts and feelings only refer to objects which are outside the mind. But what exactly is this reference ? It is not an external relation between thoughts and things. Because we do not have thoughts complete in themselves on the one hand and things on the other, so that the relation of reference might simply be interposed between them. Our thoughts and feelings seem to include in themselves, as their objects, the things to which they are supposed to refer. If there is no thought in which nothing is thought and which does not refer to anything, then it is evident that in any concrete thought the thing thought of and the reference are given as part of the thought itself. In the last resort the proposition that our thoughts refer to things can only mean that things are known in our thoughts. And if they are to be known and known as they are, it is difficult to understand how they cannot be included in the thoughts in which they are known.

Reference to objects seems to be a function of all thoughts, and if the reference is actual and goes right up to the object, then thought which is inseparable from this function must go the same length.

Moreover, where is this reference ? It cannot be simply an occurrence in the brain; nor can we think that it is wholly within thought when we take thought as abstracted from its object. In that case thought would not be helped by 'reference' to transcend itself and reach out to objects. Reference then is only that aspect of our thoughts and feelings which signifies that things or objects are included in them.

2. Our being, at least as appearance, consists in its actuality. It is impossible to catch ourselves in the past or in the future. Neither the past nor the future is real as actual. The past is real in our memory, the future in our expectation. As thus made real, they may very well be part of our being without giving rise to any inconsistency.

3. The distinction between subject and object is a valid distinction, but it is real only within the life of the self which includes both subject and object. It is true that we have given the character of conscious subject to the self. It is easy to recognise the self in the subject. But the subject is not the whole self nor is mere subjectivty an adequate description of selfhood. The subject is always relative to the object. When nothing is given as object the subject ceases to be a subject, although it may not cease to be a self. The self seems to speak

through the subject, and it is apt to be identified completely with the subject. But this would be analogous to the mistake we should commit if we were to suppose that the Parliament is identical with the party in power, because the party in power speaks always in the name of the Parliament. The party in opposition as well as the party in power forms parts of the Parliament. The party in power is only dominant for the time being, but it is never the whole Parliament, although it may speak with the voice of the Parliament so long as it is in power. Similarly the subject is only the dominant aspect of the self and not the whole self. The subject is, as we have said, relative to the object; and so is not real by itself but only within a whole which includes itself with the object. Our enemies too are part of our very self. We may desire their complete destruction; but so long as they are there we cannot completely dissociate ourselves from them. They are like a disease of the body or the mind, to which we have fallen a prey and which has become part of our being. We may do our utmost to extirpate all the evil tendencies of our mind and thus we may assume an attitude of hostility towards them but still it cannot be denied they are part and parcel of our being. Our enemies are no better and no worse than the diseased parts of the self with which also we are identified.

4. The fact that we are never absolutely identified with our friends and relatives does not show that they are not part of ourselves. Our self being inclusive of them cannot from the nature of the case be completely identified with any one of them. Any whole is not absolutely identical with any of its parts, although the parts taken together constitute the whole. My body is not my hand, but this does not show that my hand forms no part of my body.

5. It is true of course that even when I lose my properties, friends and relatives, I still continue to be myself. But is it exactly the same self which I was when I was in possession of them? Has not my self undergone any change on account of the loss I have sustained? The people in general seem to recognise some change and their recognition finds expression in their altered behaviour towards the persons who have become the victims of such losses. The man who has been rich and a friend of influential persons, is bound to feel the change that comes upon him with the loss of his property and friends. He finds that the respect, which used to be paid to him spontaneously, is now only grudgingly shown or not shown at all. His words do not carry the same weight with the public. He has not got the same credit with the people with whom he has to deal in any connexion. He is in a way the ghost of his former self. How are we then to suppose that his self has not suffered any change? When it is said that he has the same sense of selfhood or of himself, it is not remembered that the concrete personality of a man does not consist in his mere sense of selfhood. Everybody has the same sense of selfhood, but this does not make any particular person quite the same as another. Real men are not mere centres of an indistinguishable feeling of selfhood but are concrete personalities with physical and spiritual endowments of various kinds, showing themselves in their characteristic influences on men and things around them. There cannot be any set limit to the personality of a man as to how far it can go and how much it can include in itself. It is always found connected with a physical organism, but on the basis of it, a spiritual superstructure is raised,— a new dimension of

being—which covers in its influence and being a much wider area of existence. We are changing from moment to moment according as the constituents of our body and the contents of our mind are changing. And although there are constant meetings and minglings between different personalities, in many identical contents, our distinct individuality is never lost; because there are no two persons who do not differ in their mental and physical constituents.

In upholding this view of the self, we are aware, we are going against the verdict of two very important schools of Indian thought. Both Sankhya and Vedanta maintain that the self or the spirit is a principle of intelligence which has no real connection with anything else. But although both these schools maintain that the self in its real nature exists in itself and is unattached to anything else, they do not deny the fact that in the world the self is found identified with a body together with a mass of physical and psychical dispositions. This identification is supposed to have taken place through 'ignorance' or 'desire'. But whatever may be the explanation of the fact that the self in its wordly course is found identified with a portion of the world of men and things, the fact itself is not and cannot be denied.

The Voluntaristic Conception of The World.

H. D. BHATTACHARYYA.

It has been asserted, perhaps more often than is necessary, that there can be no true philosophy unless one can get beyond the world of appearances and penetrate into the realm of being. To take events in their face-value is to live on the plane of commonsense which is equivalent to crude thinking. Of late conmonsense has had some vengeance with the help of the realists who in their various theorisings have sought to defend the popular way of thinking in many matters connected with sense-data. But even realists have been obliged to jettison some aspects of appearance in order to concentrate their efforts upon Essence and Existence, primarily of a non-mental type. They have revived pluralism, displaced relation from its pedestal of glory, and rigidly circumscribed the limits of mental operation. A distrust of the reality of mind, born apparently of a reaction against the ego-centric idealism of Berkeley, characterises the whole movement. Backed by a powerful revival in psychology of the behaviouristic standpoint, Realism has begun to ask such strange questions as to whether consciousness exists, whether mind is a mere cross-section of reality or a neutral stuff, whether thinking is mere sub-vocal speech, introspection a myth, intelligence a mere conditioned reflex and emotions only reactions of the effectors and glands of the body.

It requires a certain amount of boldness now-a-days to assert that, in spite of the rapid development of the sciences, behaviourism and realism, there is still some such entity as mind and a greater boldness still to hold that reality is monadic in character and solipsism is not a dead creed. All honour, therefore, to H. W. Carr who is at present defending the forlorn cause of Leibnitz and fighting the battle of spiritualism. Even convinced spiritualists are fraternising with the realists and seeking a compromise in the concept of emergence that reconciles the originality of the real and the appearance of the spiritual. There is indeed an idea that there must be a nisus towards emergent or holistic activity, but spiritualism of older times that sought to base religion on an antecedent perfection is now out of fashion and, in consonance with presentday democratic ideals, a God that is to be, a *primus inter pares*, an impersonal spirit, a limited deity are somehow tolerated but not an Absolute or a Creator or even the founder of a pre-established harmony. Plurality and change are with us every day—things that it would be foolish to ignore; but unity is not visible on the surface of things and has to be thought into appearances. It is therefore a secondary principle dependent upon the operation of a shadowy something called mind whose own right to exist is doubtful. Verily is God a creature of our own understanding, no less so than the Essence of the metaphysicians. The transcendental unity of apperception is read into all experience and it is thus that appearances get unified—man is constitutionally incapable of living in a pluralistic universe and therefore he invents all sorts of unity to satisfy a personal need. A world of particulars externally related to one another, a world of monads not mediated by any Absolute, space and time shot through and through by the principle of relativity are some of the latest attempts to get away from the monistic spell in metaphysics, just as extreme individualism in politics and religion is the fashion in civic and social life.

To those whose gaze is turned outwards the most obvious phenomenon is change in the external world, and it is from this point that they start on their enquiry after the nisus of being. Why should not things remain unchanged in character and position ? What causes them to mature and decay or to change into something else ? Why should there be any change of place ? Is motion eternal ? If not, when and how did it begin ? How is it transmitted and what is its relation to matter ? For centuries matter, motion (or energy) and space have provided a tangled material for speculation, and even now new theories about their nature and inter-relation are cropping up. The dynamic introduces a complication from which the static is comparatively free, and philosophic attempts have been mainly directed towards the ascertainment of the changeless base of change—the permanent substratum of phenomenal existence beyond which thought cannot or need not go.

But to thoughtful minds the regressive method is only one half of the whole enquiry, for the other half is constituted by the progressive method whose function is the determination of the articulation of the real in the world of change, the urge that lies embedded in the heart of reality whereby it abandons the security of calm and plunges into the uncertainty of restlessness. If reality was not dynamic at all times, how did it assume a changeful character ? Was it deliberately done or was it an involuntary fall from a pristine quiescence ? Was it self-imposed or was it introduced from the outside ? Is it pushing towards any end or is it drifting helplessly and only acquiring momentary stability here and there ? In other words, the problem of the essence and the appearance, being and becoming, reality and change, one and many, pops up its head as soon as a divorce is made between the static and the dynamic, substance and power, reality and relation. If the units of existence are many, how are they ever related and how are they harmonised into a seeming universe ? With what powers are they endowed and to what kinds do they belong ? Pluralism has the advantage of being in consonance with the world of appearance where plurality and change are so obtrusively real ; but its difficulties thicken when any relation of the units has to be evolved to explain the different types of organisation that the world reveals. Monism, on the contrary, has the advantage of law and order, unification and organisation, on its side; but then its difficulty is to conceive how the one becomes many, how it articulates itself in a world of infinite diversity and bewildering change and fragments itself sometimes into systems within systems and sometimes into types of events where all unity seems to be lost. Thus it happens that the world refuses to give unequivocal support either to pluralism or to monism, to absolute regularity or to downright chance, to perfect adaptation or to chaotic conglomeration.

Those who limit their observations to physical nature in its non-vital manifestations are likely to carry away the impression, however, that chance rather than system rules the procession of being. True, the different forms of physical energy are convertible to one another and reveal to that extent a principle of unity at their back ; true also, the different forms of atomic integration and the sidereal system reveal the existence of a kind of organisation in the inorganic world ; but there is too much of random activity in inanimate nature—earthquake and flood, cataclysms and eruptions, hurricanes and avalances, that take no account of human needs and are difficult to justify by reason in many cases. Events take place in nature, it may be, according to law; but that law has no reference to any ulterior good of any sentient being. It is relentless in its operation and unforgiving to the defaulter—it grinds the good and the bad alike, and has no tendency to preserve the achievements of the virtuous and obliterate the relics of savage vandalism. Like the random and spontaneous movements of a child, physical changes may serve to keep the system going; but they have no aim beyond themselves and no tendency to change their character in course of time. The single natural laws from the unvarying groundtone of the world symphony—they can be implicitly taken on trust; but in their combinations they baffle human calculations and, in addition, unforeseeable agencies play crescendoes and diminuendoes in a disconcerting manner on their placid surface and complicate the chances of prediction and routined adjustment.

But inorganic nature raises only one problem, viz. why things should change their nature and position; and the answer that it gives goes no further than this that motion was in the heart of things, either free and fluent or held locally in check and then liberated by the intrusion of force from a contiguous area. Nature knows no complete repose, for out of such an original state no change can ever arise (as Ward pointed out against Spencer) and into such an end-state it cannot drift without jeopardising creation as a whole. So the instability of primal homogeneity or the radioactivity of the world's substances is invokedto prevent the first or the last. A blank persistence without change and an entropic consummation are alike distasteful to thought and probably impossible in nature; and so even if nature has no consciousness or end, it possesses the power to prevent absolute stagnation and ultimate staticity and is thus far akin to a ceaseless process of thought. Verily in Nature do we find the glimmerings of that refusal to stand still whose most patent manifestation is to be found in our own mind. Nature is monotonous but not dead. Alike in the steady motion of the stars and planets and in the terrestrial changes which seem whimsical to our imperfect knowledge the world manifests its dynamic urge to go on ceaselessly; and the more it reveals its secrets the more do we realise the protean possibilities of its powers even though they are controlled by law. If we could prove that even in inorganic nature laws are contingent and that absolute uniformity is more an ideal of thought than an actuality, then we would have brought nature very near the higher forms of activity where freedom dominates mechanism and prediction becomes problematical.

But there are other aspects of nature which show certain peculiarities of behaviour. In chemical affinity and crystalline structure the units of nature divulge their preferential modes of action just as on the subatomic level the electrons show that only certain formations are practicable in nature. Why the elemental units should refuse to form different groups or different combinations and why certain structures should become stable while others should not either be formed or else disintegrate quickly are questions that are not easy to solve. On higher levels, in the different species of plants and animals, the same question is repeated, and by referring them to the peculiarities of spatial configuration or material motion we simply show our natural piety and do not furnish any rational explanation. Organic forms are intimately associated with chemical affinity and crystal structure, and thus in the different levels of material existence we are presented with a set of facts which show that nature knows, in addition to infinitely variable combinations, certain definite modes of aggregation which cannot be altered in any way. Even when due consideration is paid to isomerism and allotropism, plant and animal evolution, the broad fact that nature does not allow any and every kind of formation in any field, organic or inorganic, is incontrovertible; the laws of equilibrium demand the conformation of structures to their own requirements and shatter ruthlessly all attempts at organ building of a widely different type. Hidden somewhere within the unlimited latitude of action that nature allows are invisible tethers to which all natural formations are bound and which curtail the range of their roamings at will. Just as although the human body is capable of a large number of queer actions its ordinary activity is limited to a few definite types, so also in nature random possibilities are limited by the requirements of actuality under given circumstances and all oddities are banned by an inhospitable regularity that rules nature with an iron hand. This is the second contribution of nature to an understanding of the urge at the root of being, namely, that actions tend towards definiteness in order to have a survival value. The framework of nature, even if it be not rigid, is not nebulous and it refuses to bend to suit particular individuals. Divergence is possible only within certain limits, beyond which lies the danger of disintegration. Nature abhors absolute stability and perfect instability in equal degrees—it is as little fond of a kaleidoscope as of a static show. In the innumerable transformations of its elements a certain constancy of structure is observable. From the very beginning its units are dominated by certain definite relations—all of them are not independently variable to such an extent that each compound is a type unto itself.

Rising higher, we find in the realm of the living certain new types of activity. The simple types of movement and affinity that the sub-vital regions evince are here left far behind, and as we rise in the scale of life we seem to face stranger and still stranger forms of action with the effect that we begin to wonder whether after all we are in the same world of being still. In spite of the sedulous attempts of organic chemistry, which partially stormed the stronghold of life a few decades ago, and in spite of all the similarities that life shows to mechanism, we are still far away from that consummation where a uniform set of rules would govern physical and vital manifestations. Starting with irritability which the simplest protoplasm manifests and passing through the tropism of plants and the tactical responses of micro-organisms and lower animals, we rise to reflex actions, instincts and purposive behaviour in the realm of higher life—a series of reactions which take us progressively away from that rigid response which we have learnt to associate with inorganic existence. Beginning with the ascent of the sap in plants which first challenges seriously the employment of mechanical principles over the entire field of nature we make a transition ultimately to the practical inexhaustibility of nerves in animal bodies. In the phenomena of generation, regeneration, restitution of function, vicarious function, anaphylaxis, adaptation and evolution life manifests a bewildering variety of action which cannot be conveniently explained on mechanical principles; and in the evolution of indtermintation in keeping with the development of the nervous system, life bids fair to transcend the regularity and routine which are inseparable from the operation of mechanical laws.

If then we range over the entire field of nature, we find that a restlessness characterises existence as a whole. When waves roll and stars shoot, winds blow and the earth trembles, we do not generally interpret such physical phenomena as the working of a mind akin to our own, except in poetic moods and pantheistic speculations. When we watch, however, the invisible sorting of materials that goes on in a living body and the definite structures that they gradually assume under our very eyes we grow more interested, for here at any rate is the beginning of that order which we have learnt to associate with the working of a mind. And when from structure we rise to function and note how in response to every changing circumstance the tiny mass of life adapts itself by useful action, whether tropistic, reflex or instinctive, the conviction is borne in irresistibly upon us that we are in a very familiar land and that only utter prepossession can refuse to see in these manifestations the adumbrations of purposive human behaviour. The mind has direct knowledge of only one cause of change, namely, a dissatisfaction with the present. The new that is more important or interesting always pulls the mind away from the old and the familiar; the need that the present satisfies is followed by other needs which the new alone can meet; and so the enternal drama of life rolls on with need succeeding need and action following upon action with no higher aim perhaps than that a fuller life should be lived and a wider contact with nature should increase effort and enjoyment alike. Even when life is not illumined by a beatific vision there is enough of encouragement to plant its foot forward and to take the necessary next step on an onward journey that might after all prove interminable. It can hardly be said of life or mind that it is aiming at a final state to be quiescent at last, for their perfection is a greater activity of themselves, an endless quest and a limitless adventure which only the conditions of time and space and material can alone limit. Each manifestation looks like a finished product so far at it goes because it is adapted to its own immediate environment. But an invisible push from within and behind is upsetting all existing arrangements, and so life and mind are obliged to mount higher and higher to retain foothold in a more strenuous world where environments are anything but kind, neighbours anything but friendly and former adjustments anything but helpful.

This pushing and pulsating whole of reality seems then to be endowed with a kind of impulse or hormic urge to move ever forward, to aim at fineness when mere bulk fails and to produce in its ever advancing march a degree of cunning unknown to earlier times. The degree of inter-relation seems to improve as a whole as the elements get to know one another's property better and the dynamic equilibrium is maintained for longer periods than before. There are indeed seeds of unforeseen upheaval within and the adjustment may break down at any moment both in nature and in history; but the forces of peace are also strengthening with the rolling of years and catastrophes are getting rarer day by day. It seems as if the random movements of an infant world are getting more and more organised, and habits of action are being formed as the world is maturing in time. Geology is aiding the philosopher here by showing how the world was at one time more subject to cataclysms than now. Biology too adds its own testimony for it shows how in ancient times the differentiation of species was more quick than now, possibly in keeping with the quicker change of scenes that the ancient world underwent. A mutation at the present day would be regarded as a curiosity, but there is no doubt that in those unsettled times, when the atmosphere had not yet attained its present steadiness, plants and animals had to evolve much more quickly to survive in a swiftly changing world. The strength of the special creation theory lies exactly in this fact that most of the living species have remained constant since man began to observe them and that sudden change in the nature of any kind of plant or animal is rare nowadays. Experimental zoology by introducing complications has been able to imitate the former action of nature in bringing forward new kinds; but as the world to whose mercy these are to be relegated allows only certain definite types to survive, the experimental forms are mostly sterile or shortlived and leave no trace behind. Failing to stop an original variation, nature is now engaged in reducing types to definite proportions by laying down the limited conditions of survival.

The reading of a will into nature may be a poetic fancy or a splendid analogy; but there is no doubt that if all that evolutionism says is true the temptation to use the terms of human psychology is almost irresistible. That a chaotic nebular mass should form galactic and sidereal systems and that on one of the planetary bodies the course of evolution should so shape itself that gradually, with the dissipation of heat and the formation of an atmosphere, conditions favourable to life should arise and living germs, brought from outside by radiant pressure or indigeneously produced, should increase, multiply, proliferate and evolve into innumerable kinds of plants and animals which become mutually adjusted to one another in a progressive manner and that lastly consciousness should appear in the scene and supersede blind natural selection by rational selection—these successive stages of the world event look so much like the manifestations of an increasing purpose that an extension of the categories of human thinking becomes permissible. As in human life, there have indeed been many rejected motives, fruitless ventures and aimless wanderings; but on the whole steady progress has been maintained in the denouement of the world-drama and even where progress has been thwarted and some backsliding has occurred, adjustment on a lower plane has been effected provided the conditions of life have not too rapidly altered.

This has enabled metaphysicians of the type of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann to see in the operation of nature the working of a will, aided occasionally by flashes of idea to tide over difficult corners and to advance to higher levels. We are not concerned with their particular formulation of the doctrine of the world-will and its ethical and religious conclusions. Here is a passage from Schopenhauer which will illustrate the line of thinking we are trying to understand: 'Whosoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge *in abstracto*, and therefore clear and certain, of what every one knows directly *in concreto*, *i. e.*, as feeling, a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, which manifests itself to him as idea, both in his actions and in their permanent substratum, his body, and that his will is that which is most immediate in his consciousness, though it has not as such completely passed into the form of idea in which object and subject stand over against each oher, but makes itself known to him in a direct manner, in which he does not quite clearly distinguish subject and object, yet is not known as a whole to the individual himself, but only in its particular acts,—whoever, I say, has with me gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as *idea* alone. He will recognise this will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal existences which exactly resemble his own, in men and animals as their inmost nature, but the course of reflection will lead him to recognise the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the north pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two different kinds of metals, the force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition and combination, and, lastly, even gravitation which acts so powerfully throughout matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun,—all these, I say, he will recognise as different only in their pnenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as that which is directly known to him so intimately and so much better than anything else, and which in its most distinct manifestation is called *will*." Mere motion as such does not figure very much as a mode of will in this description, but there is no reason why any and every change should not be included within will provided we do not mean by it only such actions are as purposive, implicitly or explicitly. Like the spontaneous and random movements of our own body, it may ultimately be pressed into the service of a purpose later on, but in its first happening it may be blind, to all intents and purposes, judged by any particular ideal of achievement. In other words, every change may be interpreted as the operation of a will either working with a deliberate purpose or else driven by the unconscious need of doing something to avoid stagnation and death. The whole world would then be like a living body in which ceaseless movement alone keeps it fit, and energy would circulate in this total system as in a living body to keep it in existence and vigour. Many would remember the comparison of the whole world to the sacrificial horse in the opening sentences of the Bṛhdāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in this connection.

But in any scheme that treats the world as anything but mechanical there are obvious difficulties of correlation and congruence. If the world is a will and there is also the will of which every introspective being is conscious within, how are the two wills related ? To what extent is there any mutual understanding between the two, and to what extent are they uncompromisingly opposed ? When the forces of nature lend themselves to the manipulation of human intelligence and human will and agree to be harnessed in the interests of conscious purpose, it seems as if the world exists to be subdued by man and to place at the disposal of human agency a perpetual storehouse of energy for purposes of man's development in knowledge and power. But when the achievements of man, built up with the sweating labour of years, are shattered in a trice and man himself is engulfed in the furies of nature, we begin to revise our opinion and ask if nature is not absolutely indifferent to man's progress, if not positively hostile to man's aspirations and acquisitions. We begin to ask why, after making the world conducive to human existence and development, nature should still refuse to be totally controlled by man or to abandon the whimsical fury which compels man not only to live dangerously every moment but also to see his cherished products break up like a house of cards. Only mysticism can then find in all such wanton destruction a hidden purpose higher than the small overt aims of man, and faith alone can justify the belittling of man's work in the interest of a higher destiny of the world as a whole. But the individual reason that aimed and achieved refuses to be convinced that the destruction was justified or that the forces that caused havoc had any purpose in their operation. Thus a voluntaristic ontology finds itself faced with an uncompromising dualism in reality when it does not seek refuge in mysticism or profess to see, in the manner of Hegel, rationality in every action of the real,—both when man wrests a domain from the forces of nature and when nature reclaims a lost territory. Or, when it has gone in for any monistic ideal, it has summarily brushed man's pretensions aside and preferred to treat the operations of the world-will in a manner which human consciousness would call blind but which is really in keeping with the small place that man fills in creation. The world-will never intends to abandon any of its present modes of working just as the human body is still shot through and through with non-rational tendencies. There may be a temporary triumph of rationality here and there ; but the discontent in the heart of things has no intention to be quieted, for that would mean jejune routine in place of the glorious uncertainty of adventure. So, after allowing the repetition of the customary for some time, the world suddenly breaks away from its own moorings to lead a life of fresh adventure, and the evolutions that have taken place have all come out of the insatiable thirst of the world for the novel and the uncreate, the unforeseen and the irrational. The inner drive of things cannot be comprehended within the neat boundary of a rational scheme of existence, and even when its materials remain constant the unseen exploring and artistic nature of the world tries its hands at new combinations for the sheer joy of creation either in the fashion of a palimpsest or by totally pulling down the old fabric. The power that causes the metamorphosis of insects and guides the ontogeny of other living beings shows that it has the capacity of playing differently on the same materials; it is therefore supremely indifferent to its first achievement. Man would therefore be a sportful product of this world-power—of no abiding significance to its further activity and liable to decay when no longer wanted by the power that gave it being.

But even when man is not so shabbily treated the old difficulty of understanding the purpose of his existence is not easily solved. How far can he transcend the laws of natural operation and claim exemption from the law of natural causation ? Can he be an exception to the rigorous regularity of the law of causation ? If not, in what fields is he free ? How are human freedom and natural determinism related and reconciled ? If there be no contingency in natural laws,as is claimed by some, how did man who belongs to nature come to possess this power of free action ? Is he then a creature of two worlds, as Kant said with necessity and freedom determining the different aspects of his being ? How can a house divided against itself thus stand ? It is evident, therefore, that the questions raised by Voluntarism are not easy to solve. A voluntaristic scheme is certainly more disquieting than an idealistic one ; but then it does not raise false hopes and enunciate complacent make-believes. The great danger of idealism is that, in its eagerness to detect order, rationality, harmony and progress everywhere, it has a tendency to overlook phenomena contradictory to its own cherished opinions and to force facts into preconceived theories. Voluntarism keeps closer to facts in nature, life and mind, and puts a welcome check to high pretensions and vain ambitions in philosophy.

We shall now turn to the subjective aspect of our life to ascertain how far the objective interpretation given above is indebted to the former for its justification and validity. We have already said that it is possible in voluntarism to keep the ontological and epistemological discussions fairly distinct.*

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* The reader is referred to my article on *The Voluntaristic Outlook*

As a matter of fact, voluntarism finds it much easier to formulate an epistemology than an ontology. In the next article we shall discuss why that is so.

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in This Journal, Vol. II and Ashalatika Haldar's arrticle on *Knowledge in Voluntaristic Epistemology*, also in This Journal, Vol. V. Prof. John Dewey's Gifford Lectures on *The Quest for Certainty* (a summary of which was given by me in the *Modern Review* of Calcutta for August, 1930) should be read in this connection.

A Neglected School of Vedanta

(OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJNANABHIKSU.).

UMESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE.

When we speak of a school of thought, we expect not only a founder but also adherents of the system. Vijñānabhikṣu's is a well-known name; but he is more famous as a commentator of the Sāñkhya system than as the founder of a Vedāntic school. This is due to the fact that, although as an interpreter of Vedānta he certainly chalked out a bold and novel path, yet he could not claim many followers in that path. We have in him the founder of a new school of Vedānta, but the school did not attract many disciples. This is why inspite of his boldness and originality, he has been neglected as an interpreter of Vedānta.

His interpretation of Sāñkhya, on the other hand, has been more fortunate. Though adversely criticised, his Bhāṣya on the Sāñkhya-Sūtra has been regarded as "not only the fullest source that we have for a knowledge of the Sāñkhya system, but also one of the most important of such sources". (Garbe, Preface to *Sāñkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya*). It cannot but be admitted that he read too many Vedāntic ideas into his interpretation of Sāñkhya; but still as the most comprehensive interpreter of that system he has attracted considerable attention.

With regard to his interpretation of the Vedānta, however, the little attention that he has been able to draw, has meant nothing but unsparing condemnation. "Vijñānabhikṣu's treatment of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads", says Gough (*Philosophy of the Upaniṣads,* P. 260), "is false from first to last." But curiously enough, Gough bases his opinion on Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the Sāñkhya and does not take into account his Vedānta-Bhāṣya. Perhaps this would not have meant any difference in his estimate of our philosopher. But it is clear that both Garbe and Gough criticise him *as* a Sāñkhya philosopher with a Vedāntist bias *rather* than as a Vedāntist with a Sāñkhya bias. If it is true that "Vedāntic influences manifest themselves in Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the (Sāñkhya) Sūtras", it is equally true that Sāñkhya prepossessions are also obtrusively present in his commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras. So, if he is to be condemned as a biassed commentator of the Sāñkhya, as Garbe insists, then he should also be condemned as a biassed commentator of the Vedānta, as Gough thinks.

But it does not seem to be fair to him to condemn him thus as one-sided and pass him over. The very fact that he, in the words of Garbe, "mixes up many other heterogeneous matters and even quite effaces the individuality of the several philosophical systems", ought to make us pause and consider his view-point more carefully than has hitherto been done. "Indeed", as Garbe himself has pointed out, "he maintains that all the six orthodox systems contain in their principal dogmas the absolute truth". This obviously marked a new point of view in the philosophic thought of India. It was a spirit of *eklekticism* and Vijñānabhikṣu stood out as a great representative of this movement. And this invests him with an importance which cannot be lightly passed over. He tried to blend Sāñkhya and Vedānta ideas and construct one great system with the reconcileable elements of both. Just as the attempt to reconcile dogmatism and scepticism gave rise to the critical system of Immanuel Kant, so we have the philosophy of Vijñānabhikṣu emerge out of an attempt to synthesise the Sāñkhya and Vedanta philosophies.

Vijñānabhikṣu is important for another reason. In the second chapter and also elsewhere in the Vedānta-Sūtras we find a systematic attempt to crush Sāñkhya. But at the same time, it is frankly recognised that there are certain *śruti* texts which are capable of interpretation in accordance with Sāñkhya tenets. In other words, the Vedānta-Sūtras imply the existence of some thinkers of the Sāñkhya school who based their conclusions on *śruti* texts just as the Vedāntists do. These Sāñkhya writers were at least contemporaneous with the author of the Vedānta-sūtras and thus anterior to Vijñānabhiku ; and a tendency to invoke the authority of *śruti* in support of Sāñkhya doctrines is manifest in the Sāñkhya-sūtras also (e. g. i. 51., i. 54., i. 154, v. 12., & v. 21.). But Vijñānabhikṣu is perhaps the most comprehensive writer who collects these texts and utilises them to the fullest extent. In other words, Vijñānabhikṣu is important, *first*, as a Sāñkhya writer who sought and discovered more *śruti* support for the Sāñkhya than any other writer of the school ; and, *second*, as a Vedāntist who attempted a reconciliation between Vedānta and Sāñkhya.

It is not implied that Vijñānabhikṣu's is the most correct interpretation of these systems : that would be a bold statement to make. On the contrary, it may well be contended that he "quite effaces the individuality of the several philosophical systems". But whether the *śrutis* really yield the meaning he ascribes to them, is not very important : perhaps they do not, as Gough emphatically asserts. But a philosophical system which seeks to reconcile two opposing systems like the Sāñkhya and the Vedānta, symbolises a bold eklektic attempt not unworthy of consideration.

We cannot say that Vijñānabhikṣu is the first writer of the school of thought he stands for : possibly there were others who preceded him and prepared the ground for him. For, under Vedānta-sūtra ii. 2. 37., Sankara refers to a school of Sāñkhya which seems to to be the same as that of Vijñānabhikṣu. He says :

> "केचित्तावत् सांख्ययोगव्यपाश्रयाः कल्पयन्ति प्रधानपुरुषयो रधिष्ठाता केवलं निमित्तकारण मीश्वर, इतरेतर-विलक्षणाप्रधान-पुरुषेश्वरा इति "—

Surely, Sankara could not have referred to Vijñānabhikṣu. The line of thought represented by Vijñānabhikṣu, therefore, was nearly eight hundred years old already in his own time. Nevertheless, we have not got any other *bhāṣya* on Vedānta-sūtra which pursues this line with anything like the thoroughness of Vijñānabhikṣu.

Vijñānabhikṣu was perhaps a Bengali *sannyāsi* and belonged to the sixteenth century A. D. (cf. Introduction to the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition of his *Vedānta-bhāṣya*). The period to which he belonged is somewhat important. Although sharp differences between the several systems of philosophy were still vigorously maintained by many, yet at about this period the tendency to look upon these systems as correlated parts of the larger whole of Hinduism was already asserting itself. This is why we find Vijñānabhikṣu always trying to show that Sāñkhya, Yoga and Vedānta and even Vaiśeṣika are not only not contradictory but are rather complementary to each other.

As between his Sāñkhya-bhāṣya and Vedānta-bhāṣya, Vijñānabhikṣu appears to have regarded his *bhāṣya* on the Vedānta as his chief work ; for, whenever an occasion presents itself to him in his Sāñkhya-bhāṣya, he refers to his other *bhāṣya* and says 'this question has been more fully dealt with by us in Brahma-mīmāṇsā' ('brahma-mīmāṇsāyām prapañcitam-asmābhih &c'). This shows that his Vedānta-bhāṣya was not only his chief work but it was also the earlier of the two. It is truer, therefore, to describe him not as a Sāñkhyist with a Vedāntist bias but rather as a Vedāntist with a Sāñkhya bias. And as between the systems which he attempted to synthesise, he appears to have looked upon Vedānta as giving the highest knowledge. His own statement under Vedānta Surtra, i. 1. 2., is :

"इदं ब्रह्मात्मज्ञानं विविक्त-जीवज्ञानात् सांख्योक्तादपि श्रेष्ठं,
नातोऽधिकं ज्ञानमस्ति ।"

This shows that the qualified identity of *jīva and Brahma* which according to him is the teaching of Vedānta, is the highest knowledge—higher than that of Sāñkhya which only considers the *jīva* by himself. At the close of his *bhāṣya* on the *Sāñkhya-pravacana-sūtra* also he says :

"सांख्यकुल्यां समापूर्य्य वेदान्तमथितामृतैः ।
कपिलर्षि र्ज्ञानयज्ञ ऋषीनापाययत् पुरा ॥—"

This means that according to him even Kapila, the founder of Sāñkhya, 'filled the little brook of Sāñkhya with nectar derived by churning the ocean of Vedānta.' The Vedanta was thus the highest knowledge,—only it was to be understood as *he* understood it.

This new interpretation of Vedānta, however, did not find many adherents and could not become a school in the proper sense of the term. It was not because his interpretation was wrong; for, if he was wrong, there were others also who erred: all the interpretations of Vedānta could not be equally right. But the real reason for neglect shown to him was perhaps the fact that he was merely a philosopher and not the ardent advocate of a religion, like the Vaiṣṇava commentators of Vedānta.

There were other reasons also. In the introduction to his commentary on Jīva Gosvāmī's *Tattvasandarbha*, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa compliments Jīva as one who had rescued the Kṛṣña cult from the onslaught of Sāñkhya ideas. This seems to be a reference to Vijñānabbikṣu (*vide* Introduction to my edition of of *Vedānta-syamantaka*, Punjab Sanskrit Book Depôt). Attacks of this kind also may have thrown Vijnānabhikṣu into the shade.

We have not got materials enough to gauge the earliest relation between Sāñkhya and Vedānta. But it seems beyond doubt that the antagonism between the two systems started early enough. The long war that the Vedānta-sūtras wage against the Sāñkhya proves the deep-seated opposition between them ; but it also proves another thing, viz., that Sāñkhya was its most formidable, and, according to the Vedānta, its most sinister rival as well. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, transcended these jealousies and conceived Sānkhya as one of the pillars of a mighty edifice of which Vadānta was the coping-stone (cf. His Vedānta-bhāṣya, Chowkhamba edition, p. 68, p. 627, &c.) He would not admit that there was any fundamental opposition between the two systems.

(II)

The leading conceptions of Sāñkhya may be summarised as follows :

(i) There are only two ultimate realities, *Pradhāna* and *Puruṣa* ;

(ii) Pradhāna is the material, and in fact, the only cause of the world ; and

(iii) Of Puruṣas there is a multiplicity—all of them inactive and unproductive by themselves.

(iv) Sāñkhya is also regarded as godless (*nirīśvara*), i. e. not admitting the existence of a creative personality or highest soul.

As to the process of the evolution of the world and its dissolution, the views of Sāñkhya are not so diametrically opposed to those of the Vedānta as might be imagined from the incessant attacks of Vedānta on Sāñkhya. The elements are the same in both, viz., earth, water, air, fire and ether; the senses also are the same in number and nature; so far as these minor details are concerned. the two systems hardly differ at all. But as in all philosophies, so in Sāñkhya and Vedānta also three things are fundamental, viz., God, soul and world, together with their inter-relations. And it is with regard to these that the differences come out. But Vijñānabhikṣu contends that even with regard to these, Sāñkhya and Vedānta ought not to be conceived as different if only *śrutis* are properly understood. If *pradhāna* can be shown to be an aspect or attribute of Brahma, or, if Vedānta can be shown to have recognised the existence of *pradhāna* and a plurality of souls, then, the two systems become practically identical, except perhaps in the matter of emphasis—Sāñkhya placing emphasis on the individual souls, while Vedānta stresses the ultimate source of all things, viz, Brahma. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what Vijñānabhikṣu attempts to show in his two *bhāṣyas*. He taunts the new, pseudo-*vedāntists* (नवीना वेदान्तिब्रुवाः) as having misunderstood *śruti* altogether and constructed their theories, such as that of *māyā* out of their misconceptions about the meaning of the *sūtras*" of Vedānta.

(i) With regard to the usual characterisation of Sāñkhya as godless, in spite of the fact that the language of Sāñkhya-sūtra i. 92, seems to be unequivocal, Vijñānabhikṣu contends that the author of the Sāñkhya-sūtras only wanted to say that the existence of God could not be *proved*: he did not mean to say that God did not *exist.* It was a denial not of the existence of God but of proofs of His existence. And according to him, the purpose of such a denial in the *sūtras* was to dissuade the spiritual aspirant from setting his heart upon the attainment of the glories of a God-like life. To think of and believe in a Highest Being with all the glories (ऐश्वर्य) of omniscience and omnipotence, would tempt the mind away from a desire for *mokṣa* and prompt it to aspire to a life of enjoyment, even though it be enjoyment of the highest kind. But such an aspiration would not be true indifference (वैराग्य) which is necessary for salvation. Hence it was that the author of the Sāñkhya-sūtras wished to divert the mind of man from the conception of God—a Being usually regarded as not only the highest but also the happiest—and it was for this purpose that he categorically asserted that there were no proofs of the existence of God.

But it must not be imagined that he denied God; for, if that were his meaning, the *sūtra* in question (i. 92), should have been differently worded: instead of saying 'because of the absence of proof of God' (ईश्वरासिद्धेः) the *sūtra* should have said 'because of the non-existence of God' (ईश्वराभावात्), In fact, what is denied by the author of the Sāñkhya-sūtras is apparently the God of popular faith; and the denial itself is a means to an end and not the final statement of an ultimate truth. Says Vijñānabhikṣu :

"यदि हि लोकायतिक-मतानुसारेण नित्यैश्वर्य्यं न प्रतिषिध्येत

तदा परिपूर्ण-नित्यनिर्दोषैश्वर्य्य-दर्शनेन तत्र चित्तावेशतो विवेकाभ्यासप्रतिबन्धः स्यादिति सांख्याचार्य्याणामाशयः ।"

It has been very often suggested that this attempt on the part of Vijñānabhikṣu to prove that Sāñkhya was not atheistical has not been successful. One point is decidedly against him: with all his labours, he cannot get rid of the fact that in *sūtra* iii. 57., the question of the existence of God arises again, and there too, the author of the *sūtras* reiterates his unbelief in a creative, personal God. He admits the existence of a creative principle which is no other than *puruṣa* emerging out of *prakṛti* at the beginning of a cycle of creation. Such a God Sāñkhya is prepared to admit—"**ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा**"—but only such a God.

In *sūtra* v. 2., *et seq.*, the question of God as the dispenser of the fruits of *karma* arises and, there too, the author is definitely and unambiguously against such a belief; and there also Vijñānabhikṣu has the same justification to offer:

"अयं चेश्वरप्रतिषेध ऐश्वर्य्ये वैराग्यार्थमीश्वरज्ञानं विनापि मोक्षप्रतिपादनार्थं च प्रौढिवादमात्रमिति प्रागेव व्याख्यातम् ।"

There should be no aspiration even to godlikeness as a state of existence, for, after all, this also is a desire and all desire is a hindrance to *mukti*; and nothing but absolute *mukti* or freedom should satisfy the philosopher. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, this is what the Sāñkhya wants to teach by this denial of God. It does not really want to say that God does not exist; but it does want to say that salvation can be attained *without* knowing Him and independently of Him. This is how Vijñānabhikṣu has saved God but he has saved Him at the cost of His importance for man. A God that did not matter for man and did not function, had better not exist at all. On this point, therefore, Vijñānabhikṣu's defence of Sāñkhya must be regarded as weak and inconclusive.

It is interesting to note that the Sāñkhya-sūtras refer to the authority of *śruti* on the following points :

(a) *Mokṣa* as the highest good ; i. 5.. *et seq.*
(b) Existence of souls : i. 36.
(c) Nature of souls : i. 51 and 54 ; i. 147 ; and vi. 10.
(d) Nature of discrete things as having a beginning : i. 77.
(e) Absence of rebirth for a knowing man : i. 83.
(f) Consistency of the theory of plurality of souls with the doctrine of unity affirmed in certain *śrutis* ; i. 154 and vi. 51.
(g) Nature of the senses : ii. 20 22.
(h) Nature of the subtle body (*liṅga śarīra*) : iii. 14-15.
(i) Emancipation of souls in this life (*jīvanmukta*) iii. 80.
(j) Necessity of meditation for salvation : iv. 17.
(k) Uselessness of *karma* for salvation : iv. 22.
(l) *Pradhāna* as the cause of the world : v. 12. & vi. 32.
(m) Virtue (*dharma*) as something real : v. 21.
(n) Indivisibility of soul and *prakṛti* : v. 73.
(o) Impermanence of atoms : v. 87. (Vijñānabhikṣu cannot find this *śruti* and considers it lost but thinks it must have existed.)

The Sāñkhya-sutras thus invoke the support of *śruti* on quite a number of important points. But on the question of the existence of God, they rather attempt to get rid of inconvenient *śrutis* by a process of interpretation as in i. 95. It is very difficult, therefore, to say that Sāñkhya really has in mind what Vijñānabhikṣu attributes to it. Nevertheless, from the very fact that hebestows so much labour on this point, it is clear that he himself believed in the theism which he ascribes to the Sāñkhya. He believed in a creator —a personal Being : this is the first point in his philosophy ; but he also believed in the other principal tenets of the Sāñkhya, such as *pradhāna* as the cause of the world and also in the plurality of souls.

So far as these tenets are concerned, Vijñānabhikṣu is in agreement with the Sāñkhya-sūtras ; and so far as the Sūtras refer to *śruti*, he finds out those *śrutis*, and even when the *śrutis*, cannot be discovered—(cf. Sūtra ii. 20., & v. 83) -he would not challenge the honesty of the *sūtras*, but would rather contend that the appropriate *śrutis*, must have existed and must have been lost now, *because* the *sūtras* speak of them and also because corresponding ideas may be traced in *smṛtis* such as that of Manu. It is obvious, therefore, that so far as these ideas are concerned, Vijñānabhikṣu not only agreed with Sāñkhya but believed them to be the teaching of *śruti* as well. And it was this conviction that led him to give a new interpretation of the very *sūtras* of Vedānta also which have been understood by other commentators as implying a refutation of Sāñkhya doctrines.

His loyalty to the Sāñkhya was after all loyalty to *śruti* ; if he accepted the theory of *prakṛti* and plurality of souls, it was not perhaps because Sāñkhya taught it, but rather because he thought it to be the teaching of *śruti* : and, again, if he differred from Sāñkhya in his belief in a personal God, that also was due to the fact that he regarded *śruti* as teaching the same thing.

The special and characteristic feature of Vijñānabhikṣu's philosophy, therefore, was this unswerving reliance on *śruti* : so far he was a Vedāntist, no less so than Śañkara or Rāmānuja—and perhaps more so than Madhva or

Vallabha. And as a Vedāntist, he was marked off from others by his belief in the chief Sāñkhya ideas, viz., *prakṛti* and plurality of souls. In other words, he would substitute the concept of *prakṛti* of Sāñkhya for that of *māyā* of Śañkara; and would regard this as the truer, the more authentic Vedānta as distinguished from the later pseudo-Vedānta of Sañkara and others. Now, as he contends, if this philosophy of his be the true philosophy of *śruti* or the Upaniṣads, then, obviously, it must also be the philosophy of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. So far, therefore, as they have been understood to confute the doctrines of Sāñkhya, they have been *mis*-understood. And this is what he attempts to show in his *magnum opus*—the Vedānta-bhāṣya.

(III)

1. *The Plurality of Souls* :—

The Sāñkhya-sūtras also attempt to show that *śruti* intended to affirm this doctrine of plurality (cf. S-S, i. 154., vi. 51., &c). But there the proof is more or less negative. Sāñkhya has its own arguments for the doctrine, apart from the authority of *śruti*, viz. the fact of simultaneous births and deaths, bondage and emancipation, &c. (S-S., i. 149., vi. 45, &c.). It is next argued that this fact of plurality is not contradicted by the *śrutis* which affirm the non-duality of Brahma: the unity of Brahma spoken of in *śruti*, is one-ness of *kind* and not numerical unity: (**'नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात्'** ...i. 154.). In other words, when *śruti* says 'There is only One without a second' (**'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्'**) it means, both according to the Sāñkhya-sūtra and also according to Vijñānabhikṣu, that there is only *one kind* of souls; the numerical distinctness of these souls is not denied thereby ; what is denied is only the duality of kind (विजातीयद्वैतनिषेधपरत्वात्). And it is further contended (vi. 51) that, these *śrutis* speak of the unity (in kind) of the souls just to suggest that for a soul there is nothing else that deserves attention—that a soul should be indifferent to everything else but itself and its kind.

It will be seen that this interpretation of *śruti*, after all, only means that *śruti* is not *opposed* to the plurality of souls ; but this is only a negative sanction. A more positive support for its doctrines the Sāñkhya-sūtra does not find in *śruti*. Vijñānabhikṣu supplies this want by squeezing the Vedānta-sūtras.

Under S-S. i. 154., he refers to Vedānta-sūtra iii. 2. 32 & iv. 2. 16. The first of these two *sūtras* occurs in connection with the question as to whether there is anything other than Brahma ; and it is needless to say that the *Advaita* school (Śañkara) understands this *śutra* to mean that Brahma is the only one ultimate reality. The context of the other *sūtra* is the question whether after emancipation (*mukti*), there is any difference between the soul and Brahma ; and here, too, it is needless to say that according to the *Advaita* school there is none. But as is apparent from his reference to these *sūtras* under S-S. i. 154., Vijñānabhikṣu explains them in a different way. The first he explains to mean that there is a sameness of kind (सामान्यता) and not numerical unity (अखण्डता) between the finite soul and Brahma. The second he understands to mean not absolute merging of the individual into Brahma in *mukti*—not complete loss of personal identity for the individual—but an indistinguishable coexistence just like that of air in the sky ('आकाशे वायोरिव अविलक्षणानन्यत्वमेव'). By this interpretation, Vijñānabhikṣu gets rid of those *sūtras* which might be understood to affirm absolute monism of Brahma. The next logical step for him is to find clearer and more positive assertion of the duality between Brahma and finite souls on the one hand and of the plurality of souls on the other.

At the very outset of his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras he affirms—and he repeats it at the close also—that the author of the *sūtras* never intended to affirm the identity of the finite soul with Brahma, although such a meaning has been ascribed to him ; for, if that were his meaning, the very first *sūtra* should have indicated it and it should have been differently worded : instead of ' अथातो 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'', it should have read 'अथातोजीवब्रह्मैक्यजिज्ञासा'. But this is not the case ; and hence we have no evidence that the author of the *sūtras* ever intended to affirm the identity of *jīva* and Brahma. Besides, he could not possibly have made any such assertion, for, *śruti* does not countenance it. To indicate the relation between *jīva* and Brahma, various similes have been employed in *śruti*, such as fire and its sparks, and so on. All these indicate that the true relation between the two is not one of identity but of a whole and its parts (अंशांशिभावः'). As has been already pointed out, those *śrutis* which apparently speak of identity really mean sameness of kind and not identity or numerical unity. Although some commentators (Vijñānabhikṣu has chiefly Śaṅkara in mind) have ventured to read *advaitism* in the Vedānta-sūtras, still there is no *sūtra* which definitely and explicitly asserts this kind of absolute monism ('अखण्डत्वे स्पष्टसूत्राभावात'). On the contrary, Vijñānabhikṣu argues, there are *sūtras* which clearly affirm a difference between *jīva* and Brahma ; and he refers to V-S. ii. 1. 22, ii. 3. 43.

It must be conceded that here Vijñānabhikṣu stands on rather firm ground. For, V-S. ii. 1. 22. *does* affirm a distinction between the finite soul and Brahma and even Śañkara confesses that it does so.
His comments on the *sūtra* are :

"यत् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावम्
शारीरादधिकमन्यत् तद् वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः । &c."

Of course, he would always seek to get over this admission by his oft-repeated simile of the sky and the sky in the pot (**'आकाश-घटाकाश'**).

V-S. ii. 3. 43. is more openly in agreement with Vijñānabhikṣu's position. And there, too, Śañkara has to make the reluctant admission that 'finite soul is but a part of Brahma' (**जीव ईश्वरस्य अंशो भवितुमर्हति यथाग्ने र्विस्फुलिंगाः**) Of course, he immediately hastens to modify this admission by the addition of a qualifying clause :**"अंश इव अंशो, नहि निरवयवस्य मुख्योऽंशः सम्भवति"**

In other words, Brahma being indivisible cannot admit of parts ; so, when *jīva* is spoken of as a part of Brahma, the language must be understood figuratively, meaning 'part *as it were*'.

To this Vijnānabhikṣu replies :

"ननु निरवयवस्य ब्रह्मणः कथं मुख्योऽंशः स्यादिति चेन्न ।
योथक्लक्षणांशत्वस्यावयवत्वाभावेऽपि दर्शनात् । यथा शारीरस्य केशादिरंशो राज्ञश्चैकदेशोंशः पितुः पुत्र इति" । १-१-२

It will be seen, however, that Sañkara, too, uses the same simile in this connection as Vijñānabhikṣu—a simile on which the latter so frequently relies, viz, that of a fire and its sparks. In addition to this, Vijñānabhikṣu uses the example of father and son. Just as the son

8

receives life from the father—the two being distinct as individuals but one as sharing in a common life when the son is potentially present in the father—so are finite souls related to Brahma. Even Śañkara admits that *caitanya* or consciousness is common to *jīva* and Brahma: so far there is non-difference (**अभेद**) between them; but they are at the same time distinguishable and hence there is *bheda*, too, just as a spark is different from fire though heat is common to both. His own words are:

> "चैतन्यं चाविशिष्टं जीवेश्वरयोर्यथाग्नि-विस्फुलिङ्गयो रौष्ण्य
> अतो भेदाभेदावगमाभ्यामंशत्वावगमः ।"

There is another *sūtra* of Vedānta to which Vijñānabhikṣu refers in support of his doctrine, viz., '**आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च**,' iv. 1. 3. (see under ii. 1. 22.) This *sūtra* Sañkara understands to mean that Brahma should be viewed as one's own self. This apparently is the meaning of the *sūtra*, for Vijñānabhikṣu also explains it in more or less the same way. He says:

> "यद् ब्रह्म……तदेतत् आत्मेति अहमिति उपगच्छन्ति अनुभघन्ति तात्त्विकाः, तथैव शिष्यान् मुमुक्षून् ग्राहयन्ति च, &c."

How can the soul which is distinct from Brahma be perceived as Brahma himself? In this connection Vijñābhikṣu refers to V-S. iii. 3. 40. This *sūtra* Śañkra explains by reference to Ch. Up. v. 19., *et seq.* Vijñānabhikṣu however, interprets it in quite a different way. He takes it to mean an affirmation of the existence of finite souls in spite of the fact that there are texts which seem to say that there is nothing else but Brahma. These latter texts, Vijñānabhikṣu contends, simply imply a glorification (**आदर**) of Brahma and not a denial of the existence of souls other than Brahma.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, there is a sense in which Brahma and *jīva* are identical. At the dissolution of the world (**प्रलय**) and on the emancipation (**मोक्ष**) of the finite soul, there is no object of consciousness for it and, in that state, it is indistinguishable from Brahma. But on the reappearance of the world and in the stage of bondage, i. e., so long as the soul inhabits a corporeal frame, it is distinct from Brahma:

> **प्रलयमोक्षादौ विषयसम्बन्धाभावात् काष्ठलोष्टादिवत् जडाः सन्तो जीवा मध्यन्दिनादित्यवत् सदा सर्वावभासके परमात्मनि विलीयन्ते समुद्रे नदनद्य इव, पुनश्च स एव परमात्मा स्वेच्छयाग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवत्तानुपायिसम्बन्धेन स्वतो विभज्यान्तर्यामी स नः (?) प्रेरयति---**&c." (under V.-S. IV. 1. 3.)

He repeats this dictum in several places ; for example, under V.-S. ii. 3. 43., he gives the relation between *jīva* and Brahma as that of effect and cause—of son and father—and says that Brahma is the soul of the finite selves (**'जीवानामात्मा ब्रह्म'**). According to him, the souls are distinct from Brahma just as sparks are distinct from the fire from which they spring. The sparks are potentially present in the fire until they are shot forth, and before they come out of the fire, they are not distinguishable from it. So, before the unfolding of the universe, souls are there in Brahma like potential sparks in a fire; and, at that stage and in that sense, there is an identity between them both. But at the beginning of creation—or, more correctly, at the beginning of each cycle of existence—these souls are breathed out, so to say, by Brahma and their distinctness becomes manifest (see also under V-S., i. 1. 2.).

It will be seen, however, that all these citations from the *sūtras* of Vedanta do not *prove* the plurality of souls. The *sūtras* in question may, no doubt, be understood as implying a difference between soul and Brahma; and as a matter of fact, some kind of difference has been admitted even by Sañkara, just as some kind of identity also has been admitted by Vijñānabhikṣu. But even according to the interpretation of Vijñānabhikṣu, these *sūtras* do not establish the plurality of souls. It is of course true that the multiplicity of finite souls is an apparent fact; if the reality of these is not denied, their plurality is a matter of common experience. Nevertheless, if it were the intention of the author of the Vedānta-sūtras to affirm such a doctrine, he should have expressed it in words instead of leaving it to be inferred. But no explicit assertion of the plurality of finite souls can be discovered in the *sūtras.* Vijñānabhikṣu claims that it was in the mind of Vyāsa, the alleged author of the *sūtras*; and in support of this contention he refers (under V-S., i. 1. 2.) to Mahābhārata xii. 350. There the doctrine propounded is that of plurality of souls. There are many *puruṣas* (souls), we are told, and there is also a Soul of souls—a Monad of monads, as it were—which is the container (आधार), the sustainer and the source (योनि) of them all. And it is also said that this was what Vyāsa really taught.

Vijñānabhkiṣu claims that his is the true interpretation of the teachings of Vyāsa, because this is the interpretation given by Vaiśampāyana also, who was a direct disciple of the great master, and was, therefore, in a much better position to know his meaning than any of the latter-day scholars (आधुनिकाः).

It may, no doubt, be objected that, after all, the Mahābhārata is only a *smṛti* and cannot be set off against express *śruti* texts. To such an objection, Vijñānabhikṣu's general answer is a quotation from the Mahābhārata itself to the effect that *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* also must be called in aid of the interpretation of the Vedas:

"इतिहास-पुराणाभ्याम् वेदान् समुपबृंहयेत् ।
विभेत्यल्प-श्रुताद्व वेदो मामयं प्रहरिष्यति ॥"

(see under V-S. i. 1. 3).

As to invoking the aid of *smṛti* for finding out the meaning of *śruti*, examples are found even among the Vedānta-sūtras themselves; and the tendency to look for the truer meaning of *śruti* in *smṛti* texts, was already asserting itself in other writers also of whom an interesting, though later, example is Jīva Gosvāmī of Bengal.

This, indeed, is Vijñānabhikṣu's justification for what Garbe calls "a significant fact that in his argumentations he is quite ready to attribute to the Purāṇas and other apocryphal works the same authority as that which he ascribes to the oldest Upaniṣads".

Though Vijñānabhikṣu cannot quote from the author of the Vedānta-sūtras definite statements about the plurality of souls, yet he is not altogether without support in *śruti* texts, e. g., Katha, ii. 5. 9-10, which he frequently quotes. And he can certainly say (as under V-S i. 1. 3.) that "those who conceive an absolute and ultimate opposition between Vedānta and Sāñkhya &c, must be inevitably opposed to those *śrutis* also which lend support to Sāñkhya ideas".

Whatever the author of the Vedānta-sūtras might have in mind, it is clear that Vijñānabhikṣu believed in the plurality of souls and took it to be the truer and deeper meaning of *śruti* as well. However much Gough and others may condemn his interpretation of the Vedānta, the profuse quotations which he makes from Purāṇas and other writings of the same class, show that he was the exponent of a widely accepted system of ideas; and that these ideas were, rightly or wrongly, traced to the fountain-head of all philosophical ideas, viz., *śruti* (cf Mbh. xii. 350).

2. *Prakṛti as the matrix of the world:—*

The conception of Prakṛti as the unconscious cause of the universe has been the target of the most violent attack upon the Sāñkhya system. Quite a number of the *sūtras* of Vedānta (as interpreted by Sañkara and others of his way of thinking) are directed to the refutation of this doctrine. The plurality of souls is true, at least for ordinary purposes of life, even according to the most thorough-going absolutist. So, although its ultimate reality has been challenged by many, this doctrine does not provoke half as much opposition as the theory of Prakṛti.

But even for this doctrine, support from *sruti* has been claimed and Vijñānabhikṣu has attempted to squeeze such support even out of the Vedānta-sūtras. In Sāñkhya-sūtras v. 12., vi. 32., and vi. 34., the claim is advanced that, according to *sruti* also, *prakṛti* is the cause of the world. Under these *sūtras*, Vijñānabhikṣu quotes Śvet. Upaniṣad iv. 5. This and similar passages of the Śvetāśvatara appear to have been the stronghold of the Sāñkhya school in the region of *śruti*, as is evident from the very elaborate references to these texts in Vedānta-sūtras i. 4. 8., *et seq*. Sāñkhya obviously reads its own meaning into these passages and the more widely accepted interpretations of Vedānta confute these claims with the help of the Vedāntra-sūtras. According to the usual interpretation of the Vedānta-sūtras, there is no sanction for the Sañkhya idea of *prakṛti* in *śruti*. Vijñānabhikṣu's attempt to make these very *sūtras* of Vedānta yield a different meaning altogether is an interesting feat of intellectual acrobatism.

The Vedānta-sūtras that are generally understood to refute the theory of *prakṛti* are: i. 1. 5-11 ; i. 2. 19 ; i. 2. 21-22 ; i. 3. 3 ; i. 4. 1. *et seq.* ; i. 4. 23 (?) ; ii. 1. 1. ; ii. 2. 1-10 ; etc. It must be an interesting spectacle to see Vijñānabhikṣu wrestling with these *sūtras* to force his own theory out of them.

With respect to i. 1. 5-11, the usual interpretation is that, since the verb, 'to see' (**ईक्षति**) is used in *śrutis* in reference to the ultimate cause of the world, this cause must be a conscious Being and not an unconscious entity like the *prakṛti* of Sāñkhya: (See Śāñkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇtha, Bhāskara but *not* Vallabha and Madhva). The interpretation put upon these *sūtras* by Vijñānabhikṣu is based on an extreme pro-Sāñkhya assumption. The wording of the leading *sūtra* in this group is "**ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्** ", which literally means : No, it is not said in *śruti*, because of the verb 'to see'. Now, what is it that is '**अशब्द**' or *not* said in *śruti* ? Vijñānabhikṣu imagines an extreme Sāñkhyist saying that an ultimate cause other than Pradhāna &c., i. e. what the Vedāntist calls Brahma, is not implied in *śruti* ; and to this imagined theory, his answer is (and this is the anwser of the *sūtra* also, as he understands it) that Brahma is not '**अशब्द**', which is to say that He *is* spoken of in *śruti*, because of the use of the verb 'to see'. Sañkara and others understand the *śūtra* as a refutation of the Sāñkhya theory of *prakṛti* in general, whereas Vijñānabhikṣu explains it as a refutation of the *extreme* school of Sāñkhya which looks upon *prakṛti* as the only ultimate cause and denies Brahma.

It will appear that according to the interpretation of Vijñānabhikṣu, this and the following *sūtras* imply no challenge to the reality of *prakṛti* : rather they imply a challenge to the doctrine of Brahma itself. Is this interpretation fantastic ? That, however, is a matter of opinion. But it should not be overlooked that the

Madhva school also puts a somewhat similar interpretation on these *sūtras.* With regard to *sūtra* i. 1. 5., Madhva says*:*

'Brahma is not अशब्द or अवाच्य, i. e., He is not inexpressible ; because the verb *to see* is used in reference to him as the object.

V-S. i, 2. 19 Śaṅkara explains as follows : The word अन्तर्यामी used in certain Upaniṣad texts cannot refer to *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya. This is an additional reason for the rejection of that theory. Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, Bhāskara, Vallabha and Madhva—all take the *sūtra* more or less in the same light. Vijñānabhikṣu sees no reason to differ from them materially, for the term 'antaryāmī' cannot refer to unconscious *prakṛti ;* but that in itself does not involve the denial of *prakṛti.*

In i. 2. 21-22., also Vijñānabhikṣu agrees with Śaṅkara and others in holding that in certain texts of the Upaniṣads, such as Muṇḍ. i. 1. 5., the epithets used apply to Brahma and not to *prakṛti.* In V-S. i. 3. 3., the question mooted is whether the container of the earth, the sky and everything, spoken of in Muṇḍ. Up. ii. 2. 5., &c., can mean *prakṛti.* Śaṅkara and others read a negative answer to this question in the *sūtra,* ; and Vijñānabhikṣu agrees.

In i. 4. 1., *et seq.*, the objection anticipated is that there are some *śruti* texts which do speak of *prakṛti* and hence it cannot be contended that the Sāṅkhya theory is *not* sanctioned by *śrūti.* The texts referred to in this connection are Kaṭh. i. 3. 11. (See Śaṅkara, Ramānuja, &c.), But to this possible objection, the *sūtra* is usually understood to reply that the *śruti* texts in question do not refer to what the Sāṅkhya means by '*avyakta*' viz., *prakṛti* which is the cause of all things.

The term *'avyakta'* used there means the subtle body. (V-S. i. 4. 2.). The *sūtras* give reasons for this interpretation, into the details of which we need not go. In *sūtra* i. 4. 8., again, another Upaniṣad text, viz., Svet. iv. 5., is considered, which might be, and possibly was by some, understood to sanction the Sāñkhya theory of *prakṛti.* But there, too, for reasons given in the *sūtras* the contention is refuted. In i. 4. 11., another Upaniṣad text, viz, Br. Up. iv. 4. 17., is considered, which also, it seems, was or might have been, used by the Sāñkhya school in support of their theories. The theory considered here is not of *prakṛti* but that of the twenty-five *tattvas.* And here, too, for reasons given in the *sūtras*, this possible support for Sāṅkhya theory in *śruti* is shown to be groundless.

To i. 4. 1., Vijñānabhikṣu gives a very interesting turn. He imagines an opponent suggesting that, because there are texts which affirm the causality of *prakṛti* just as there are texts affirming the causality of Brahma, therefore, *both* Brahma and Prakṛti should be regarded as *joint* cause ("उभयोरेव कपालद्वयवत् विश्वोपादानत्वमस्तु") But, Vijñānabhikṣu argues, such a theory would destroy the independent causality of Brahma and make him subject to change. This, therefore, cannot be the meaning of *śruti.* What *śruti* really means is that *prakṛti* also is no doubt the cause of the universe, but this is so only in the sense that it is the creative power of Brahma : "प्रधानस्यापि ब्रह्मशक्तिविधया कारणत्वमुक्तम्". *Prakṛti* is to be understood as the 'body' of Brahma by presiding over which he creates the world. He does not undergo changes ; the changes in the visible world are changes due to *prakṛti* :

"शरीरवत् शक्तिविधया प्रधानादीनामुपादानत्वादिकम् बोध्यते, तद्विना निर्विकारस्य ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वानुपपत्तेः ।"

The *sūtras* following i. 4. 1. are interpreted by him as establishing the fact that *prakṛti* is to be conceived as the body of Brahma:

"तस्य प्रधानाख्यशक्तेः स्वरूपं दर्शयन्नपि शरीर-वदेव परमात्मनः प्रधानम् न स्वतन्त्रमित्याह ।"

This conception of *prakṛti* as the body of Brahma, as it were, or His creative power, by introducing changes in which he brings the changing world into existence, gives us the key to the whole system of Vijñānabhikṣu. The difference between a *body* and a *power* in ordinary cases means no distinction in the present case; for, Brahma being a pure spirit, the conception of body as applied to him can only mean spiritual energy or power. (For a similar idea, reference may be made to the Vaiṣṇava philosophers of Bengal). Now, unlike the extreme Sāñkhyists, Vijñānabhikṣu does not deny a conscious, personal, creative principle. He tries to defend this principle even in the face of one of the most anti-theistical of systems, viz., Sāñkhya. Even within the domain of Sāñkhya itself, he has attempted to set up this theory. Obviously, therefore, he did not regard *prakṛti* as the ultimate cause of the world. At the same time, it cannot but be conceded that even the Vedānta-sūtras cannot ignore the existence of *śruti* texts which affirm or seem to affirm Sāñkhya tenets. So, with whatever success orthodox Sāñkhya theories may have been refuted in the Vedānta-sūtras, Vijñānabhikṣu's theories are not refuted thereby. By conceiving *prakṛti* as the power of Brahma, he gives a new turn to Vedānta ideas, and perhaps also to the theory of *māyā*, and attempts to bring together the apparently opposing concepts of *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya and Brahma of Vedānta. And he contends that in this way all Vedānta texts can be reconciled. It is in this strain that he explains all the Vedānta-sūtras of i. 4.

In other words, the *sūtras* which the antagonists of the Sāñkhya interpret as discarding the notion of *prakṛti*, Vijñānabhikṣu explains as only meaning to say that *prakṛti* cannot be taken as the one independent cause of everything. To take an example: Sūtra i. 4. 7. is explained by Śaṅkara to mean that just as the word 'महत्' is used in *śruti* in its ordinary etymological sense and not in the technical sense given to it by Sāñkhya, so also is the word अव्यक्त used by *śruti* in an ordinary untechnical sense without implying the meaning in which the Sāñkhyists use it. Sāñkhya has no copyright in the word and the word has other senses beside the one given to it by Sāñkhya; and the mere fact that *śrūti* uses the word cannot imply that it sanctions the Sāṅkhya doctrine. But of this *sūtra* (i. 4. 7.) Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation is that just as 'महत्' of Sāṅkhya is not an independent cause (स्वतन्त्रकारण), so *prakṛti* too, cannot produce anything by itself.

In i. 4. 11., according to all commentators, the text considered is Br. Up. iv. 4. 17; and all except Vijñānabhikṣu might well be expected to say that the text in question does not mean the twentyfive *tattvas* of Sāñkhya. What can Vijñānabhikṣu say to this? He agrees with others as to the Upaniṣadic text meant here. He further agrees that it is a mistake to interpret this passage as speaking of the *tattvas* of Sāṇkhya. At the same time, however, he gives a subtle twist to the *sūtra* and takes it to mean that even though some *śruti* texts speak of the oneness of the ultimate cause, there are also *śrūtis* which speak of the manifoldness of the power of Brahma and hence the text in question here involves no contradiction; that is, *prakṛti* as the power of Brahma is one but it manifests itself in a variety of forms. And hence, as Vijñānabhikṣu explains him, the author of the *sūtras* wants to say that the different and apparently contradictory texts are not irreconcileable.

In i. 4. 23., the word *prakṛti* occurs, in its ordinary sense; and the *sūtra* is usually understood to mean that Brahma is the *prakṛti* (source) of all things—He is the *material* cause of the universe as much as its efficient cause. (See Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja &c.) Vijñānabhikṣu cannot deny this; but he re-iterates his fundamental thesis that Brahma is not cause *if* he is considered away from *prakṛti*. Of course, as already (i. 4. 1.) concluded, *prakṛti* also by itself cannot be regarded as the cause of the world, as the extreme Sāñkhyists aver; *prakṛti* is cause *only* as presided over by Brahma. Nor can the concept of *prakṛti* be substituted for that of Brahma: that would directly contravene the clear meaning of *śruti*. (i. 2. 1.). But neither can the *sūtra* be understood to mean that Brahma is *directly* the cause of the world:

> "साक्षाद् ब्रह्मणो जगत्प्रकृतित्वमपि नास्य सूत्रस्यार्थः, अस्मिन् पादे शक्तेरेव प्रकृतत्वात्, 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (i. 1. 2.) 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (i. 1. 4.), 'तदधीनत्वादर्थवत्' (i. 4. 3.) इत्यादि सूत्रैरेवाधिष्ठानकारणत्वस्य ब्रह्मणि लब्धत्वाच्च ।"

That is to say, according to Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of the *sūtras* quoted here and also of other *sūtras*, Brahma directly is not the *material* cause; he is the sustaining cause (अधिष्ठान कारण) ; the material of the universe is *prakṛti* which, again, is nothing but the power (शक्ति) or attribute (उपाधि) of Brahma.

In ii. 1. 1., the Vedānta-sūtras revert to the attack on Sāñkhya. And the usual interpretation of the *sūtra* is that, if the acceptance of the concept of Brahma and the rejection of that of *prakṛti*, involves a conflict with *smṛti*, the contrary procedure would do the same: that is, the rejection of the concept of Brahma in favour of that of *prakṛti*, would also imply similar conflicts with other *smṛti*. So, there is no justification really of the Sāñkhya ideas which are not accepted by *śruti*.

Under this *sūtra* Vijñānabhikṣu draws pointed attention to the fact that a considerable volume of *smṛti* does support Sāñkhya theories, and a considerable volume supports the idea of *prakṛti* as the sole cause (स्वतन्त्र प्रधानकारण) also. But there are the *śrutis* and a large volume of *smṛti* also which support the Vedāntic theory of the causality of Brahma. So this latter is the theory to be accepted by us. The conflicting *smṛtis* cancel each other, and *śruti* prevails over them both.

"ईश्वरप्रतिषेधांशे कपिलस्मृते दुर्बलत्वमित्याह ।"

That is to say, Sāñkhya is *weak* so far as it denies the existence of God. And this means that even Sāñkhya should be explained in consonance with these *śrutis*.

We should recollect here that this denial of God or a creative personal principle is what Vijñānabhikṣu would not ascribe to Sāñkhya: according to him, the author of the Sāñkhya-sūtras did not intend such a denial, though people have read this meaning into his system. And if Sāñkhya is understood as Vijñānabhikṣu understands it, Sāñkhya and Vedānta can be harmonised and brought into line with each other.

The second quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta-sūtras also begins with another attack on the Sāñkhya—this time, as Śañkara points out, it is by logic rather than by scriptural quotations that Sāñkhya and other systems are refuted. And here as elsewhere Vijñānabhikṣu cannot deny that an attack on Sāñkhya is intended; but as in other places, so here too, his contention is that it is the extreme Sāñkhyists who have misconstrued the meaning of Sāñkhya that is the object of the attack:

> "इदानी मनीश्वराणां स्वतन्त्रप्रधानाण्वादि-कारणवादिनां बौद्धप्रभेदानां मतानि ब्रह्मकारणतापरिपन्थितयात्र पादे निराक्रियन्ते ।"

That is, the attack here is upon those who do *not* believe in God (अनीश्वर) and regard either *pradhāna* or atoms, &c., as the sole and exclusive (स्वतन्त्र) cause of the world and who are, after all, only different kinds of Buddhists. These people base their conclusions on arguments alone and do not seek the support of *śruti*; and, so, their position has to be attacked with counter-arguments and this is just what is attempted in this section of *sūtras*:

> 'ते च तर्कमात्रेण प्रत्यवतिष्ठमाना स्तर्कमात्रेणैव प्रत्याख्येयाः ।

It will appear, therefore, that according to Vijñānabhikṣu, all these attacks on Sāñkhya are attacks on that extreme form of that school which denies the existence of a personal Being as creator and ascribes causality to *prakṛti*. The concept of *prakṛti* is not repudiated altogether by the Vedānta-sūtras, as Vijñānabhikṣu understands them; in fact, this cannot be done, for it is supported by *śruti* texts, such as those of Svetāśvatra Upaniṣad and hosts of *smṛti* texts. The concept of *prakṛti* is not irreconcileable with that of Brahma. Properly understood, there is no conflict between Sāñkhya and Vedānta. One little word 'स्वतन्त्र' holds the key to the whole system of Vijñānabhikṣu. 'स्वतन्त्र प्रकृति' and 'स्वतन्त्र ब्रह्म' as cause are both impossible ideas for him. *Prakṛti* belongs to Brahma and neither can be conceived without the other. This *prakṛti* is sometimes called the body (शरीर), sometimes power (शक्ति) and sometimes again attribute (उपाधि) of Brahma. And Brahma as the container (अधिष्ठान) of this *prakṛti*, or the substance in relation to it, and as directing it, is the producer of the world.

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R. Das.

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R. Das.

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CONTENTS

	PAGE.
I.—Vedantic Mysticism : G. R. Malkani	221
II.—Fact and Thought of Fact : K. C. Bhattacharyya . . .	232
III.—Indra's Absolute Idealism : Sitanath Tattwabhusan . .	244
IV.—The Modified Nominalism of the Jaina : Jadu Nath Sinha	249
V.—The Activity of the Self : Rashvihary Das	262
IV.—A Neglected School of Vedanta : Umesh Chandra Bhattacharyya	281

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THE
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Vedantic Mysticism.

BY G. R. MALKANI.

We mean by mysticism the direct experience of a super-sensible and a super-rational reality. There are now two different ways of looking at this matter so far as Advait Vedanta is conceived. (*a*) We may suppose that the vedantic philosophy is quite complete in itself, and that it can quite well reason out the position of non-dualism. This will however only give us rational knowledge, or a certain intellectual view of things. It will not amount to the realisation of Brahman. To have this realisation, we must have recourse to some kind of meditative practice, sadhana, etc. As the result of such practice alone, we can have knowledge that will make us free. We may philosophise, but we can never achieve the goal without *yoga* and the revelation to which it alone can lead.

(*b*) We may, on the other hand suppose that the Vedantic philosophy has failed in its purpose, and that its main position, namely the sole reality of Brahman, cannot be satisfactorily reasoned out. But where philosophy fails, mysticism takes up. It comes to the rescue. It alone can prove without a doubt that Brahman is the sole reality.

We shall take up the latter position first. Here again two different attitudes may be adopted : (1) the postulate of the sole reality of Brahman is inconsistent with facts. There is the physical world, and there are individual souls. These can never be proved to be unreal or illusory. If there is any Absolute, it must embrace the known differences. Vedantic Brahman does not embrace differences, and cannot explain them. It is an empty notion, far removed from actual experience.

Those who argue the unreality of Brahman in some such way, may have quite a plausible philosophy of their own. We have nothing to say to them here. But the only proper attitude of such people will be that the Vedantic idea is irrational, and if there is any such thing as Vedantic mysticism, it must be some form of erroneous perception, a perception that runs counter to the requirements of reason. In short, vedantic philosophy fails, and with it goes vedantic mysticism.

(2) We do not propose to contradict Vedanta outright from some position of our own. For all we know we may be mistaken in our common notions of reality and unreality. We are therefore prepared to be taught. But we cannot be expected to forego the exercise of our own reason. We accept all that Vedanta wants to teach us ; we accept that Brahman is the sole reality, that the world comprising both physical nature and finite individuals is an illusory appearance, that this illusory appearance is due to ignorance or avidyā, etc. But having accepted this, we want to know whether these various positions are consistent one with another. What we find however is that they are not, and that the view of things here suggested is self-discrepant. We are therefore obliged to believe that mysticism will pethaps put things right, and that it will bring conviction where reason fails to do.

Let us examine this position at length. The inner discrepancy spoken of above may be put somewhat as follows: The world-appearance is illusory in character. It is true that an illusory appearance does not really exist; and since it does not really exist, Brahman may be the sole reality. But at the same time, we have to answer the question, how does this illusory appearance of the world at all become possible? Brahman cannot be its cause; for Brahman is the substratum, and the reality of the substratum is inconsistent with the reality of the false appearance superimposed upon it. Brahman also cannot cause anything; for it is actionless, unchanging and pure. We might even go further and say that the world cannot be caused or brought into being by Brahman. If it were, it would cease to be illusory; for a real cause cannot have any but real effects. It is said that the illusory appearance is due to avidya. But then there must be this avidya in addition to Brahman, which will mean a real dualism. And then what is this avidya to rest on as its support? It cannot have Brahman as its support; for Brahman has no avidya; he is unconditioned, pure, and free from all those activities in which the manifestations of avidya consist. The finite individual too cannot be this support; for he is a product of avidya, and does not yet exist. The question therefore has to be answered,—how is avidya itself possible?

It will now be observed that if Brahman is the sole reality, we can only account for the appearance of the world by postulating avidya or the absence of right knowledge. The world can have no real cause. It is because we want to imply an unreal cause that we postulate avidya as the cause. Avidya then, taken as an explanatory concept, cannot be treated as signifying anything real. When we say that the world-appearance is due to avidya, we cannot mean that avidya is something real. Another point to be noted here is the demand to know the support of avidya. This means that we regard it as nnquestionable that avidya cannot be real in itself, and that it can only be realised somehow in what is intelligent. Can we now turn round and say that the fact that there is avidya leads to dualism? Indeed if avidya can exist independently and side by side with Brahman, that would be so. But nobody has ever argued that position. The concept of avidya then does not challenge the sole reality of Brahman, but rather implies it.

Still the question is insistent—but how is avidya possible? Our answer is that the question is illegitimate and should not arise; and that for the following reasons. (*a*) We can talk of the possibility or otherwise of a thing when the thing can be known as a present fact. Avidya can never be known as a present fact, and there is therefore no real problem about it. As soon as we are aware of it, it is already gone. It has reality, if we may say so, only so long as we are unaware of it; but then there can be no problem of avidya. When we become aware, we know fully what is was,—just a subjective misapprehension, quite irrational in its character. There is no further light about it which we can rationally demand. True, we often try to find reasons why a particular mistake arose. But when we find that those reasons do not *explain* the mistake, and that a mistake is in the last resort a pure mistake, quite inexplicable, we cease to ask further questions.

(*b*) The form of avidya is dependent upon knowledge. It is only when we know rightly that we can significantly speak of having been in ignorance. Ignorance can never arise before us as a concrete fact capable of being known, so long as right knowledge has not arisen. But while the form of avidya is thus dependent upon knowledge, it is at the same time incompatible with it in actual fact and can never abide along with knowledge. We may therefore well conclude that avidya is not a real fact; for its appearance in knowledge is inconsistent with its being there; or in other words, avidya cannot be where it appears. Where it appears, there is just the absence of avidya. There is this self-contradiction in the very nature of avidya. But what is self-contradictory can have no rational explanation.

(*c*) The status of avidya cannot be different from that of its products which we know to be illusory. The snake, in the snake-rope instance, is a real snake so long as we might say the ignorance about the rope is also real. It is only when this ignorance becomes unreal and is dispelled by knowledge that the snake is seen to be unreal also, which we express by saying that the original snake was illusory, i. e. non-existent. The illusory appearance and ignorance which we advance as its cause are thus exactly of the same reality. The effect partakes of the reality of its cause, and vice-versa. Now it is admitted that an illusory appearance does not become unreal only when it is known as illusory, but that it is unreal, and so does not exist, at any time, past, present or future. Its unreality is thus a timeless fact. But just in the same way its cause, namely avidya, must be so, too. How can we then ask for the reason of that which does not exist at any time?

(*d*) It is evident that avidya is not a known fact of the visible universe. If it were, it would be illusory like the rest. Avidya is conceived *as an explanation* of the visible world *in consonance with* the sole reality of Brahman. If Brahman is the sole reality, then the appearance of anything else beside Brahman is an illusory appearance due to avidya. If avidya presents itself as fact and presumes reality, then Vedanta says that that too is illusory like the rest. Avidya then is not a fact to be explained ; so far as it is such a fact, it is like the rest. It is a valid conception only as it is an explanation of all seeming facts (including itself) *in consonance with* the sole reality of Brahman. If it stands aside and requires explanation, then it has explanied nothing; and we have no need to call in avidya and raise unnecessary problems. Avidya is a concept that in explaning the visible world also explains itself. It is on that account an ultimate explanation ; and to raise any problems about it is wholly to misunderstand its real meaning.

The above arguments may not be convincing to all. There will always be some who will stick to the starting point which gives us a philosophical problem, and insist that the facts on which that problem is based cannot be wholly false. We may call the world illusory, but it is there to be taken account of. It is not nothing. If it were nothing, we should have had no problem. But we do have a problem, which proves that it is something; and this something cannot be Brahman. How can we then escape a fundamental cantradiction in all Vedantic reasoning ? We philosophise, and then we cannot turn round and say that there is nothing to philosophise about, and no philosophy. That would be just like kicking away the ladder when we have reached the top. We must therefore recognise that if philosophy is a real process, the facts on which it is based and with which it starts cannot be wholly unreal ; and yet their reality militates against the conclusion which this process of reasoning is supposed to have arrived at, namely the sole reality of Brahman. Is it not plain that there is something wrong with the process of reasoning.

This brings us to the question, what is a philosophical explanation? It is evident that when we ask what a thing is, we may simply mean what is the cause of it, or how it has come about. Any answer to this question must be based upon the known facts of experience. It is the province of empirical sciences to give explanations of this sort about things. We may therefore suppose that some explanation of things which is not empirical, and which cannot therefore be given by any of the empirical sciences, is what we should expect philosophy to offer. But an explanation which is not empirical can only be rational. There is this difference between the two. An empirical explanation refers us ultimately to facts as they orcur and as they can be observed by us. It does not really explain. A rational explanation on the other hand must bring out the inner meaning of things and make them more intelligible to us. It must indeed keep facts as they are. It cannot change them. But neither can it restrict itself to a statement of facts as they are for empirical observation; for that statement will not explain facts. In order to do this, it must lead us in a way beyond the facts as originally observed by us. This will involve, in the last resort, a real difference between facts as they appear for empirical observation and facts as they rationally mean. The difference can only be designated ultimately as the difference between the standpoint of ignorance and the standpoint of true knowledge. The process consists in appealing to certain rational intuitions the truth of which cannot be denied, and analysing the known facts in the light of those intuitions. What is certain is that any rational explanation must *supersede* the empirical view of things as being due to want of thought, and therefore to error and ignorance. It cannot be said to *explain* the latter, for it is opposed to it and supersedes it. Knowledge will drive out ignorance ; it will not explain it. When therefore philosophy explains things rationally, it presupposes this difference of stand-point. It would be the height of absurdity now to turn round and say that a philosophical explanation is incorrect because it is inconsistent with facts as given to empirical observation and with which philosophy itself had to start. There is no rational or philosophical explanation if such inconsistency does not arise, and is not from the beginning presupposed.

The world as known to us through our senses is shown rationally to partake of the same nature which the unreal snake has in respect of the rope. If our reasoning is true, then we may see the world with our eyes, but with our reason we shall know it to be Brahman and not what it appears. The appearance is illusory, non-existent, and real only from a point of view which must be superseded. When we have superseded it, can we still insist that the appearance is somehow real and that it requires explanation ? What non-empirical explanation can we give except that it does not exist in fact, and is due merely to ignorance ?

It is asked,—but why is there any ignorance ? It will perhaps not be accepted as a sufficient answer to this question that ignorance as conceived by Vedanta does not as a matter of fact itself *exist*, or that it is a postulate of all philosophising significant in the supersession of it and not in any explanation. But a little reflection will show that the question is quite illegitimate. We want to know the *why* and the *wherefore* of ignorance. All explanation however is significant in the transcendence of ignorance, and not in the explanation of it. *If ignorance can be explained, there must be some other ignorance which will be transcended in the explanation* *but not itself explained.* That can be explained which can be explained. But that which is real only as being irrational, and therefore real in the absence of reason, cannot have a rational explanation.

The cause of ignorance is ignorance. Ignorance cannot arise from knowledge, or from anything else. Once therefore it is postulated, it must be supposed to be beginningless. But this beginningless ignorance exists only in ignorance. When true knowledge has dawned, ignorance is known to have never existed and to have been unreal at all time. Vedanta says that ignorance is beignningless, but that it has an end. This should not be interpreted to mean that something which is real without beginning ceases to be real at a particular moment of time. What is real once can only continue to be real. Its true meaning is the one we have suggested. If you take ignorance to be a fact and want to know its cause, then it has no cause outside itself, and is in that sense beginningless. On the other hand, when you become aware of ignorance as ignorance. it has not only ceased to exist at that time, but it is also seen never to have existed at any time whatsoever. It is unreal for all time; while Brahman is the only timeless reality.

Our conclusion is that Vedanta is not self-discrepant as a philosophical system. The self-discrepancy arises from a misunderstanding of its concepts. But even supposing that it is self-discrepant, mystical experience can do nothing to remove its contradiction. There remains only the first alternative, namely that Vedantic mysticism must be based upon the truth of Vedantic philosophy. It is because the system is true that there can be a true experience answering to its conclusions. The question may be raised,—but what is Vedantic mysticism after all?

It is important in this connection to note that Vedanatic mysticism is not a matter of some mechanical practice based on faith. Not action but knowledge is the way. The only question is how is this knowledge achieved? We think that it is only by right discrimination that it can be achieved. It may be said that knowledge thus arrived at will still be merely intellectual, and therefore indirect and unconvincing. To this our answer is that if our reasoning is not abstract, but is based upon the facts of direct experience, then our conclusions cannot be divorced from the latter. Direct experience will remain intact; there will be change merely in our understanding of it. Knowledge thus arrived at, will therefore be as direct as any experience can be; and "mysticism" is only a term to signify direct experience of a particular kind, namely that which relates to what is not sensible. Our intuition of self is direct and not sensible. Here therefore we have the true basis of Vedantic mysticism.

Knowledge of Brahman which we obtain by discrimination is not like knowledge of America which we obtain by reading books, or hearing reports from persons who have visited that country. The latter is indeed indirect knowledge; it becomes direct when we ourselves visit that country and see things for ourselves. Knowledge by discrimnation is quite direct; for we know Brahman already. There can be no mere direct contact with him than that which we already have. What divides us from him is not want of direct intuitive contact; it is merely an error of our understanding, or our misunderstanding. Discrimination removes this error. We may bring this out by taking a concrete instance although a very crude one. I know a certain person *x* doing work which I regard to be highly philanthropic. I come across evidence which proves to me conclusively that he has a selfish motive in everything he does. Can I now regard him as I used to do formerly? It is evident, I cannot. The man and his acts will continue to be just the same. But my understanding is now changed regarding them. I shall only see mischief and self-interest where formerly I saw high and noble purpose. Just in the same way, reality will continue to be known as I know it in the state of ignorance. The change will be merely in my understanding. But this change makes all the difference between bondage and liberation or moksha, the goal of Vedantic mysticism.

Fact and the Thought of Fact..

By K. C. Bhattacharyya.

Fact means what is believed: what a person believes is a fact to him. The characterisation of fact as what stands in a constant system of relations or as what is given and not constructed by the mind or as what conditions and constitutes successful willing is no definition, as it itself assumes some fact. Fact does not admit of an impersonal definition.

Fact need not be the existent. The non-existence of that about which there can be an actual question of existence is also a fact that one believes and asks others to believe. A content about which there is no such question is, if believed a fact and if not believed, is no fact. There may be believed contents like the moral *ought* or freedom which are facts that are neither existent nor non-existent. What is taken as false or unreal is no fact and one cannot speak of its non-existence also as fact, there being, as will appear presently, no question of its existence.

The existence or non-existence of a content about which there can be an actual question of existence is a fact that is *thought.* Other facts are not properly said to be thought and the consciousness of a content as false or unreal is not a thinking consciousness. That about which the question of existence is asked is the possible existent. What is thought is either the possible existent or the existence or the non-existence of the possible existent. Nothing is properly said to be thought which does not imply the question of existence.

This restriction of the use of the word thought requires justification. In the question 'does A exist or not', A does not mean an existent; it is a thought-content that is some-time said to be subsistent. Must such a thought-content be understood as a possible existent? Is anything sought to be known about it except whether it exists or not? One may, it may be said, seek to analyse it or to find out if it is compatible with another thought-content. Are such problems answered by thinking without reference to existence and non-existence? The answer in any case, it may be contended, is self-evident however it is reached. But it is not self-evident like an axiom, being no judgment if a judgment is understood to imply a reference to the fact of existence or non-existence. Is the explication of a meaning or its compatibility or otherwise with another meaning a thought-content at all? Is the awareness specially of contradiction properly called thinking? A contradictory thought is no thought, being only a loose expression for a combination of words meaning contents in contradiction with one another: the contradiction itself is no meaning. A synthesis of two meanings may indeed be a meaning but the so-called relation of compatibility is no meaning. It is only a symbolic expression for the problematic synthesising process which, if called thinking at all, is thinking without any thought-content of which we are actually conscious. So too when a given meaning is known to be equivalent to the synthesis of two meanings, the equivalence is a symbolic expression for an equating process which is at best a thinking without an actual thought-content.

What then is sought to be known about a thought-content or objective meaning without reference to its existence or non-existence is not itself an objective meaning, If anything is objectively known about the subsistent as other than a possible existent, it is its distinctness. If the reference of the distinct subsistent to existence be not necessary, how is the relation understood at all? In 'A has or has not existence', is the relation of *having* itself a subsistent or existent? If it is subsistent, how does it again get related to existence and if it is existent, how does A which means only a distinct get related to it ? It will not do to say that that the reference of the subsistent to existence is no objective content at all, for then the judgment 'A exists or does not exist' would have no objective meaning. There appears to be no escape from the view that the subsistent *means* the possible existent. A content abstracted from its possible existence is not even subsistent. Not that a content as thus abstracted is an unmeaning phrase: it is only not subsistent, not a meaning or thought-content, though it is still a significant speakable. Even a contradiction which is no thought is a significant speakable.

A speakable content that is not thinkable as having no reference to existence may or may not be fact. The false or unreal is a significant unthinkable that is no fact. It is unthinkable as implying the absence or withdrawal of the question of existence and is thus distinct from non-existence, to assert which of a content is still to entertain the question of its existence. What is said to be false is a speakable content that is sometimes wrongly taken to be a proposition, understood as the thought-content that is asserted or denied in a judgment. A negative judgment is the denial of a proposition or of a possible existent but the awareness of a content as false is not a negative judgment. To take something to be false is to reject or negate it without being aware of the negation as a thought-content. The negative judgment also implies rejection or disbelief but the disbelief there is always a qualified belief. If the judgment 'A is not B' be a denial of the proposition 'A being B,' it is also an affirmation of the proposition 'A being not B.' Even in the limiting case of the negative judgment—the negative existential judgment 'A is not', the disbelief in the existence of A is a positive belief in the non-existence of A, non-existence being understood as a factual determination of the possible existent

A. But the assertion of falsity implies *pure* disbelief that is not equivalent to any belief. The content that is disbelieved here is not even understood as a possible existent and is accordingly no thought-content. If it is still called a proposition, we have to distinguish it as a merely speakable proposition from the thinkable proposition that is affirmed or denied in a judgment.

But has not the purely disbelieved content, it will be asked, a reference to existence? If the golden mountain or the hare's horn is disbelieved, do we not take these to be thinkable and as possibly existent? The question is if the person who disbelieves such a content takes it to be a possible existent during the disbelief. In forming a negative judgment like 'A is not', one entertains the question of A's existence, the content of the undecided question being just the proposition. But in stating the hare's horn as an example of the false or unreal, we do not have an undecided question of its existence in our mind. We do not actually ask if it exists: we can only imagine ourselves asking it. If then a purely disbelieved content admits of a question about its existence, the question is not actual to the disbeliever, being only a *possible* question. The content of an actual question being the possible existent, the content of a possible question would be the possibility of a possible, an entity that we need not regard as unmeaning but which is not the same as the thought-content called proposition that is asserted or denied in a judgment. If the content that we take to be false or unreal has a reference to existence at all, it is this possible or imaginary reference. Such reference we may deny only to a contradiction like square circle: a question is not even imagined about the contradictory. Not that it is absolutely unimaginable, for the contradictory is not meaningless like the word *abracadabra*. We can ask about two thoughts if they are compatible and hence a possible question of existence about the possibly compatible—the doubly possible question, as we may call it—is not altogether excluded. If the content of a possible and a doubly possible question were to be called proposition, it would be only a speakable that is not thinkable, a significant entity that is yet no meaning.

What is rejected as false then is a speakable but not thinkable proposition. Must it be even a speakable proposition? The terms false and unreal are sometimes distinguished, the former being taken to be asserted of a proposition and the latter of a thing about which there is only a possible question of existence. Is the distinction tenable in the case of the perceptually false or the illusory? A perceptual judgment like 'this stick exists'—expressed, it may be, in the interjectional form 'this stick'—may be said to be the affirmation of the proposition 'this stick' existing' or 'the existence of this stick.' A proposition of this kind is indeed a useless paraphrase of the word *this* but it is not meaningless. When a stick is mistaken for a snake and the mistake corrected, the correction is properly expressed not as 'this is not a snake' but as 'this snake is not a snake'. It is not the thinking denial of a proposition, for the proposition 'this snake being snake' cannot be denied. It is no judgment but is only the symbolisation in the form of a judgment of the peculiar experience of perceptual annulment, of the visible reduction of the percept to unreality. Correction is the correction of a falsity and so it is the thing snake as apparently perceived and no proposition that is taken to be false. The snake can be here spoken of indifferently as false or unreal.

What is false then need not be a proposition. Where it is a proposition, it is speakable but not thinkable and is equivalent to a content about which there is no actual but only a possible question of existence. Such a content is said to be unreal and so the false—whether perceptual or non-perceptual—may also be called unreal. The term unreal however is apparently wider than the term false. A content that is said to be unreal may or may not have been previously believed and the question of its existence may or may not have been raised. All that is necessary is that it should be disbelieved and that there should not be an actual question of its existence during the disbelief. If the question was previously raised about it, it is now wholly dropped, and if it was previously believed, the belief is now wholly or partially withdrawn. About the unreal in the form of the contradictory, no question of existence could have arisen and it could not have been believed. What is called imaginary may or may not have been believed and made the subject of a question but in any case the belief and the question are now wholly withdrawn. An unreal content is properly said to be false if it was believed and hence could be the subject of an actual question, the question being now wholly and the belief only partially withdrawn. What does the partial withdrawal of belief mean?

The possible existent is fact that is indeterminately known as either a determinate existent or a determinate non-existence. We speak of the falsity of what was previously believed to be a possible existent. Existence or non-existence is itself a determination of fact but each again has its particular determination: we speak of the previously believed existence or non-existence *of A* as false. The falsity would imply disbelief in *this* existence or non-existence but not in *some* possible existence as a determination of fact. When A is taken to be false, the non-existence of A may also be false but *some* possible existent must be believed. One may, for example, dream of the room in which he actually is and on waking take the dream to be false without believing in the non-existence of the room. So too the falsity of the belief in the non-existence of A need not imply belief in the existence of A, though in neither case is the belief in the possible existence of *something* rejected. This is the sense in which belief is to be understood as *partially* withdrawn in an assertion of falsity.

Belief in some fact is implied in all negative assertion—the assertion of non-existence or falsity or other form of unreality. To say that a content is non-existent is to continue to believe in some actual existent. To say that it is false is still to believe in some fact as possibly existent. To take it to be imaginary or contradictory requires no belief in a possible existent but only in fact about which there is no actual question of existence. The assertion of falsity presupposes the belief that reality or fact can be existent fact or the fact of non-existence. The belief is not denied or rejected in the assertion of a content as contradictory or imaginary but it is irrelevant to such assertion of unreality.

The notion of the possible existent may appear to present a confusion. A fact is taken to be thought if there is an actual question of existence about it or in other words if it is a possible existent. The consciousness of falsity however has been said to imply a belief that is not questioned in some possible existent. Falsity is not a thought-content and the possible existent that is presupposed by falsity is also presumably not a thought-content and yet thought-content is defined as the possibly existent. There is no confusion if we remember that what falsity presupposes is *some* possible existent, only an indeterminate assertible, an unquestioned and therefore unthinkable fact; and that thinkable fact as a determination of this indeterminate is the subject of a question of existence. The determinate assertible is thinkable fact, the indeterminate assertible is unthinkable fact and there may be unthinkable fact that is not assertible at all.

A speakable content then is either fact or no fact. The false, the imaginary and the contradictory are forms of unreality or no-fact. Fact is either thinkable or unthinkable and unthinkable fact may or may not be assertible. Thinkable fact is the possible existent as determinate and the unthinkable assertible is the possible existent as indeterminate. Is there any unthinkable fact that is not assertible and if so, is it coordinate with the unthinkable fact that is assertible ?

The false or the unreal as such is an unassertible content that is not fact. It is unassertible in the sense that it is purely disbelieved. The believed content may be distinguished from the believing but the disbelieved content is not distinguishable from the disbelieving. As thus indistinguishable, the disbelieved content is not asserted and so if there be a believed content that is not other than the believing of it, it would be said to be unassertible fact. A fact that is not yet known to be existent fact or the fact of non-existence but is known as not other than these alternatives—the indeterminate possible existent—is believed to be other than the believing, to be presented or objective in this sense. Unassertible fact then would be what is believed without being presented or objective. Not that it would be only the believing: it would be believed as not distinct from the believing, believed to be the subjective that is not merely consciousness of fact but is itself the fact of which it is conscious. Concrete subjectivity, as we may call it—the spiritual in our ordinary parlance—is thus the fact that is not only unthinkable but unassertible.

Unthinkable fact—whether assertible or unassertible—is fact about which there is no actual question of existence. About the assertible unthinkable there may be a *possible* question, just as there may be a possible question about the false or imaginary. The indeterminate fact that is said to be possibly existent is the objective or the assertible *in general* about which there is no question of existence because the question presupposes it. But it is possible to ask about it—

what idealism actually asks—if objectivity or distinction from the subjective or spiritual is fact or no fact, real or unreal. It would be an actual question not of existence but of facthood or reality, representing a spiritual as distinct from logical doubt. Spiritually actual, it can be admitted in logic only as a *possible* question of existence. The idealist's doubt about the object is properly not about its existence, not whether it is an existent among existents. Since the object *means* the possible existent, the existent *or* non-existence, the doubt is whether the existent is existent and non-existence non-existence. It is an unintelligible question which is none the less real, being in fact a spiritual uncertainty symbolised by the logical form of a question.

The possibility of existence and non-existence or bare objectivity is a fact beyond the question of existence. Subjective or spiritual fact is also beyond the question but the difference is that a question about the former is not meaningless while it is meaningless about the latter. No question is actually entertained about the former while about the latter there cannot be even a possible question. The possible question entertainable about bare objectivity is, as already said, whether the existent is existent and non-existence non-existence. It is the question whether existence and non-existence are not both unreal. If the possible means *either* existent or non-existent, what is neither existent nor non-existent would be the impossible. It may be a contradiction to speak of a content as both existent and non-existent but to say that it is neither is only to imply that it is not thinkingly known, that it is impossible to thought but not that it must be unreal. The impossible may be fact, though this *may-be* is a motiveless possibility to logic, a possibility that cannot be thought but cannot also be rejected by thought. Hence it is not meaningless to suggest that objectivity—meaning both existence and non-existence—is unreal, though in the absence of a positive spiritual feeling or experience of such unreality, the suggestion would be worthless. It is not worthless because there is a spiritual feeling of the symbolistic character of the object or of its unsubstantiality in itself or of both, of the vanity of the object-interest as independent of the spiritual interest—the heart of religion and the perennial spring of all idealism.

Thus the facthood of objectivity though unquestioned in logic is questionable from the spiritual standpoint, the question being not meaningless but motiveless for logic, no actual intellectual question. A question about the facthood of the spiritual however is meaningless. We may contrast three forms of certainty—the necessity of an axiom, the unquestioned character of the object in general and the self-evidence of the spiritual. All the three are logically undeniable. The axiom however admits of an actual question, there is only a possible question about the object in general while a question is altogether meaningless in respect of the spiritual. An axiom is at once a law and an intuitable form of a particular organisation of thinkable facts. The law is necessarily true for the organisation but it does not exclude the possibllity of an alternative organisation of the facts under a different axiom. Objectivity again, as presupposed by the logical question, is not itself questioned in logic; but while logic does not entertain, it does not exclude a doubt other than the intellectual, which is symbolised by a logical question. That doubting cannot be doubted is true not of the logical but of the spiritual doubt. Spiritual uncertainty is itself a certainty and if objectivity is spiritually felt to be suspect, it is as much unreal as real. The object is never felt to be more than suspect, to be altogether unreal, though one may feel the want and the desirability of such feeling.

No question arises about the facthood of the spiritual itself unless it is artificially objectified by language or otherwise. The question about the reality of the self arises when the self is represented—it may be, through a word like I—as a meant thing among things. To realise that it is an unmeanable or unthinkable content would be to reject the question itself as illusory and not to obtain an answer to the question. So if an alleged spiritual value of a thinkable object is pronounced unreal, it means either that it is not a spiritual value or that the value is not embodied or incarnated in the object but not that the spiritual value that it is alleged to be is itself illusory. So a doubt about the facthood of what is called a subjective state is an uncertainty about the naming of the subjective fact or about its being a fact in the mind of the doubter as appropriated by him or even about its being subjective at all but not about there being the subjective state.

Doubt about an object need not imply the belief that the object exists at any time but only implies the belief that there is *some* object, belief in bare objectivity which is not questioned within logic, though a question about it is not meaningless. What appears as a doubt about a subjective fact implies certainty about the fact and uncertainty only about its symbolic characterisation by an objective category. Uncertainty about the spiritual is a spiritual certainty about its persisting objective aspect being merely symbolic or superinduced and is infact the beginning of the correction or elimination of the aspect. The spirit is born in the uncertainty about the facthood of objectivity and it realises itself on the one hand by freeing itself from or correcting away the objectivity that sticks to it and on the other by consciously symbolising or contemplating itself as object to consolidate its freedom.

While the bare object is an unquestioned fact, it is not co-ordinate with self-evidencing spiritual fact. Objectivity cannot be disbelieved but there may be spiritual doubt about its being other than the spiritual. As the spirit realises itself by symbolising itself as object, the object may be only the self-symbolising function of the spirit. The suggestion has value for the spiritual consciousness but is not assertible in the secular or logical consciousness, being only not denied in it. So long as the dualism of the spiritual and the secular consciousness remains, we have to regard the object as an unquestioned fact and the subject as an unquestionable fact without being able to assert their unity or duality.

IV. Indra's Absolute Idealism

BY SITANATH TATTWABHUSAN.

The story of Indra and Pratardana in the third chapter of the *Kaushītaki* Upanishad is of great importance in Hindu sacred literature. It gives the Sastric exposition of the doctrine of incarnation. It explains in what sense the individual self can declare itself as one with the Universal. The story is very simple, but the metaphysics it teaches is abstruse and beyond the comprehension of ordinary intellects. It is only when one has passed beyond the Objective stage of thought, in which the distinction of subject and object is all but unrecognised, and the Subjective stage, in which they are sharply distinguished but their necessary relation remains undiscovered, and rises to the Absolute stage, in which this relation is seen, that one understands Indra's philosophy. It is remarkable that even with their common philosophy of unity, the *rishis* of the Upanishads do not all rise to this stage of thought. When they do not do so, the Monism they teach is more or less dogmatic and unreasoning, following apparently the insight of some previous thinker. This cannot be said of the philosopher whom we are now dealing with. He seems to have a true insight into the ultimate unity, though his exposition of his views is not as clear and full as a modern might wish it to be. It is often crude and poetic, but our thinker's comprehension of the central truth is undoubted. However, the story is this. Pratardana, the son of Divodasa, a Rigvedic hero, goes to Indra's heaven through his valour and prowess. Indra is so pleased with them that he promises his guest a boon which however the hero asks the god himself to choose for him. Indra thinks that the highest boon for man would be to know him and proceeds to explain what he means by himself. What he does is really making evident the presence of the Universal Self in every individual. When one realises one's identity with the Universal, one becomes sinless, though one may do what seems the most horrible acts. The god refers to some of his most objectionable deeds as related in the *Rigveda* and says that by doing them he did not incur any sin owing to his conscious unity with the Deity. All this is of course anachronistic, for it is a far cry from the warlike exploits of the Rigvedic Indra to the idealistic philosophy of the Upanishadic sage. However, our philosopher says he is *Prāna* (Life), and he is *Prajnā* (self-conscious Reason). *Prāna* seems nothing more than one of the supposed functions of the body like seeing, hearing, acting etc. But it is really the basis of all other functions. We may do without any one or more of the others, but we cannot do without *Prāna*. And this *Prāna* is one with *Prajnā*. Our senses and organs cannot act without *Prajnā* at their basis. All perceptions and actions imply the unity of consciousness. It is I who see and hear, and it is I who feel and act. Indra identifies *Prāna* with the objective aspect of our life and *Prajnā* with the subjective and shows the unity of these aspects. What is spoken, smelt, seen, heard, tasted, done, felt, generated, moved and thought of are called the *Bhūtamātrās* (objective elements) and the speaker, smeller, seer, hearer, taster, doer, feeler, generator, mover and thinker the *Prajnāmātrās* (subjective elements). The former cannot be know except in relation to the latter. The very idea of the former implies the latter. As Indra very reasonably says, one should not try to know the *seen*: one should try to know the *seer*. One should not try to know the *heard* : one should try to know the *hearer*, and so on. Objects without relation to the subject are abstractions. As he further says:—

ता वा एता दशैव भूतमात्रा अधिप्रज्ञं दश प्रज्ञामात्रा अधिभूतम्। यद्धि भूतमात्रा न स्युर्न प्रज्ञामात्राः स्युः। यद्धि प्रज्ञामात्रा न स्युर्न भूतमात्राः स्युः। नहि अन्यतरतो रूपं किञ्चन सिध्येत् तद् यथा रथस्य अरेषु नेमिरर्पितो नाभौ अर्पिताः। एवम् एव एता भूतमात्राः प्रज्ञामात्रासु अर्पिताः प्रज्ञामात्राः प्राणे अर्पिताः। स एष प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मानन्दोऽजरोऽमृतः। एष लोकपालः। एष लोकाधिपतिः एष सर्वेशः। स मे आत्मा—इति विद्यात्। स मे आत्मा—इति विद्यात्।

That is—"These ten elements of the objective world exist in relation to consciousness, and the ten elements or phases of consciousness exist in relation to the objective world. If there were no elements of the objective world, there would be no elements of consciousness. If there were no elements of consciousness, there would be no elements of the objective world. No form or entity is possible from only one of the two sides. This (i. e., the concrete reality) is not many (but one). As the circumference of the wheel of a car is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, so are these elements of the objective world placed on the elements of consciousness and the elements of consciousness placed on life. This life is the conscious Self,—blissful, unfading and immortal. He is the Guardian of the world. He is the Sovereign of the world. He is the Lord of all. One should know him thus—He is my Self."

By seeing the fundamental unity of subject and object Indra reaches the true Infinite, which is neither beyond the finite nor an aggregate of finites, but shines in every finite as its support or ultimate truth. It is the absolute distinction, without unity, of subject and object which divides the world, divides reality, and prevents the dividing understanding from grasping the Infinite, the ultimate Reality beyond which there is nothing. This ultimate Reality is the Subject-object beyond which nothing is known and nothing can be conceived. However, this view, when properly understood, effectively disposes of Yājnavalkya's Subjective Idealism with its corollaries of the impermanence of knowledge and the final merging of the finite in the Infinite. Subjective Idealism of all forms, ancient and modern, belittles the objective aspect of reality. This seems to be contingent and changeful, while the subjective aspect seems necessary and permanent. But to say so is to indulge in abstractions. Every form of reality, high or low, presents both a subjective and an objective side, and when one of them changes, the other does the same. For instance, the piece of paper before me, a very small and apparently negligible part of reality, presents both these sides and would be impossible without any one of them. It is an object of my knowledge and thus necessarily implies me as its knower. But it may seem that though I am necessary for it, it is not necessary for me. Really however *I as its knower*,—that much of me which consists in being its knower,—would be impossible without it. And when every aspect of my nature consisting in being the knower of particular objects is abstracted from me, I am really reduced to nothing. In the same manner every change in the object before me represents a change in me. If the paper is torn, if it changes colour, or is burnt, these changes represent changes in my mental life. They are as much objects of my knowledge as the paper when unchanged. A mere subject without objects, a merely unchanged reality not related to change,—the idol of

Māyāvāda or Subjective Idealism—is therefore an abstraction. It will be seen in the same manner that an Infinite unrelated to the finite, a Universal without relation to particulars or individuals,—the idol of the Absolute Monist—is also an abstraction. Our philosopher, Indra, seems to see this truth also, though he is not fully explicit on this point. He says one should know the Absolute thus—"He is my Self." What reality is represented by "my"? It is the finite individual, the subject of growing knowledge and of instructions and injunctions like "one *should* know" and "one *should* act so." It is created by the Absolute's eternal activity of self-distinction—his process of distinguishing himself from his creations and yet integrating the latter with him,—a process unintelligible to the mere analytic Understanding, but not so to the synthesising Reason. If the Absolute were alone, without necessary relation to finite selves, the ethical and spiritual world, which consists of *persons* related to one another, would be impossible *even for a single moment.* **A** solitary Absolute could not imagine himself for a moment without self-contradiction as distinct from objects in time and space and distinct from persons other than himself. The presence of the objective world and of finite intelligences knowing the Infinite is therefore a conclusive evidence of the truth that the absolute is not *Ekamevādvitīaym* in the monistic sense, but that he is necessarily related to finite objects and persons. All this is implied in the philosophy of Indra and Prajāpati which we have taken pains to interpret in this paper. That there are also other Upanishadic sages who hold similar views may be seen in different parts of the longer prose Upanishads, the *Chhāndogya*, the *Brihadāranyaka* and the *Kaushītaki*, if they are read with an open and unbiased mind.

The Modified Nominalism of the Jaina.

BY JADU NATH SINHA.

The Buddhist believes in specific individuals only which are like themselves (*svalakṣana*). He does not believe in the universal (*jāti*). He is an uncompromising nominalist. According to him, particulars or individuals alone are real; there is no universal or class-essence among them; they are characterised by themselves; there is not even likeness or similarity among them. The Jaina agrees with the Buddhist in denying the existence of a class-essence in the individuals belonging to the same class; but he differs from the latter in recognising the existence of common characters or resemblances among them, which he regards as the real universal. The Jaina does not go so far to say that specific individuals alone are real and there is no likeness or similarity among them. According to him, there is *likeness* or similarity among the individuals belonging to the same class, and this *likeness* is the real universal; there is no universal class-essence among them. This doctrine may be compared with Mill's nominalism. According to Mill, though there is not a universal class-essence among the individuals belonging to the same class, still there are certain fundamental qualities common to them all; and in thinking general terms, we have indeed concrete images before the mind, but concentrate our attention on the fundamental attributes common to them, and recognise them as common to the whole class of things.

Thus the Jaina is neither an uncompromising nominalist nor an uncompromising realist. The Buddhists are out-and-out nominalists. They recognise the existence of specific individuals only. They entirely deny the existence of the universal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka, on the other hand, recognise the existence of one, eternal, and ubiquitious universal in the individuals. They are out-and-out realists. The Jaina holds an intermediate position. He also recognises the reality of the universal, but, according to him, the universal is not one, eternal, and ubiquitous, as the realists hold, but is multiform, non-eternal, and non-pervading or limited; and this universal is nothing but the common character or *similarity* among the different individuals belonging to the same class. The Jaina does not recognise the existence of any other universal than this common character or similarity which is perceived through the sense-organs like colours and the like. And this common character, according to him, is the cause of the universal notion which has no other object than this.

The difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka, on the one hand, and the Jaina, on the other is that according to the former, the universal notion has its objective counter-part in the real universal or class-essence in the individuals, which is different from them, and is one, eternal, and ubiquitous, while according to the latter, the universal notion has its objective counter part in the common character or similarity of many individuals, which is not one, eternal, and ubiquitous, but many, temporary, and limited. There are many individuals, and so many common characters in them. The individuals are born and perish, and so the common characters, which exist in them, are temporary. The common characters are confined to the individuals in which they exist; so they are limited in nature. Thus the Jaina is neither an uncompromising nominalist like the Buddhist nor an uncompromising realist like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka. He is an advocate of modified nominalism.

According to the Jaina, an object of knowledge is both universal and particular (*sāmānya-Viśeṣātma*).[1] It is not merely universal like the Being or Brahman of Sankara; nor is it merely particular like the specific individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the Buddhist. It is characterised both by common characters (*sāmānya*) and by uncommon or distinctive characters (*viśeṣa*). Our consciousness of similarity (*anuvṛtta pratyaya*) has for its object common characters (*sāmānya*), and our consciousness of difference (*vyāvṛtta pratyaya*) has for its object uncommon or distinctive characters (*viśeṣa*).[2] The consciousness of an object involves assimilation and discrimination both. Assimilation is due to common characters, and discrimination is due to uncommon characters. Hence, an object of knowledge is both universal and particular, since it is characterised by common and uncommon characters both. The common characters, again, which constitute the real universal (*Sāmānya*), according to the Jaina, are of two kinds, viz., *Tiryak* Sāmānya and *Urddhvatā Sāmānya*.[3] By *Tiryak Sāmānya* he means similar modifications (*sadṛśa-pariṇāmastiryak*)[4] e. g., dewlap and the like in cows, (cf, Ramanuja). By *Urddhvatā Sāmānya* he means the permanent substance which abides in the midst of past, present and future modifications (*parāparavivarta-vyāpi-dravyamūrddhvata*).[5] e. g., earth in its various modifications. So, the common characters of an object are constituted by its permanent substance which persists in the midst of all its changes or modifications, and its modifications which are similar to those of other like objects. And these are the real universal; there is no other universal than these common characters.

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1. सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थो विषयः। *Parīkṣamukham*, iv, 1.
2. अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात्। *Ibid*, iv, 2.
3. *Ibid*, iv, 3.
4. *Ibid*, iv, 4.
5. *Ibid*, iv, 5.

(II). *The Jaina criticism of the Buddhist Nominalism.*

Prabhā-candra offers the following criticism to the Buddhist doctrine of nominalism in *Prameyakamala-mārtanḍa* :—

(1) First, the Buddhist argues that the universal is not perceived apart from the individual; hence it does not exist.

But the Jaina urges that the universal is as much an object of perception as the individual; it is an object of uncontradicted experience in the form of 'inclusive' or assimilative perception (*anuvṛttapratyaya*), just as the individual is an object of uncontradicted experience in the form of 'exclusive' or discriminative perception (*vyavāṛtta-pratyaya*). Just as the exclusive perception of particularity cannot be denied, so the inclusive perception of universality also cannot be denied. Both these experiences are uncontradicted. And the verdict of uncontradicted expereince can never be called in question. Hence, uncontradicted assimilative perception establishes the real existence of the universal (*sāmānya*) common to many individuals, which cannot be apprehended by discriminative perception.

(2) Secondly, the Buddhist argues that there is no universal apart from the individual, for there are not two distinct cognitions of the universal and the individual.

But the Jaina urges that there *is* a difference between the cognition of universality and that of individuality, for all of us perceive the difference. There are two distinct cognitions of the universal and the individual. It is true that both of them are perceived at the same time and in the same object. But that does not prove that they are apprehended by one and the same cognition. For, in that case, the colour and the taste of a cake perceived at the same time would be apprehended by a single cognition. But as a matter of fact, the cognitions of the colour and the taste, though simultaneous, are different from each other. Nor can it be argued that the universal is identical with the individual since both of them are perceived at the same time through the same sense-organ. For, in that case, the wind would be identical with the sun since sometimes both of them are perceived at the same time through the tactual organ. In fact, the difference between two objects is proved by the difference in their cognitions. And there *is* a difference between the cognition of the universal and the cognition of the individual: the fromer is inclusive, while the latter is exclusive in nature. Hence, the universal is different from the individual. Moreover, sometimes we perceive only the common character (e. g., tallness) of two objects (*e. g.*, a post and a man) but cannot perceive their distinctive characters as in doubtful perception. This conclusively proves that the cognition of the universal is different from the cognition of the individual. And this difference in cognitions proves the real difference in their objects. Thus the universal must be different from the individual.

(3) Thirdly, the Buddhist contends that the experience of universality (*anugatapratibhāsa*) does not necessarily imply the real existence of the universal, for it can be produced by different individuals.

But the Jaina urges that the experience of universality is never possible without the real existence of the universal; for, otherwise, it would not be experienced in the same form in all times and places. Moreover, individuals are different from one another; difference constitutes the essential nature of individuals. How, then can they produce the experience of universality? Still if the Buddhist insists that different individuals can produce the experience of universality, then, for the same reason, different horses would produce the universal notion of 'cow' which is absurd.

(4) Fourthly, the Buddhist contends that though individuals are absolutely different from one another, and devoid of common characters, still the preclusion of certain individuals (e. g., cows) from those individuals which are neither their causes nor effects (e. g., horses, buffaloes etc) is the cause of the experience of universality (e. g., 'cow') and the consequent action.

But the Jaina replies that the negation of contradictories is not at all possible in those individuals which are devoid of common characters; hence it cannot be the cause of the experience of universality. Moreover, the negative conception of the 'negation of contradictories' can never lead to practical action, which always follows from positive cognitions. Besides, if the experience of universality is possible without the real existence of the universal in nature, then, for the same reason, the experience of individuality also would be possible without the real existence of the individual in nature, which is not admitted by the Buddhist. Hence, if discriminative perceptions have for their objects discrete individuals in the world, then assimilative perceptions too must have for their objects real universals in the world. Thus the universal has a real existence in nature.

(5) Fifthly, the Buddhist contends that though there is no real universal in the individuals, the experience of universality is due to the illusory identification of different individuals owing to the similarity of the actions produced by them. For instance, though different cows have no real identity among them, yet they seem to be identical in nature since all of them produce similar actions e. g., milking, carrying, *etc.*

But the Jaina points out that different individuals produce different actions. If it is said that the identity of the actions produced by different individuals is due to the similarity of other actions, then it would lead to *regressus ad infinitum*. Even the cognitions produced by different individuals are different from one another. So, they cannot account for the experience of universality.

(6) Lastly, the Buddhist contends that the illusory identity of different ideterminate* perceptions is due to their producing one and the same universal notion; and the illusory identity of different individuals is due to the illusory identity of the ideterminate preceptions which are produced by different individuals. Thus, according to him an illusory identity is superimposed on the different indeterminate perceptions produced by different individuals, because of the identity of the universal notion produced by them; and an illusory identity is superimposed on the different individuals on account of the illusory identity of their effects, viz., indeterminate perceptions. Thus an identity is superimposed on indeterminate perceptions, though they are absolutely different from one another, and superimposed identity, again, is superimposed on specific individuals which are absolutely different from one another.

The Jaina urges that this theory of the superimposition of a superimposition is, indeed, a nice hypothesis, which does not appeal to reason but to blind faith! As a matter of fact, indeterminate perceptions, which are absolutely different from one another, can never produce one and the same universal notion. Had it been so, the indeterminate perceptions of horses and other animals too would have produced the universal notion of 'cow'. So, it is wrong to argue that the illusory identity of different individuals is due to the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions

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*The Buddhists do not believe in determinate perceptions. The so-called determinate perceptions are not perceptual in character since they are not free from *vikalpas* or determinations e. g. name, genus, substance, quality and action. All perceptions are indeterminate, according to the Buddhists.

of these individuals, and the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions is due to their producing one and the same universal notion.

Hence, the Jaina concludes that the universal really exists in the world in the form of common characters or similarity (*sadṛśapariṇāma*) since it is an object of uncontradicted experience.

(III). *The Jaina criticim of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka Realism.*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka hold that there is a real universal in the individuals, and it is one, eternal, and ubiquitous. But this doctrine is refuted by the Jaina almost by the same arguments which have been advanced by the Buddhist to prove the non-existence of the universal. The Jaina does not believe in any other universal than likeness, since likeness alone is an object of perception, and nothing beyond likeness is perceived. And this universal in the form of likeness is not one but many, since it exists in many individuals; it is not eternal but temporary, since it is produced and destroyed along with the individual in which it exists; it is not ubiquitous but limited, since it is confined to the individual in which it exists.

It cannot be argued that the cognition of the universal notion itself proves the existence of one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal. For, what does it mean? Does it mean that wherever there is a universal notion, there is such a universal? Or does it mean that wherever there is such a universal, there is a universal notion?

The first meaning is not possible. It cannot be held that wherever we have a universal notion, there is a real universal corresponding to it. For, we have a universal notion of universals *for instance* such as the generic character of cows (*gotva*), the generic character of horses *aśvatva* etc; but is there a universal of universals (e. g.

gotvatva or ashwatvatva) corresponding to the universal notion ? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the existence of a universal of universals. Then, again, we have the universal notion of the different kinds of negation or non-existence, viz., antecedent non existence, subsequent non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. But is there a universal of negation among these different kinds of negation ? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the existence of the universal of negation. But these universal negations can be explained by the common character in the different universals and the different kinds of negation respectively. Hence, there is no other universal than common character or similarity.

The second meaning also is impossible. It cannot be held that wherever there is a real universal in the world, there is a corresponding universal notion in the mind. For, though there is not a real universal in the cooks in the form of their generic character (*pacākatva*), according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, still there is the universal notion of 'cook' (*pācakah, pācaka ityādi*). Such a universal notion is not produced by the function (*karma*) of the cooks, for functions differ with each cook; and different causes can never produce the same effect. Nor can it be produced by the community of functions (*karmasāmānya*), for, if it is possible at all, it can produce the universal notion of cooking, but not of the cook.

Hence, the Jaina concludes that the universal notion cannot have for its object one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal existing in different individuals. There is no other universal than the common character or similarity, which is not one in many individuals, but differs with each individual in which it exists. And such a universal in the form of a common character differs in each individual like the uncommon or distinctive characters. Just as an individual is distinguished from other individuals by virtue of its uncommon or distinctive characters, so it is assimilated to other individuals by virtue of those characters which it has in common with them; and these common characters are perceived in the form 'this is similar to that', 'that is similar to this', and so on. Just as the distinctive characters of individuals lead to effective actions by producing discriminative perceptions in the mind, so the common characters of individuals lead to effective actions by producing assimilative perceptions in the mind.

(IV). *The Jaina refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka objections.*

(1). First, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka urges that if the common character or similarity constitutes universality, why do we perceive an individual cow as 'this *is* a cow', and not as 'this is *like* a cow'? The Jaina replies that we have such a perception because of the superimposition of identity or similarity (*abhedopacārāt*).

The Jaina further retorts: How can the Bhāṭṭa explain such a perception as 'this is *like* that',—'the white cow is *like* the black cow'? If the Bhāṭṭa argues that we have such a perception, because of their relation to the same universal, then, the Jaina says, we would have such a perception as 'these two individuals are possessed of the *same* universal'. The Jaina holds that we have such a perception as 'this *is* a cow', and not as 'this is *like* a cow', because of the superimposed identity between the two individuals on account of their common characters.

(2). Secondly, the Bhāṭṭa asks: If an individual is perceived to be like another individual on account of their common characters, how can these common characters, again, be perceived as *like* one another? Is it because of other common characters among these common characters? If so, then it would lead to *regressus ad infinitum.*

The Jaina replies that just as distinctive characters can be perceived as distinct from one another without supposing other distinctive characters among these distinctive characters so the common characters among individuals can be perceived as *like* one another without supposing any other common character among them. The hypothesis of any other universal than the common characters among individuals is unwarranted by the facts of experience. There is no class-essence (*jāti*) in the individuals.

S. 4. *The Modified Nominalism of Rāmānuja.*

Rāmānuja holds almost the same view as the Jaina, as regards the universal. According to him, there is no other universal (*jāti*) than a configuration or arrangement of parts (*saṃsthāna*) among the individuals; but there is a likeness in the configurations of individuals. In individual objects there are points of likeness, but not a universal classs-essence (*jāti*). Rāmānuja entirely denies the existence of a class-essence, but he admits the existence of fundamental likeness or close resemblance (*sausādṛśya*)? What is fundamental likeness (*sausādṛśya*)? That property of the object which is the unconditional and invariable condition of the use of the word 'much alike' (*susadṛśa*) is fundamental likeness (*sausādṛśya*). If likeness is not a property of an object, it is no likeness at all. If it exists as a property in another object, then it leads to *regressus ad infinitum.* Therefore, there is no class-essence in individuals, but only a likeness or similarity among certain individuals. And even among these individuals not a single quality is found to belong to all the individuals of a class (e. g., cows). How, then, can we define fundamental likeness (*sausādṛśya*) among them? Rāmānuja holds that the individual members of a class are not found to possess a definite quality in common, but they resemble one another in the greatest number of qualities (*pauṣkalya*). This doctrine reminds us of Mill's doctrine of Natural Kinds, according to which, the members of the same class have the greatest number of resemblances among them, and differ from the members of a different class in the largest number of points. Rāmānuja further urges that there is not only no identity of class-essence among the different individuals of a class, but there is not even an identity of name among them. Rāmānuja goes further than Hume and Mill, when he holds that even the name is not general among the individuals of a class. When we say 'cow', we mean different cows in different times and spaces. A is like B; B is like C; C is like D. Thus there is not a *single likeness* among A, B, C and D; but there are different *likenessess,* because the correlative terms differ in each case. Rāmānuja, thus, is an advocate of thorough-going nominalism. But he does not go to the length of saying that there is no likeness at all among the specific iddividuals, which are absolutely different from one another. Thus the Buddhists are the most uncompromising nominalists. Rāmānuja is a bit less uncompromising, and the Jaina is still less so. If the Buddhists be regarded as typical exponents of thorough-going nominalism, the Jaina and Rāmānuja both may be regarded as advocates of modified nominalism.

Rāmānuja holds that at the stage of indeterminate perception i. e., the perception of the first individual of a class we perceive a particular arrangement or configuration of parts (*samsthāna*) which is the distinctive character of the whole class, but we do not recognise it to be the common character of all the individuals belonging to the class, for at that time we have not yet perceived any other individual. Thus, even in indeterminate perception the universal character of an object is known, but not *as* universal; for according to Rāmānuja, there is no other universal than a particular collocation or arrangement of parts, which is common to all the individuals of a class, and this class-character in the form of a particular collocation of parts (*saṃsthāna-rūpa jātyādi*) is as much an object of sense-perception as the individual object (*piṇḍa*) itself, and moreover, the individual which has a particular collocation of parts can never be perceived apart from the particular arrangement of parts. Hence, according to Rāmānuja, both universality (in the form of likeness or a particular configuration of parts) and individuality enter into the indeterminate perception of an object, but the universality or common character is not recognised to be the common character of all the individuals belonging to the class.

The common character is known to be common only at the stage of determinate perception or the perception of the second, the third and the subsequent individuals.

तत्र प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणे गोत्वादेरनुवृत्ताकारता न प्रतीयते, द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणेष्वानुवृत्ति प्रतीतिः । …प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणस्य निर्विकल्पत्वं न पुनः संस्थानरूपजात्यादेर ग्रहणात् ।

संस्थानरूपजात्यादेरपि ऐन्द्रियकत्वाविशेषात् । *Sribāhṣya*, 1.1.1.

The Activity of the self.

BY RASVIHARY DAS.

There cannot be any rational doubt about the existence of the self. It is also beyond doubt that the self is conscious. The question whether the self is always conscious or suffers sometimes from unconsciousness, and, if it does so, whether the self ceases to be a self when it is unconscious, may not admit of an answer which will be universally accepted. But the fact that the self is there and if anything is ever to be conscious it must be the self which is so seems to admit of no serious doubt. The whole being of the self, however, does not seem to come out in the simple fact that it is conscious. The self, which each one of us knows in himself and which seems to be required by the validity of moral consciousness, is not a self of which mere consciousness is the only predicable characteristic. We feel ourselves to be active as certainly as we feel ourselves to be conscious. Not only do we *know* but we are always *doing* something or other. We engage ourselves in actions which are intelligible only on the supposition that we are active in them. We cannot conceive of any act in which no one is active, and undoubtedly there are acts whose activity (i. e. the activity implied in them) is referred only to ourselves.

Some people think that knowing itself is an activity. If it be so, then the fact that we know would itself establish the fact that we are active. We do not however think that knowing is identical with or is a form of, being active. Activity may be implied in some of our knowledge of things. But knowledge itself is not so much an act as a fact. The fact of being conscious can never be translated adequately in terms of activity. The knowledge of a particular object may require various activities on our part. We may have to give our special attention, put ourselves in a suitable position and make ourselves active in some other ways. But when the knowledge comes or happens, it does so as a flash. We at once become conscious and in merely being conscious we do not find ourselves in an act. An act is always a process, but knowledge as such is not a process. There may be a conscious process. i. e. a process pervaded by consciousness, but consciousness itself is not a process. A process may terminate in a new knowledge but the knowledge itself will not be a further process. 'An act of knowledge' is a current phrase in philosophical literature, but, strictly speaking, it denotes nothing more that the fact of knowing. But although we are not *proved* to be active merely by the fact that we know, we cannot yet deny that we are really active.

But what is it exactly that we mean when we ssy that we are active? I do not think that activity can strictly be defined. It is a primary experience, and if one has no sense of activity, we shall not be able to convey an adequate idea of activity to him by words, gestures or any other symbols. Still we may name or describe certain experiences in which activity is involved. When 'we seek anything, strive after it, aim at it or intend it', we undoubtedly find that we are active. We are not pure intelligences which have and exercise the sole function of only registering facts. We are not mere disinterested spectators in this drama of life. Our interests centre round many things of the world, and in order to realise these interests, we have to put ourselves constantly in action. To secure the material things of life we have to perform many bodily movements. To produce a work of art we have to undergo activities which are physical as well as mental. Even when we are faced with a difficult speculative problem, we find that the solution of it does not come to us without making us intensely active in thought. In all departments of life we find change and process. And it appears certain that many of these changes and processes originate from us. When I walk, write or think, it cannot be said that nothing in being done. Something is being done; there cannot be any doubt about that. If there is some doing going on, there must be a doer. And in these instances of my walking writing and thinking, I do not find anybody except myself who can be the doer. But what exactly *doing* is can only be immediately perceived and not described in words.

It is at least certain that we begin or initiate many processes which would not otherwise come into being. We may not be the sole and sufficient causes of these processes, but our participation in them must be an important factor in any explanation that may be sought to be given of them. The full explanation for them may not be found exclusively in us, because many other things besides ourselves help to materialise a process which nevertheless is initiated by us. But if we are left out, no consistent account of them will be possible. We give our willing assent and the process begins. But the process does not begin of itself; it has to be started by us, so that the fact becomes indisputably clear that the process would not take place if we did not act in the way we did. By our action we become inextricably involved in the process and have to bear the burden of responsibility for all its consequences. The entire fabric of moral experience rests upon this primary fact. No moral experience would be possible if nobody could be held responsible for any actions in the world. It is because there are acts or processes of change, which are referred to us and are definitely connected with us that we can be moral or inmoral. If no action could be traced back to us, if, that is, there were no connexions between us and any action that happens in the world, we should not be held responsible for the results of any such action. It is because we identify ourselves with our acts that we can quietly accept the praise or the blame that is bestowed on us on account of these acts. In fact no ground for praise or blame would be there if some personality were not definitely connected with some definite acts. If I did nothing,—and if indeed I can do nothing,—why should I be sorry for the result of any action that merely happens in the world ? The fact is that we are not merely the theatres of certain psychical processes which may be supposed to take place in us without our playing any part in their being or doing. The cognitive relation is not the only relation that exists between us and the world of change and process. We do not simply see changes and posit them to be there. But many of them are actually brought about and maintained in being by our activity. It is only when we recognise this and believe that we are right in this recognition that we can rationally endow ourselves with rights and duties. If essentially I can never be active, if nothing can really be done or effected by me, no question can at all arise of my exercising any right or performing any duty. There should be then no morality for me.

We always speak of a moral *agent.* A person, that exercises only the ghostly function of a mere spectator, without being in any other way connected with the things he sees, cannot lay claim to any moral attribute. If he is by nature incapable of adopting any active attitude in thought or action, if things are only done to him and he does nothing, he connot by any means be subjected to any moral criticism. Even when we are criticised for not doing certain things, it is never doubted that it was possible for us to do those things. In fact it is this possibility which gives meaning to and justifies such criticism. It is clear therefore that the validity of our moral consciousness is consonat only with the certainty that activity is one of our essential characteristics. If it remains originally doubtful whether or not we can at all be active, that is, whether or not we can effect anything in the world, we should not on any occasion feel so certain that we have been right or wrong nor should we be so positive in ascribing moral attributes to other. That we are active and that our activity counts in the world are facts which appear to be beyond all question. They appear particularly indisputable to us who have started our metaphysical speculation from the certainty and the validity of moral consciousness.

Yet there have been philosophers who deny that the self can really be active. It is contended on the one hand that no activity can really be found in the self, and, on the other, that the idea of activity, especially as applied to the self, is itself full of contradiction and cannot therefore be true.

Those who maintain that the self cannot directly be found to be active do not necessarily seek to uphold that the self is not really active. It is maintained, e. g. by a writer in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, "that there is no direct consciousness of activity." (Vol. 1, p. 82). But he does not mean to assert that we have no idea of activity or that the idea of activity is a fictitious one. He thinks 'that the conception of activity is a symbolic knowledge founded on a certain complex groups of feelings and presentations.' "There are, of course," he says, "primitive experiences on which these conceptions are based, but the conceptions are built upon them, and not drawn out of them." (Ibid, 81). All that he seems to mean here is that we have no primary consciousness of activity and that by direct observation we do not find any activity experience in us. But to say that activity cannot be found by direct observation is not to say that it is not there. If there are sufficient grounds in the form of some primary experiences on which the idea of activity can be based, and if those experiences belong to ourselves, then we think we cannot be wrong in applying the idea to ourselves. So our main position that the self is active will not be affected even if we grant that by direct observation we do not know ourselves to be active. For to be active is not the same thing as to be known directly as active; and if we deny the latter, we do not thereby necessarily deny the former. But although the admission that the self is not directly perceived to be active may not seriously affect our main position, the admission is likely to create a presumption against it, inasmuch as in our defence of the view that the self is active, we have mainly supported ourselves on the direct evidence of consciousness which testifies to the activity of the self. We are not directly interested just now to ascertain the manner in which the self is known to be active; we want only to maintain that the self is really active. How it is known to be so is not very material to our main argument. But as it appears to us that the denial of a direct knowledge of the activity of the self makes it very difficult to ascertain whether the self is really active, we feel obliged to say a few words against the supposition that there are no activity experiences.

That we have an idea of activity, no one will perhaps seriously deny. The problem related to it is, first, whether the idea is built up out of some experiences which are non-active in their nature, or is simply drawn out of an elementary, primitive experience which is incapable of being further analysed into some non-aciive elements. Secondly, we have to ascertain whether the idea, however we may come by it, is really capable of being applied to the self truly. If it is found that the idea of activity is derived from a primitive experience of the self, then in knowing the source of the idea we know whether or not it is applicable to the self. For to have a primitive experience of activity is directly to experience the self being active. We are inclined to the view that we have got a direct experience of activity in ourselves and know thereby that we are active. Let us try to examine the opposite view.

If there is no direct experience of activity, there must be other experiences which, being non-active in their character, are yet able to give rise to the idea of activity in us. If we accept this position, then several hypotheses suggest themselves to us. We may suppose (1) that although activity is not directly perceived, it is reached by inference from some other experiences ; or (2) that it is the sum of such non-active experiences. We may even think (3) that whenever we have some particular experiences, they are of themselves followed by an idea of activity in our mind or (4) that our idea of activity is nothing but a symbolic representation of those experiences. Let us try to explain and examine these alternatives one by one.

(1) Now what is contended by those who deny any primary activity experience in us does not seem to be that we have no knowledge of activity as such. What they seem to deny is the givenness of activity in any direct experience. But if there is no direct apprehension of activity, how do we know that there is any activity at all ? One answer to this question may possibly be that we infer activity from non-active experiences. But can this be a satisfactory answer ? In all inferences what is inferred must already be directly experienced by us. A thing of which we have had no experience whatever cannot be made an object of inference. The antecedent experience of the thing, necessary for its inference, cannot itself be inferential; for that would necessitate some other previous experience which must be direct and immediate. So in order to be able to infer activity from other experiences, we must have had some direct experience of activity itself. If we deny all direct experience of

activity, we have also to deny that it can be reached by inference.

(2) We may suppose that what we call activity is only a whose of some particular experiences which are not in themselves active. The whole as such is never given in experience. What is given is some particular experiences and they are constructed into a whole by synthetic imagination.

But if activity were really a whole, it should consist of certain constituents. Activity seems to be a simple idea and it is difficult to find out what may possibly be its constituents. Professor Laird has very ably shown that activity can never be equated to any other experience or group of experiences. (Problems of the Self. Chap. V.) Mere change or transition is no equivalent to activity. The feeling of strain or effort does not give the essence of activity. If there is activity, there will no doubt be change or transition from one state to another, and the activity may be accompanied by a feeling of strain or effort. But these severally or together never bring out the essence of activity. If we go to experience, we find that we are very often aware of change or transition without knowing that we are active. The feeling of strain or effort only shows how we are affected in being active. But our being active is never identical with our being affected in a particular way. One may suggest other experiences in the place of those we have named here, in order to give us an equivalent of what we understand by activity. But in every case it will be found that the essence of activity can never be given in terms of some other experiences which are themselves not active. When we seek, strive or attempt to accomplish anything, a sense of 'doing' inevitably comes to us, and it cannot adequately be translated in terms of non-active sensations or ideas which may accompany this 'doing.' Moreover, our idea of activity, whatever may be its implications and concomitants, appears to be, as we have said, rather simple. And if it is so, it appears improbable that it can ever be made equivalent to a complex of many different feelings and sensations.

(3) if we give up the idea that activity is a complex whole, we can only think that it is a simple notion. If there is also to be no direct experience of it, we have only to suppose that the idea occurs to our mind whenever we have experiences of a certain type, or (4) that we form the idea of activity simply as a representation of those experiences.

Now, the idea of activity may be preceded or accompanied by certain other experiences. But activity cannot be an idea only, for the simple reason that there can be no such thing as a mere idea. The idea must refer to some experience. If the experience to which the idea of activity refers is non-active in its nature, then to think it of as active is simply a mistake or an illusion. But we can mistake one thing for another only when the other thing, for which we mistake the thing before us, is already known to us. If some non-active experience is to be mistaken for activity, it is necessary that we should previously be acquainted with activity. If we have no experience of activity, we cannot possibly commit the mistake of seriously supposing some non-active experience to be active. If our idea of activity is not illusory, then, of course, it will refer to some experience which is really active. Thus it appears highly improbable that non-active experiences should give rise to the idea of activity in our mind.

(4) We may not really commit the mistake of seriously supposing some non-active experiences to be active, but we may consciously use the symbol of activity to represent a class of non-active experiences. But the difficulty in this supposition is that we cannot

think of anything merely as a symbol. The symbolic character of a thing consists in its standing for something else. But the thing itself must *be* something, before it can stand for another. Its being itself cannot be symbolic. Now, if activity is to serve as a symbol, it must itself be something which in its *being* is not symbolic, although it may be so in its *use*. Activity itself does not mean a symbol, it is simply used as a symbol. So it is clear that activity as activity must be something. And what can it possibly be unless we refer it to some direct experience of ours ?

We must have some meaning for activity ; otherwise all our talk about it will reduce itself to mere nonsense. If we do not know what activity means, we cannot significantly assert whether or not there are any activity experiences. It is indisputable that we have got some idea of activity. Our language is full of words and phrases which are significant only on the supposition that we have a notion of activity. The question is whence did we get this idea. It cannot be derived from the phenomena of the external world. There, strictly, we find only succession and change. In the external world one phenomenon is followed by another. We cannot sense any activity out there in things. Merely to undergo change is not to be active. If we cannot draw this idea from the outside world, then it is only possible that we have got it from ourselves, i. e. from our own experience. This seems also warranted by facts. Whenever we are able to do something, we feel a sense of activity. It is only when we have got this idea from ourselves that it becomes possible for us to apply it, rightly or wrongly, to other things as well. But the reverse process is not possible. If this reading of facts is correct, then it appears reasonable that we should admit that there is a direct experience of activity in ourselves. Otherwise it is difficult to account for the idea of activity which we undoubtedly possess.

It is said that activity involves direction or tendency towards an end, and 'some feeling or knowledge of effectuation in the successive phases of the realisation of the end', and these cannot be directly experienced. " It is impossible to see how either a tendency towards an end or the effectiveness of a process on furthering the tendency, can be a direct experience or feeling of the mind. Causality cannot exist in being felt, and causality is an essential feature of activity." (Enc. Vol. I of Rel. & Et.)

All rational activities are no doubt directed towards an end and there must be some direction in all activities. But this is what we think about an activity, and activity may imply all these, but it is not itself all or any of these characteristics. Whenever there is any activity, we may find that it is directed towards something and that it gradually effectuates the end in view. But these are only additional characteristics which our thought formulates and confers upon activity. They have to be grasped by thought and cannot be directly experienced. But activity itself is something to which these determinations of thought are applied, and it can as such be felt or directly apprehended by the mind. No one can pretend that activity itself is a mere determination of thought like 'the tendency towards an end' or 'the gradual effectuation of an end in view.' To introduce the notion of causality in this connexion is to create more confusion. Roughly speaking, it may be admitted that our activities are causes of things; but the meaning of activity is not itself the meaning of causality. To be active may amount to being a cause, but this is so only when we try to understand our activity in relation to something else. Causality is essentially a category of the understanding, and so there cannot be any feeling or direct experience of causality. But this does not show that activity cannot be directly experienced because activity itself does not mean causality.

We may be active and feel ourselves to be so, without taking the further step of relating our activity to something else which would give us the idea of causality. We must distinguish between activity as a direct experience and activity as a term in an explanation. When it is used as a term in an explanation, it may appear to us as a cause. But it is not necessary to have or apply the idea of causality in order to feel or be active. We see therefore no grounds to deny that we have got a direct experience of activity in ourselves.

What we have considered above relates only to a fact of observation. We have tried to ascertain whether it is a fact that the self is not directly perceived to be active. But although the ascertainment of facts is an important business of philosophy, it is not solely concerned with the observation of facts. It has principally to enquire into the rationality of things. Philosophy is concerned more with rational criticism than with mere observation of facts, external or internal. Naturally for philosophy the objections against the activity of the self, based on the alleged facts of observation, are less important than those which are raised on the grounds of reason. When a man says that he does not find any activity in his self, we may think that he has not correctly observed, or has otherwise been misled in his observation. But when he insists that the conception of activity is such that it cannot validly be applied to anything in the world, far less to the self, he makes a more fundamental challange to our belief. Even if we feel that we are active, we must be ready to think that our feeling is an illusion, when it is proved to us that the idea of the self being active is not a consistent idea. In order therefore to validate our belief that the self is active, we have to show that our position does not suffer from those inconsistencies which have been alleged against it on grounds of reason. So let us consider here some of those arguments which seek to prove that the self cannot be active.

The idea of activity certainly implies the idea of change. If I do not change at all, I do not know how I can then be active. But mere change does not mean activity. If I am made to undergo certain changes by some external cause I am not then active but passive. The change which I undergo in being active, must be change which is entirely due to myself. In other words, it is not mere change but self-caused change that brings out the meaning of activity. But have we got really an instance of a purely self-caused change? Nothing seems to change without some cause or another. If a thing could by itself be the sufficient cause of its change, why should the change take place at a time other than the moment of its actual occurrence? Moreover, a change unrelated to any antecedent seems unintelligible. So it appears inevitable that a thing, in order to change, must at least require an occasion to put itself in the process of change. But if the change is brought about by an external occasion, how can it be then self-caused? If in changing I am determined by an outside occasion, I am passive rather than active. Therefore, it may be argued, activity cannot be a self-complete or consistent idea. (Cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Chap. VII.)

Now, although an occasion may be necessary to make us active in a particular direction, the occasion by itself does not account for the series of changes which is supposed to follow upon it. The occasion itself is not sufficient to lead to the changes, but it certainly requires the co-operation of the subject which puts itself in the process of change. It may be inconceivable that a thing should burst forth into activity without reference to any appropriate occcsion or other suitable conditions. But it is just as inconceivable that an occasion by itself should be sufficient to bring about any changes in the world. The self too plays its part. It is never contended that the activity of the self is in no way determined by any other conditions or that it explains itself without referring to anything outside it. It is a thing of common knowledge that our activity is determined by the circumstances in which we have to be active as well as by the object which we seek to realise by our activity. But an admission of these external conditions does never amount to a denial of activity as such. These conditions cannot explain activity away precisely because they leave out of account the part played by the self. The self does play a part, and so long its contribution cannot be shown to be mechanical or to be a passive resultant of external conditions, we have no means of assuring ourselves that the self is not active. It can at most be said that so far as the self is determined by an occasion, it is not active; but as it is not wholly determined by any external condition, it has room enough to be active also.

It cannot be said that the self receives passively and mechanically some influence from an external occasion and as an inevitable effect of such influence, a process of change ensues, of which the self is only a helpless sufferer or a disinterested spectator. We find, on the contrary, that, whenever there is a genuine instance of activity, the self takes note of all relevant conditions and determines itself to act. A conscious subject cannot be made to act quite in the same way as a piece of stone is made to move. We do not consider here whether the self is at all free to act. The will of a person may be as thoroughly determined as you please by his heredity and education; but the fact that he does will cannot be gainsaid. And what are heredity and education? They are also part of himself. He may find it inevitable under certain circumstances to be active. But even then it is not absolutely necessary that he should will the action, give his ready consent to the accomplishment of the act and actively work for it. The opposite alternative of his remaining absolutely idle, taking no part in the action, seems always possible. The fact that he, constituted as he is, cannot help acting in the way he does, can never mean that he does not act,

But our troubles do not end here. It has been argued that the self cannot be active if it is a simple unity, and it cannot, also, be active even if it includes variety within it. And as the self either has or has not got variety, in either case it cannot be active. Activity involves change and change means the introduction of some difference. But an absolutely simple substance seems incapable of providing any room for internal differentiation. So it is evident that the self cannot be active if it is a simple unity. If the self includes variety, then too it cannot be active. For the parts changing, i. e. appearing and disappearing, cannot be included in that which is active throughout the process and in order to be the subject of an activity, a thing must remain the same throughout the act. (Cf. Bradley, Ibid.)

The same objection may be urged from a slightly different point of view. If I am to be active, it may be urged, I must change before I can act. If I remain absolutely the same, I cannot be said to be active rather than inactive. In order to be able to initiate an action, I must have already undergone some change. But if I have already changed, how is it to be ascertained that it is the same I who am active ?

The question has ultimately to be asked as to whether the idea of change is not compatible with our idea of the self. It is said that the self cannot change. In order to know that there has been some change, the knowing subject must remain self-identical throughout the process of change. If the witnessing subject were itself to change, then there would be no consciousness of change. If the self which noticed the earlier state of a thing, is not the very same self which now sees its present state, then it is impossible to know by direct experience whether there has been any change at all. So it is contended that all changes are intelligible only on the basis of the unchanging self which witnesses them.

But the question is whether the idea of change is a valid idea. If we find it possible to conceive change, we should not find it more difficult to think of the self as active or changing. Change itself implies that the thing changing should remain the same and also become different at the same time. If a thing is simply replaced by another utterly different from it, we do not get an instance of change. The thing must somehow remain the same and also become different. This appears inconceivable to those who hold fast to the logic of bare identity.

Those who think that identity is bare identity, and difference is simple difference, will find it very difficult to give a satisfactory account of any concrete fact of experience. Change appears to be an obvious fact of experience, and for its interpretation we require the notion of identity in difference. This notion supplies us with a key to the solution of all difficulties created by the logic of abstract identity.

We do not find an instance of bare identity anywhere in the world. An undifferentiated self-identical bare unity seems to be a fiction. All unities, that are to be met with in experience, are unities of diverse elements. We find identities realised only in the midst of differences. If we are to find out any way out of our difficulties, we must be in earnest with this fruitful notion of identity in difference. Once we realise that it is possible for a thing to retain its identity even when it passes through different states or becomes the subject of different predicates, the difficulties of activity and change in connexion with the self will cease to be insuperable.

It appears certain that all our knowledge is not of the form 'A is A'. We say 'A is X' and very often, 'A is X and

Y'. If we take the familiar instance of a ball, we say 'it is hard and round'. We do not mean that one part of the ball is hard and another part round. But we mean that the whole ball is round and the whole ball is hard. Evidently hardness is not the same thing as roundness. But their difference is transcended and not annulled in the unity of the ball. Can we think of anything which can by no means be made the subject of two different predicates ? It seems impossible that we shall ever find out any such entity in the world. Now if a thing is always capable of becoming the subject of two different predicates, it is certain that differences can always be accommodated within a unity.

One may object to the phrase 'identity in difference' as being rather paradoxical. But the fact that is sought to be expressed by this phrase can scarcely be denied. It may even be admitted that a thing is not identical in the sense in which it is different. But it has to be recognised that the identity of the thing,—its nature, whatever it may be,—is always made up or constituted by some differences which are not allowed to fall asunder, but are held together by the unified idea of the thing itself.

If we are in no case willing to admit any unified differences, we shall have to be left with only simple unities. But of such unities, no predication is possible, since any predication is bound to destroy their utter simplicity and introduce some difference. We cannot think of them and have no right to assert that they exist.

In any case we have to admit that the world at this moment is not what it was some time back. Static sameness never appears to be the rule of being in the world. But if things now are different from what they were before, we have to think either that they themselves have become different or that they have gone out of existence and have been replaced by other new things. The second alternative requires us to believe in the momentariness of all existence and involves us in many serious difficulties. If we believe in it, we have to suppose that absolutely new things are arising every moment on the grave of old things. What we ordinarily believe to be a single object, persisting in time, is, according to this supposition, a series of objects, appearing and disappearing in quick succession. But it is difficult to conceive how an entirely new object can arise out of the vacuity of nothingness left by the disappearance of its predecessor. And since this state of vacuity is equally available everywhere on the disappearance of any object whatever, there is no reason why a particular thing should appear at a particular time and place. The pencil now in my hand may, with as much reason, give place to another pencil, very similar to itself, as to a monster. But since this is never the case, we cannot but believe that there are no complete breaks in the being of things. So when we become aware of any difference in anything in the world, we cannot necessarily suppose that the previous thing has completely disappeared, yielding place to a new one. We may rather think that the thing itself has become different. But in order to become different, the thing must be there. Now if we are constrained to think that it remains there while becoming different, we are in other words admitting the possibility of change. If we do not believe in atomic series, in breaks and jumps in the being of things, we must perforce admit that there is such a thing as continuity of existence. But to be continuous is to own at least the predicates of two different instants. This requires a unity of different states. If these things are not only possible but positively demanded by the facts of experience, there should not be any special difficulty in understanding the nature of the self as active.

The difficulties of the self being active are ultimately the difficulties of the conception of 'identity in difference'. Abstractly considered, what is self-identical is not of course different. The idea of identity seems opposed to the idea of difference. But in any concrete thing, there is an element, which is self-identical with itself, along with others which are different from one another. In such a case we may legitimately make use of the conception of identity in difference in order to express our idea of the thing.

The self has undoubtedly an element in it which remains ever identical with itself. As witnessing subject, the self never undergoes any change. No difference is ever introduced in its pure subjectivity. But the self is not simply the pure subject. There are obvious differences in its various states which are also owned and recognised by it. The self is constituted by various elements, some of which are persistent and remain identical, while others are changing. The name self is not given merely to the self-identical element (which may very well be inactive), or to the changing elements as divorced from the basis of identity ; but it is applied to the changing elements as unified with the self-identical element. As the basis of identity is never lost, the self can become conscious of differences in itself and in others. As different elements come to be unified with it and the self is understood to be a self only as thus identified with them, there are obvious differences within itself. In this way we find room for identity in difference in the life of the self ; and so the idea of the self being active does no longer present to us any insuperable difficulty.

A Neglected School of Vedanta

(OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJNANABHIKSU.).

UMESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE.

II.

3. *Concept of Brahma.*

Apart from the introduction of the idea of *prakṛti*, Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of Vedānta differs from other interpretations in some other important essentials also. The central concept of the whole of Vedānta is undoubtedly that of Brahma. With regard to this concept also Vijñānabhikṣu's position is different from that of other schools in many important details.

In Vedānta sūtra iii. 2, the question is mooted whether Brahma is one or two, i. e., as Sañkara points out, whether He is qualified (**सविशेष**) or unqualified (**निर्विशेष**). Śañkara's conclusion in this connexion, as might have been anticipated, is that there is only one Brahma and He is of one homogeneous nature and without any modification :

‘ **निर्विकल्पैकलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म नोभयलिङ्गं विपरीतलिङ्गं च**”—
iii. 2. 21.

It is needless to add that other views have been held on the subject. Śañkara denies the reality of the external world and also of the individual ; so, his characterisation of Brahma cannot be accepted by those who ascribe some kind of reality to these two. For instance, Rāmānuja understands these very *sūtras* as saying that Brahma *is* '**उभयलिङ्ग**', i. e., can be characterised as both with and without attributes (*sub* iii. 2. 25). And the relation between Brahma and the world like that between Brahma and the individual is, that of substance (विशेष्य) and attribute (विशेषण). (See under *sūtra* iii. 2. 25).

Vijñānabhikṣu occupies a peculiarly third position with reference to this question. In V-S. iii. 2. 11, &c., his view is very much akin to that of Śañkara. Brahma is without any attributes; he is always the same and undergoes no modification:

"परमात्मन: स्थानतोऽपि उपाधितोऽपि न उभयलिङ्गं एकरूपत्वमेव ।"

That Brahma has a form and that he enters upon a career of sportiveness (लीला), is only an unjustifiable conclusion of modern men:

"परमेश्वरस्य लीलाविग्रहकल्पना माधुनिकानामपसिद्धान्त:" &c.
——iii. 2. 14.

In view of the fact that in *sūtra* ii. 1. 33., the creative activity of Brahma is explicitly compared to men's sportful activity which is spontaneous but purposeless, Vijñānabhikṣu's denunciation of the concept of *līlā* here seems to refer to the Vaiṣñava conception of incarnation and the activities of the incarnate deity which are so profusely described in the *purāñas* like the Bhāgavata.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, Brahma is so devoid of attributes that even the attribute of '*ānanda*' or bliss cannot belong to him.

"ब्रह्मण आनन्द-स्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगम आधुनिकानामपसिद्धान्त एव"—
iii. 2. 16.

Vijñānabhikṣu elaborates this position more fully under i. 1. 2., where among other things he refers to the arguments suggested in Sāñkhya sūtra v. 66.: नैकस्यानन्दचिद्रुपत्वे द्वयोर्भेदात् । There it is said that the same thing cannot be both consciousness (चिद्रूप) and at the same time blissful (आनन्दरूप).

Pleasure and pain, happiness and its opposite, are changing conditions which are impossible of a being that is pure *cit.*

What, then, will become of V-S. i. 1. 12. and of the numerous *śruti* texts which apparently ascribe the attribute of bliss to Brahma? So far as the *śrutis* are concerned, Vijñānabhikṣu's position is that of Sāñkhya-sūtra v. 67. The ascription of bliss to Brahma is only indirect—figurative—and negatively true: दुःखनिवृत्तेर्गौणः—।

That is, Brahma is **आनन्दमय** or blissful in the sense that there is no pain in him. *Positive* pleasure he does not experience, for such experience would imply a changefulness of consciousness which cannot be his. But just as there is no positive experience of pleasure, so there is neither any positive experience of pain in Brahma. His is a pure neutral consciousness: so far as absence of pain may be said to be pleasure, Brahma has it, but not what is usually meant by pleasure. As Vijñānabhikṣu says under V.-S. iii. 2. 16.:

"ये तु केचिदाधुनिका दुःखविरुद्धत्वमेवात्मनः सुखत्वमाहुस्तन्मतं न दूष्यते परमप्रियत्वेनात्मनो दुःखविरुद्धत्वस्यास्माभिरप्यङ्गीकारात्।"

With regard to V.-S. i. 1. 12 (*q.v.*), Vijñānabhikṣu holds that there is a sense in which Brahma is blissful. Just as the sky as the container of living beings may be said to posssess life, so in that sense Brahma also may be said to possess bliss. And like his other attributes (such as '*satya-sankalpa*' &c.) the attribute of blissfulness also is only figurative and is intended to help worship and meditation and must not be understood as describing his essential nature.

In this connection, Vijñānabhikṣu quotes V-S. iii. 3. 11 & 12. Sutra iii. 3. 11. reads: "**आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य** Sankara explains this to mean that the attributes of bliss, &c. belong to the *chief* (**प्रधान**) by which he means Brahma. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, on the authority of Amarakoṣa, takes the word 'pradhāna' in the technical sense given to it by Sāñkhya as equivalent to *prakṛti,* and explains the *sūtra* to mean that the attributes of bliss, &c., belong to *prakṛti.* Under *sūtra* iii. 3. 12., he re-iterates this dictum and refers to i. 1. 12., where, though only in a limited sense, he has ascribed 'ānanda' to Brahma. This apparent contradiction, he says, he reconciles under iii. 3. 14. This *sūtra,* though somewhat differently explained by others, means, according to Vijñānabhikṣu that the ascription of attributes to Brahma is intended only to assist meditation. (आध्यानाय)

Though Brahma is one and without attributes, still under i. 1. 2., Vijñānabhikṣu advocates the conception of a duality of Brahma—पर (ultimate) and अपर (penultimate). And in support of this conception, he refers to *sūtras* iv. 3. 12. & iv. 3. 9. and also to some *śruti* texts. According to him, *para* or *mukhya* Brahma, i. e. Brahma in the strictest sense of the term, is of course one; but next to him and created by him is *Hiraṇyagarbha*; and to this also in an indirect sense the term Brahma is applied;

"हिरण्यगर्भे त्वपरब्रह्मणि ब्रह्मात्मन्यूनशक्तितया तदव्यवहित-कार्य्यत्वादिना ब्रह्मशब्दो गौण इति वक्ष्यति 'सामीप्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेश' इति सूत्रेण।'

The *sūtra* referred to here is iv. 3. 9. A glance at that section of the *sūtras* and the almost unanimous interpretation put upon them by the different commentators, shows that the conception of *para* or *kāraṇa* Brahma and that of *apara* or *kāryya* Brahma were both part of the orthodox Vedanta theory. The only difference in this connection between one school and another lies in the degree of reality ascribed to the *apara* Brahma or created souls from Hiraṇyagarbha downwards. It is also generally agreed that the creation or evolution or emanation—whichever way the process may be conceived—of the world, takes place, not straight from

Brahma, but through the mediation of another personal being usually called Hiraṇyagarbha; and it is further agreed that to this secondary cause also the appellation Brahma is applicable. But Vijñānabhikṣu. contends that this Hiraṇyagarbha along with other innumerable finite souls is a *jīva* and, therefore, belongs to the same category as souls of men. And if the name Brahma is applied to him, it must be in a secondary sense as in the case of man. Some *modern* thinkers, no doubt, consider *jīva* and Brahma as indivisible and contend that the term Brahma is applied to both in the same primary sense; but this, according to Vijñānabhikṣu is of course *not* true. The application of the term Brahma to *jīva* is justified only by the fact that there is a sameness of character belonging to them as part and whole (अंशांशभेदाद् &c.).

We find, then, that on the one hand it is contended that Brahma is altogether without attributes which always imply some limitation; on the other hand, we have the conception of secondary Brahma or Brahma with limiting attributes. So far as his conception of Brahma is concerned, Vijñānabhikṣu is not very different from Sāñkara. But it is perhaps better to describe his position with regard to Brahma at that of Sāñkhya with reference to Puruṣa in general.

As to the secondary or *Gauṇa* Brahma, Vijñānabhikṣu unlike Sāñkara, would not say that it is unreal, but would only say that it is not Brahma properly so-called. To the *jīvas*, the term Brahma is applied in this indirect sense, for, though they are distinct from Brahma yet they partake in his nature —are one with him in nature and kind. (See under i. 1. 2.).

Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of Brahma is indicated in the very first stanza of his salutation to Brahma with which he begins his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras. Brahma is saluted there as: चिदचिच्छक्तये तस्मै नमश्चिन्मात्ररूपिणे । *Cit* and *acit*—the conscious and the unconscious, spirit and matter—are but his powers: shall we say *attributes*, in the language of Spinoza?—Brahma himself is only *cit*—pure consciousness and nothing but consciousness.

4. *Brahma as Creator*.

If Brahma is absolutely free from attributes, how does he create? The Sāñkhya-sūtras object to a God just because of this difficulty. If there be a God, He must create; for, if He does not create, He had better not exist at all: no one would have such a God. But if He creates, He must desire; and if He desires, He feels want, and, therefore, is limited. And, if He is a limited Being, He is not a God. Now, either He creates, or He does not create; in either case, however, we find that He is not a God. So, He does not exist; or according to Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation, cannot be shown to exist (S-S.. i. 92-94). This is apparently the objection that is anticipated and refuted in Vedānta-sūtra ii. 1. 32-33. Here the proposition laid down is that Brahma does create not because he has wants to satisfy, but because of sheer sportfulness. Vijñānabhikṣu goes further and warns us that though in the case of man even in sport some kind of motive may be present in the subconscious region of mind, in the case of Brahma even this must not be assumed. His creative effort is pure sport and no purpose.

The effect of the ultimate cause being eternal, an effort necessary to make manifest the result (of his activity), is always there. God, therefore, has a body in the sense of a support or basis for his self-manifesting activity, and not a body with sense-organs:

"...ईश्वरस्येन्द्रियाश्रयलक्षणमेव शरीरं नास्ति न तु चेष्टाश्रयरूपमपि" ।—

Vijñānabhikṣu refers to Vyāsa-bhāsya on Patañjali where the view has been advocated that God creates out of compassion for the created. Compassion for the devotee is an end—and a very natural end for the activity of those who have nothing else to strive for. Vijñānabhikṣu understands Vyāsa to mean this and he does not openly contest this view. For an all perfect creator who can have no wants to satisfy, compassion for the world of beings to be created has been regarded as a legitimate and the only possible motive.

In the created world, some are happy, some unhappy. Does not this imply that God is partial? The almost unanimous answer to this question in Hindu thought is that man's joys and sorrows are determined by his *karma* and that the creator only metes out to each what he has deserved. In fact, he only gives effect to the inexorable and inviolable law of *karma*. This is the view advocated in V-S. ii. 1. 34. *et seq*. And Vijñānabhikṣu acquiesces in this view.

The theory that souls are born in different stations in life according to their accumulated *karma*, grants a permanency to the souls which militates against the absolutism of Sāñkara. But so far as Vijñānabhikṣu is concerned, it is in perfect tune with his doctrine of permanency and plurality of souls. The souls according to him are uncreated and eternal. They exist even before creation :

सृष्टेः प्रागपि ईश्वराधिष्ठेयो जीवोऽस्तीति (under i, 1. 2.)

And so is *prakṛti* also co-eternal with Brahma—being his creative power or body, as it were. So creative activity of Brahma only means the unfolding of the manifold elements of the world. In other words, Brahma as creator is only the force that starts the first disturbance of the equilibrium of *prakṛti*. Once this is done, *prakṛti* unfolds itself in the manifold of the world as Sāñkhya has explained it.

Brahma does not bring the world into existence out of nothing. On the contrary, the world as *prakṛti* is always there : ("अव्यक्तरूपेण जगन्नित्यमेव" *sub* i. 1. 2.). So the creative process only means an unfolding—shall we say *evolution*?

Nothing comes from outside—nothing is added : it is very much like a folded picture being unfolded. And the reverse process of dissolution is like the folding up of an unfolded picture. As a cause, Brahma is not exactly a kinetic agent—but is rather the 'अधिष्ठान'—the *substance* in which the *purusas* and *prakṛti* inhere as *attributes* and undergo modifications or evolve their *modes*.

The mode of creation is almost the same as given in the Sāñkhya : but there is this difference : according to Sāñkhya, at the beginning of creation *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* come together being drawn by their mutual attraction, but according to Vijñānabhikṣu, they are *brought* together by the supreme soul or Iśvara or Brahma. Says he :

"अस्मिंश्च शास्त्रे सृष्टिप्रक्रिया महदादिक्रमेण सांख्ययोगयोरिव वक्ष्यते......। विशेषस्त्वत्रोच्यते, प्रकृतिस्वातन्त्र्यवादिभ्यां सांख्ययोगिभ्यां पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता प्रकृतिः स्वयमेव पुरुषेण आद्यजीवेन संयुज्यते...अयस्कान्तेन लोहवत्। अस्माभिस्तु प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग ईश्वरेण क्रियत इत्यभ्युपगम्यते।" under i. 1. 2.

The elements out of which Brahma creates the world are *puruṣa* and *prakṛti.* These are in Brahma even before creation. So the world is always in Brahma *as an idea* ("इच्छाकृतिवत्"). And what happens on the dissolution of of the world is that these lie dormant again in Brahma : being indestructible, they cannot be destroyed ; but they remain inactive like a 'dead snake' or 'a sleeping man.' In other words, the world is always in Brahma as an *upādhi*—an inherent attribute, distinguishable but not separable from Brahma and in essence identical with Brahma In support of this conception of *upādhi,* Vijñānabhikṣu quotes several texts from *śruti* and the *puraṇas.* (*vide* under i. 1. 4), and contends that without this conception creation cannot be explained ('अन्यथा विश्वनिर्माणानुपपत्तेः'). Brahma is pure consciousness as we have seen before; he is incapable of desire and so cannot create, except through *upādhi*:

नहि चिन्मात्रस्योपाधिद्वारतां विना इच्छादिकं...सम्भवति
under i. 1. 4.

This *upādhi* is twofold : on the one hand, there is *prakṛti* or *māyā*—the creative power of Brahma—something different from the twenty-four *tattvas* but the matrix of them all. On the other hand, there is *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is called कार्य्योपाधि or created *upādhi* as distinguished from Iśvara which is कारणोपाधि or the creating *upādhi*. The *puruṣas* are not really created; but they are tinged with pain and desire and undergo experiences; and it is in this sense, i, e, in so far as, owing to bondage, they are distinct from Brahma; they are कार्य्य or created.

This *prakṛti* which Vijñānabhikṣu is ascribing to Brahma is in reality not different from the principle of the same name in Sāñknya; it, too, is the sum total of the equilibrated *guṇas* and the desire to create arises out of the *sattva* present therein. Brahma is pure, unchanging consciousness; but still he presides over the process of creation, which is a process of *prakṛti*.

Like the finite souls, Brahma also has a twofold body, as it were; and this enables him to supervise the process of *prakṛti*; ('जीववद् परमात्मनोऽपि शरीरद्वयवत्त्वात्'). The eternal consciousness is his subtle (सूक्ष्म) body and the other entities through which he creates constitute his gross (स्थूल) body. And he is a creator only in respect of this second body which undergoes change.

5. *The World.*

The world in reality is nothing but the evolution of *prakṛti* ; and so far as *prakṛti* is real, a degree of reality must be ascribed to the world also. In fact, when we look to the definite propositions laid down in V-S. ii. 2. 28. *et seq.*, we find that the Vedānta was not in favour of absolute acosmism. The world was real—may be in a qualified sense, if Sāñkara's interpretation be correct,—but nevertheless real ; and if Sāñkara's interpretation be not accepted, the reality of the world becomes more definite. No school of Vedānta has ever denied that the Vedānta-sūtras in ii. 2. combat the acosmism of the Buddhists ; and to that extent at any rate the cosmos is *not* unreal for the Vedāntists. And in this view of the world, Sāñkhya and Vedānta agree. Vijñānabhikṣu, therefore, has no difficulty to meet here.

The real difficulty that Vijñānabhikṣu has to counteract, specially against the Śañkara school, lies in the fact that for him the material cause (उपादान कारण) of the world is *prakṛti*, and not Brahma himself as with Sāñkara. Under V-S. ii. 2. 37.. Śankara openly attacks the theory according to which *prakṛti* is the material cause and Īśvara is the efficient cause only :

ईश्वरस्य प्रधानपुरुषयोरधिष्ठातृत्वेन जगत्कारणत्वं नोपपद्यते ।

A co-operation of Brahma and *prakṛti* for the production of the world is inconceivable according to Śankara : the two are so diametrically opposed in character. (We may recollect in this connection the Cartesian difficulty with regard to thought and extension). According to Śañkara, therefore, Brahma is the sole cause of the world—its creator as well as its material.

But as is usual in such cases, these very *sūtras* are explained by Vijñānabhikṣu in an entirely different way. According to him, Brahma is only the efficient cause, and the material out of which the world is evolved is *prakṛti*. So far as the creation of the world is concerned, the difference between Śankara and Vijñānabhikṣu is practically nothing more than this. According to Śañkara, there being nothing else but Brahma, he is both the efficient as well as material cause of the world .But according to Vijñānabhikṣu,the material cause of the world is *prakṛti,* understood, of course, in the sense in which he understands it. This *prakṛti,* as in Sāñkhya, has no beginning and is not evolved out of something else (see under V-S. ii. 3. 9.)

Having determined the stuff of which the world is made, the next question is about the stages of evolution through which the world comes to be what it is. As to these, however, the *sūtras* leave little room for doubt and difference of opinion. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, has a special task to fulfill here ; he has to bring the Vedāntic account of creation in line with the Sāñkhya account. We should remember that so far as the world is concerned, both Sāñkhya and Vedānta have to explain not only the world of matter but also the world of mind. Both systems have to explain these two aspects of the world ; and according to both, there is an order in which the senses and the sense-world come into existence ; and there is a possibility of divergence of views with regard to this order of creation.

The questions that have to be considered in this connection may be expressed as follows :—

(i) In what order do the elements of the world. such as air, water, &c., come into existence, it being assumed that they do not come into beiug all at once ?

(ii) What is the order of the evolution of the corresponding senses ? Do they appear *pari passu* with the elements, or, do they come in between the elements, each following the corresponding element, i. e., the eyes being evolved *after* light but before water, and so on or, do they appear in a reverse order, i.e., the senses first and then the elements ?

(iii) And since the senses and the sense-elements appear in different stages, is it to be concluded that each change is the effect of the preceding stage, i.e., is it to be concluded that *ākāśa* is the cause of *vāyu*, and *vāyu* of *apah*, and so on ?

The answer given by Sāṅkhya to these questions is briefly this :

(a) The elements in the shape of *tanmātras* arise out of *ahamkāra* side by side with the corresponding senses. Of the elements the order is the same as that given by the Vedānta, viz., sky, air, fire, water, and earth.

(b) Since all these are evolutes of *prakṛti* through its change into *ahamkāra*, the question of any other causality does not arise.

But so far as the Vedānta is concerned, the order of the creation of the elements is to be regarded as parallel to that of the senses and yet distinct from it. After all, both the senses and the sense-objects belong to the same plane of existence : they both arise out of Brahma. And as a matter of fact, are not the senses but elemental transformations (भौतिकानि) ? Even if they are not so, the order of the creation of the sense-objects is concomitant with that of the senses. This is how Śaṅkara puts it :

"यदि तावद्भौतिकानि करणानि, ततो भूतोत्पत्ति-प्रलयाभ्यामेवैषामुत्पत्तिप्रलयौ भवत इति नैतयोः क्रमान्तरम् मृग्यम्... अथ त्वभौतिकानि करणानि तथापि भूतोत्पत्तिक्रमो न करणैर्विशेष्यते प्रथमं करणान्युत्पद्यन्ते चरमं भूतानि, प्रथमं वा भूतान्युत्पद्यन्ते चरमं वा करणानीति ॥" V.S. ii. 3. 15.

In the second place, this question of priority does not affect the Vedānta ; because, all these come out of Brahma and no one change can bring about the next change without the direct intervention of Brahma. That is, water can give rise to earth only because Brahma as the cause acts through it (Cf. Baladeva's *bhāṣya, loc, cit*).

Vijñānabhikṣu's view of the processes of creation must necessarily be an attempt to synthesise these two divergent attitudes. So far as the general causality of Brahma is concerned, he has nothing to refute; for, he also holds that Brahma is the general presiding agency even over the secondary causes, such as air, earth, &c.

"यथोक्तमाकाशादि-भूतपंचकम् स एव परमेश्वर एवान्तर्यामिरूपेण प्रविश्य शक्ति-शक्तिमन्न्यायेन देहदेहिवदविभागेन कार्य्य-कारणाविभागेन च स्थितः ।"— under V.-S. ii. 3. 13.

But the creation of the senses and sense-objects and the relation between these two orders of creation is a matter of some moment to a Sāñkhyist. He cannot derive them both straight from Prakṛti, The grosser elements, according to him, must arise out of purer and subtler elemenss (the *tanmātras*).

In addition to this, Vijñānabhikṣu seeks to reconcile the Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms (अणु,) with the Sāñkhya theory of *tanmātras* and both these again with the Vedāntic theory of creation out of Brahma. His belief in atoms is significant.

We may note here that, according to Śañkara, V-S. ii. 2. 12. *et seq*. refute the Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms. But with Vijñānabhikṣu these *sūtras* do not mean the same thing. As in the case of the Sāñkhya concept of *prakṛti*, so here also he contends that Vedānta did not intend to deny the existence of atoms altogether but it only denied the independent causality of them—("स्वतन्त्राणु-कारणतावादम्...प्रतिषेधति"—ii. 2. 12). He even refers to Śañkara and others who give a different interpretation to these *śūtras* as *moderns* ('आधुनिकाः'—ii. 2. 13) and considers their interpretation as *untenable* ('असत्').

Under V-S. ii. 4. 13., he gives his view about the process of creation of the world and regards it as consonant with all the *śrutis* and *smṛitis* and also with Sāñkhya and Yoga. It is as follows.

First *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are brought together by Īśvara and *mahat* is generated This gives rise first to *prāṇa* and then to *buddhi*. Then comes *ahamkāra* which is after all but a function or state ("वृत्तिविशेष") of inner consciousness ("अन्तःकरण"), just as a tree is but an expression and unfolding of the seed. Next we have in the same manner *manas* and the senses (इन्द्रियाणि). Then come the five *tanmātras* corresponding to the five senses; but they are neither the causes nor the effects of the senses. These give rise to the atoms of the grosser elements ("स्थूल-महाभूतपरमाणवः". Then arise the grosser elements, such as the sky, air, etc., in the order indicated in the Chāndogya and Taittirīya Upaniṣads. Then we have the triple combination ('त्रिवृत्-करणम्') of the elements as described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, vi., which yields us the visible world.

The world of matter being thus explained and the mind-stuff, so to say, being also there, the origin of living organisms offers little difficulty to the Vedantist and this question provokes no divergence of opinion. In an organism, the mind stuff and the matter stuff, as explained above, blend together and make a whole which functions as a whole and we have sensuous life. Organic life further involves the principle of individuation. All organisms do not have the same life—they do not come into existence at the same time, their growth is not synchronous, nor do they die all at once. Although they have the same *basic* principle of existence, yet they are different in form and name.

This differentiation into individual organisms and the transformation of the elements like earth and water into living matter, viz., flesh and blood, which compose the body, is a fact of importance; but the process is indicated more or less fully in *śruti* and appears to offer little difficulty to the Vedāntist. The whole question is considered and answered in V-S. ii. 4. 14-22. The element of earth taken as food is partly transformed into flesh and part of it goes out of the system as excrement and part of it again gives rise to and nourishes the mind. So is the case with water drunk which also supplies some of the constituents of the body and partly goes out of it. And so on with the other elements. The *śruti* cited in this connection is usually Ch. Up. vi. 5.

The Hindu philosopher's conception of the world is not complete without an account of the process of its dissolution. The world, like the individual, has birth as well as death. It is not brought into existence once for all ; it suffers periodical dissolution and is brought forth again and again. This idea of dissolution (प्रलय) in a general way is shared by Vedānta with the other systems. That the order of this dissolution will be the reverse of that of genesis, could perhaps be inferred ; but lest there be any misgiving on the point, it also is explicitly stated in V S. ii. 3. 14. Vijñānabhikṣu cannot depart from this general principle ; but as his order of creation is somewhat different from that given by others, the dissolution also, according to him is the reverse of the process of creation as *he* has explained it.

6. *Samsāra and Mukti.*

The world according to Hindu philosophers is not merely the states and processes of nature that we see around us : it is not merely the display of organic and inorganic functions and the appearance and disappearance of living forms on the stage of dead matter. The world, according to him, also includes the *samsāra* or migration of the individual soul. The nature of this migration from one body to another, has, therefore, to be considered in any theory of the world. The Vedānta also has to do the same—perhaps in Vedānta this question receives more attention than in the other orthodox systems. But among the schools of Vedānta this question produces very little difference of opinion. This is partly due to the fact that the *śruti* texts which discuss this question are very clear and explicit and leave no room for divergence of views.

The Vedānta sūtras which discuss this question of *samsāra* are found in chapter iii. 1. When the soul migrates, so we are told, it carries along with it not only the senses in their latent form but also a corporeal frame, so to say, composed of subtle elemental substance. This corporeal frame includes potentially all the elements that are there in the grosser organism, that is to say, in the world. At death, only the grosser body and the senses in their actual, functional stage are left behind. But a subtle body with the potentiality of the senses encircle the soul in its journey to another grosser organism, that is to say, at its re-birth.

It is needless to say that this journey of the soul may be either upwards to a higher plane of existence or downwards to a lower life—it may be either to heaven or to hell—either to a higher organism or to a lower : and the soul may be reborn as a god or as a brute. And this journey is determined by *karma* and *karma* alone. But the soul is not reborn immediately it is dead. Between its death in one organism and birth in another, the soul may have to spend some time in the journey from the one to the other and have some halting places, too. The halting places of the soul in this journey after death till its re-birth are also determined by *karma* and have been described in some detail in the *śrutis* and also in the *sūtras*. There is one point in the Vedāntic theory of this migration which deserves special notice. Usually no doubt the soul after departing from one organism enters another *through* the medium of a parent organism from which this second organism springs. But the Vedāntist believed that the ordinary process of reproduction by which man and the higher animals propagate their species, is not the *only* process by which a new organism may be brought into existence or, which is the same thing,—by which a soul departed from one organism may assume another. The Vedāntists believed the stories of the Purāṇas about the mysterious births of men like Droṇa in the Mahābhārata, which were not dependent on sexual reproduction. Even the popular beliefs on the subject were not unacceptable to them. (*Vide* Sañkara, under V-S. iii. i. 19., etc.). So far about the assumption of a new body by a departed soul.

After the soul has assumed a human body, if not in other cases also, it experiences three important states. viz., dream, dreamless sleep, and waking consciousness. There is a fourth state also, viz., the state of swoon. These states of the soul have attracted considerable attention in Vedānta; but they have not led to any difference of opinion as between the schools and Vijñānabhikṣu has nothing special to say on the question.

7. *Mukti and its Means.*

Having thus considered the *samśāra* of the soul, which constitutes its bondage, we may now pass on the consideration of its *mukti* or salvation, and the means by which this salvation may be obtained.

All Vedāntists agree in holding that *mukti* can be obtained by *vidyā* or knowledge; but they do *not* agree as to whether *karma* is necessary for this *vidyā* or not. Is this knowledge to be regarded as a part of the religion of *karma* and thus governed by its ordinances and regulations (*vidhis*)? Is it dependent on *karma* or independent of it? The schools of Vedānta have differed on this question. Some regard *karma* and *jnāna* as inseparable and interdependent; some regard them as only partially related. Vijñānabhikṣu's position has

111590

been indicated under *sūtras* i. 1. 1-5., iii. 3. 21., iil. 4. 28., and iii. 4. 39., and briefly stated it is as follows :

Any one who desires *mokṣa* may not renounce all *karma* straightaway. Responsibilities of his *varṇa* and *āśrama* must be shouldered by each, until his mind has been trained for the last *āśrama* or *sannyāsa*, at which stage, owing to the absorption of the mind in profound meditation, the need for further *karma* will disappear automatically. The uncompromising attitude of the Śaṅkara school in this matter is condemned by Vijñānabhikṣu in several places :

> "सर्वकर्म्माणि संन्यस्य श्रवणं कुर्य्यादित्याधुनिकानां विधिकल्पनं कुकल्पनमेवेदि द्रष्टव्य"—(i. 1. 1.)

> "सवकर्म्माणि संन्यस्य श्रवणं कुर्य्यादित्यपसिद्धान्तः कल्पित एव"—(*ibid*).

His own view is thus summed up under iii. 4. 28. :

> "उत्पन्नज्ञानेनैव विरक्तेन मुमुक्षुणा योगारूढेन ज्ञाननिष्ठार्थं शमदमादि रक्षायै विक्षेपकानि कर्म्माङ्गानि न्यायतः परित्यज्य समाधिना परवैराग्यपर्य्यन्तं आत्मसाक्षात्कारः कर्त्तव्य इत्येव शास्त्रार्थः ; न पुनरज्ञेनायोगारूढेन वा कर्म्माणि त्याज्यानि, वृथा कर्म्मत्यागे पातित्याद् ।"

The means for *mukti* is meditation ; as an aid to this meditation and to the acquisition of the necessary knowledge, *karma* has to be practised, *until* a stage is reached when meditation has become the normal condition of the soul and *karma* would only divert it from meditation : at this stage naturally *karma* must go, but not before. In order that meditation may become habitual, with the soul, it must be repeated and continuous, if possible. And for steadying the mind in this meditation, certain conditions must be fulfilled : one must resort to a quiet, solitary place, must assume a posture of the body which is favourable to meditation, and so on. Even the consideration of these details assumed the dimension of a serious study in some writers; but philosophers as a rule were not very particular about them. The Sāñkhya rules that any posture of the body that is comfortable and ensures steadiness of contemplation will do ("स्थिरसुखमासनम्" —iii. 34), and the Vedānta repeats the same dictum (iv. i. ii).

This state of *mukti* also has been differently conceived by the different schools of Vedānta; but it is needless to say that Vijñānabhikṣu's view of it is in accord with the Sāñkhya theory on the subject.

The general proposition is conceded by all that *vidyā* leads to *mukti*. But *vidyā* itself is not so easily attained. It implies a tremendous struggle which may have to be prolonged from one birth to another, unless one has a great deal of accumulated good deeds to his credit, in which case the attainment of *vidya* is easier.

True *mukti* can come only after the soul has severed its connection with the body, i.e., after death. A state approaching to *mukti*, however, is possible even in this life to those who have attained true knowledge. The character of this sort of existence has been described in the Gītā and elsewhere; and the Purāṇas give concrete instances of such lives. But still real *mukti* is *vi-deha mukti*, i.e., *mukti* away from the body. One must die in order that one may be truly saved.

After death, again, the soul has to pass through some stages—some stations and schools of probation, as it were, in the spiritual world—before its final and irrevocable liberation. The shackles do not fall without resistance. The senses—the actual and potential taint of matter that has clung to the soul for who knows how many births—will disappear only by slow steps. As Vijñānabhikṣu points out at the end of his commentary:

111 59c

"कार्य्यब्रह्मलोकं प्राप्य तत्रैव भुक्त्वा द्विपरार्द्धान्ते परिपक्वज्ञानः &c."

When, however, all the difficulties have been overcome and the goal is finally reached, what is the nature of that existence? Vijñānabhikṣu is definite that the soul is not merged in Brahma—it is not *lost* in identity with Brahma—but it lives. *Mukti*, no doubt, implies an identity with Brahma; but it is the same sort of identity which the soul has with the derivative attributes of *prakṛti*, while it lives in the body which however, disappear at liberation. These derivatives are different from the soul; yet when the soul functions in the body, they appear to be identical with it—to be its constituent elements, so to speak. Such exactly is the relation between the soul and Brahma when the two live together after the former's liberation from bondage: they seem to be identical without really being so. In fact, *Mukti*, is but going back to the state in which the soul lived before it was born in flesh; that state has already been described. And once the soul has gone back to the original state, it has not to be born again. This is its **परमपुरुषार्थ**—the *summum bonum*.

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